


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Political Affairs

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CONTENTS

25 January 1990

NATIONAL PARTY AND STATE AFFAIRS

Electoral Procedures, Law Examined

- [S.A. Abakyan; *VESTNIK MOSKOVSKOGO UNIVERSITETA: SERIYA 11—PRAVO* No 6, 17 Oct 89] 1
- Democratic Union Assessed as Party [Ye.L. Losoto; *EKONOMICHESKIYE NAUKI* No 11, Nov 89] 7

REPUBLIC PARTY AND STATE AFFAIRS

Azerbaijan Forms NKAO Organizational Group

- [E. Kafarova, R. Kaziyeva; *BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY*, 7 Dec 89] 12

AzSSR Resolution Against Armenian Claims to NKAO

- [E. Kafarova, R. Kaziyeva; *BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY*, 7 Dec 89] 12

Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet Official on Election Preparations

- [L. Syroyegina; *SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA*, 19 Dec 89] 12

People's Deputy Critical of Belorussian Leadership

- [A. Zhuravlyov; *MOSCOW NEWS* No 48, 3-10 Dec 89] 14

Gomel First Secretary on Chernobyl Clean-up

- [A.A. Grakhovskiy; *SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA*, 23 Nov 89] 16

Further Coverage of 9 December Estonian Party Plenum

- Indrek Toome Speech [I. Toome; *SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA*, 10 Dec 89] 18

- Miik Titma Speech [M. Titma; *SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA*, 10 Dec 89] 21

- Revised Estonian SSR Draft Law on Immigration [*SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA*, 16 Dec 89] 22

- Law on Estonian SSR Government [*SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA*, 13 Dec 89] 26

- Estonian SSR Law on Local Government [*SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA*, 19 Nov 89] 31

- Estonian Komsomol During Transition Period [T. Volodina; *MOLODEZH ESTONII*, 15 Dec 89] 37

- Estonian Youth Union Draft Statutes [*MOLODEZH ESTONII*, 14 Dec 89] 39

- Uzbek Supreme Soviet Announces Ministerial Reorganization [*PRAVDA VOSTOKA*, 3 Sep 89] 43

- Uzbek SSR Transport Minister Named [*PRAVDA VOSTOKA*, 10 Sep 89] 44

- Uzbek Highways Minister Appointed [*PRAVDA VOSTOKA*, 10 Sep 89] 44

- Personnel Changes Made At 30 September Uzbek CP Plenum [*PRAVDA VOSTOKA*, 1 Oct 89] 44

NATIONALITY ISSUES

- Ethnic Composition of Industrial Managers Reported [*ARGUMENTY I FAKTY* No 2, 13-19 Jan 90] ... 46

Chairman Explains Armenian Terminology Committee Work on Language Issue

- [O. Bagdasaryan; *KOMMUNIST*, 16 Nov 89] 46

Achievements of Armenian National Movement Session Reviewed

- [S. Arutyunyan; *KOMSOMOLETS*, 16 Nov 89] 48

- 'Vatan' Society Chief on Contacts With Azeris Abroad [Elchin; *KOMMUNIST*, 1 Oct 89] 52

Another Ukrainian Region Affected by Chernobyl

- [V. Skoropadska; *RADYANSKA UKRAYINA*, 16 Nov 89] 54

Worker Questions Democratic Movement of Uzbekistan Goals

- [S. Chinayev; *PRAVDA VOSTOKA*, 2 Dec 89] 56

Uzbek Writers' Union Chief on Uzbek, Azeri People's Movements

- [A. Yagubov; *ADABIYYAT VA INJASANAT*, 27 Oct 89] 57

LAW AND ORDER

Legal Representation for 'Irresponsible' Discussed

- [V. Pankratov; *SOVETSKAYA YUSTITSIYA* No 23, Dec 89] 61

Work of Ukrainian Customs Inspectors Examined

- [A. Kraslyanskyy; *RADYANSKA UKRAYINA*, 26 Nov 89] 63

MEDIA AND JOURNALISM

Roundtable Views Postal Service Role in Media Distribution Problems [N. Demidov, A. Fedotov; PRAVDA, 25 Dec 89]	65
PRAVDA VOSTOKA Editor on Perestroyka in Regional Media [R.A. Safarov; OBSHCHESTVENNYE NAUKI V UZBEKISTANE No 9, Sep 89]	69

HISTORY AND IDEOLOGY

Col Gen Kleymenov on 1939 'Introduction' of Troops into Baltics [A. Kleymenov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 26 Nov 89]	74
Soviet Intelligence Agent Skoblin Rehabilitated [L. Mikhaylov; NEDEL'YA No 48, 27 Nov-3 Dec; No 49, 4-10 Dec; No 50, 11-17 Dec 89]	75

ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS

Chernobyl Organization Formed in Latvia [M. Bombin; ATMODA, 11 Dec 89]	99
Uzbek People's Deputy on Fergana Crisis, Political Issues [A. Khusanov; PRAVDA VOSTOKA, 1 Oct 89]	99
Former, Current Fergana Oblast Officials on Region's Problems [V. Berezovskiy; PRAVDA VOSTOKA, 13 Sep 89]	101

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ISSUES

Legislation Needed for Dealing with Personnel Reductions [O. Khvastunova; KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 23 Dec 89]	105
Social Benefits for Former Camp Inmates [SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA, 20 Dec 89]	106
Youth Attraction to Prostitution Examined [A. Meliksetyan; SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, 17 Dec 89]	106

Electoral Procedures, Law Examined

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UNIVERSITETA: SERIYA 11—PRAVO in Russian No
6, Nov-Dec 89 (signed to press 17 Oct 89) pp 9-19

[Article by S.A. Abakyan, doctor of juridical sciences, professor: "The Election Law in Action: Legislation on Elections—Experience of Application, Questions of Perfection"]

[Text] One of the most important elements in the reform of Soviet society's political system restoration of the soviets as truly popular organs of state power. To this end, basic changes have been introduced into the system of soviets: New elements have been created, such as the congresses of peoples deputies; it is intended to fundamentally restructure the activities of the supreme and local soviets, to expand the list of questions examined and decided only by the organs of power, and to introduce a basis of permanency and professionalism into their work.

A better qualified corps of deputies will be needed to achieve these tasks. And in order to create one, radical changes have been introduced into election laws. Some of these have found expression in the USSR Constitution, which applies to all the soviets, and in the law on elections of USSR peoples deputies, which concerns the "top echelon" of people's representatives. A second stage of the reform of the election system is on the agenda. At the same time, we already have practical experience: the elections of USSR peoples deputies have taken place and in terms of time occupied 6 months (four of planning and two additional ones). This half-year of experience in an election campaign makes it possible to take a look at what happened and then, taking this into account, to look ahead. We are talking, therefore, about a need to analyze the vitality, the correctness of the rules that have been developed in practice on the basis of legislation and about problems of further perfecting this legislation. It is absolutely clear that many of the law's provisions have turned out to be constructive and have permitted a step forward in democratization as a whole as well as in democratization of elections. However, it is also obvious that a number of points, including important, fundamental ones, need to be evaluated from a long-term perspective and with an eye to changing certain rules. This too is discussed in the present article.

1. One question that was raised in the process of the election campaign, and is now being raised, is whether the election of a part of the people's deputies by public organizations is justified? From a juridical point of view, we can see here a violation of the principle of election equality. And one cannot but agree with this: While 1500 delegates from territorial and national-territorial election districts were elected following the principle of "one voter—one vote," then for 750 deputies from public organizations this principle was supplemented by presentation of a second vote to a part of the voters—to those who voted for deputies (candidates) at congresses, conferences, and plenums of the leadership organs of

public organizations. Moreover, both theoretically and practically, some had even more votes, inasmuch as members of several leadership organs (for example, the central committees of the CPSU and the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions and the Komsomol Central Committee, the creative union boards, and the like) participated in the election of a number of deputies. The law's assertion that elections are equal for the participants in the election from public organization, in the sense that they have equal rights at a congress, conference, and plenum, is scant consolation for the overwhelming mass of citizens who do not take part in such elections. Of course, they do have the right to discuss the candidates. This is permitted by law: But, nevertheless, to discuss is not the same thing as to vote.

In our view, we cannot talk about whether or not to preserve the election of deputies from public organizations unless we make an assessment of the prospects of the congress system as a whole. Judging by constitutional norms, the congress was conceived as forum of all deputies, which meets infrequently (once a year); besides electing the Supreme Soviet and the (infrequent) passage of individual laws and programs, it is assigned the function of considering reports on the state of the country and republic and of generally assessing the nation's situation and paths of development. However, the experience of the first Congress of USSR People's Deputies showed that the people's deputies are not very much inclined to limit themselves to such a modest role. Already it is also clear that they are not going to meet once but, rather, twice a year and not for a short but for a rather long time, and that they are going to pass many laws themselves and not assign this function to the Supreme Soviet. Thus, the Congress itself may pretend to the role of a parliament and may not turn this function over almost entirely to the Supreme Soviet, as originally conceived.

Then of course the question arises whether such an enormous parliament can function effectively. It is difficult for it to be capable of work if only because, realistically, more than 2000 deputies are not in a position even to speak at a session. The drive that should be characteristic of compact parliament is lost, as is the efficiency mandated by the standards of the Constitution.

Overall, taking account of the experience of the work of the Congress of People's Deputies and of the Supreme Soviet, it is not excluded that it will be necessary to consider whether or not it is expedient to ensure a continuity in the work of these organs by means of moving toward something united, toward an organ which will assume the functions of them both, to retain only the Supreme Soviet (a majority of the republics are inclined toward this). And then, naturally, it is necessary to resolve the question of whether it is necessary to elect a part of the deputies from public organizations and whether direct elections would not be better.

Now, when the system of elections by public organizations still exists, we should give thought to the clear disproportions in the election campaigns of these and other candidates for deputy. At the nomination stage, the candidates from public organizations, as also from territorial districts, pass through a multitude of filters; they are selected from tens and hundreds. But then, as experience shows, from this total mass, only a few more candidates remain than there are mandates. For example, the women's councils [zhenskoye] had 81 candidates for 75 mandates, the Union of Theater Workers had 12 candidates for 10 mandates respectively, etc. And in a number of organizations the number of candidates was equal to the number of mandates. As regards candidates from districts then, as is known, in 399 of the 1500 districts only one candidate was registered, and there were two or more in each of the remaining ones. Therefore, for these, the campaign was simply exhausting; it was necessary for them to make 30-40 appearances each (some had 100 and more meetings each) and before various audiences. The candidates from public organizations had a average of 2-4 meetings per month, and these were with colleagues, i.e. with audiences which they knew fairly well, and even closely.

How can proportionality be ensured? Of course, not by reducing the volume of work for the candidates from the districts. But as applied to the public organizations, certain measures are expedient. In the first place, let us recall that Article 43 of the law on elections states that: "The number of candidates for deputy included in the election ballot for elections of USSR people's deputies from one or several public organizations should exceed the number of deputy mandates established for these public organizations." This by itself would force all public organizations and their candidates, without exception, to think about competitiveness. In the second place, it should be established that a candidate from a public organization will be guided not only by the overall program which the organization works out, but also will develop his own program and will present it and defend (justify) it to the members of the organization and other citizens; in the last elections, far from all candidates had such programs. In the third place, for the candidate from a public organization, there should be some kind of minimum number of meetings and other events, which would guarantee the rights and interests of regional and primary units of the public organizations. In the fourth place, it is worth thinking about taking quotas away from organizations which meanwhile have not recommended themselves (of the type of the Soviet Association of Teachers and Researchers) or which do not have a clearly expressed political orientation in their work (of the type of the Society of Motion Picture Friends); about making places available to other organizations, especially ones that have been recently established or are being formed (the Union of Lawyers, The Union of Jurists, the Union of Economists, and others); and finally about reducing quotas for a number of organizations where there are not so many real members as there is a good system for collecting "membership" dues (for example, the Red

Cross and Red Crescent Society, DOSAAF, the Society for the Struggle for Sobriety, and others).

2. Practice has shown that there are questions of an organizational character which should be successfully solved at the beginning of an election campaign, inasmuch as what we are talking about is the effectiveness of various measures and evaluation of the legality of the elections as a whole. Of many questions, we will particularly single out two.

One is tied to the establishment of election districts. We earlier paid little attention to how they are formed. In these elections, when the element of competition suddenly forced us to think about the "value" of each voter's ballot, the absence of proportionality in the number of voters by election districts came into sharp focus. It is unclear, for example, why there are only 139,236 voters in the Veshnyakovskiy territorial election district in Moscow and 192,083 in the Kirovskiy district, while there are 374,710 in the Cheremyskinskiy and 379,906 in the Leningradskiy districts, when there is a norm of 257,300 voters per district.

If, for the capital, we tend to speak only about the incomplete development of the apparatus, then for other regions of the country, different judgments are expressed on the same grounds. Thus, USSR Peoples Deputy V.I. Alksnis, at a meeting of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies on 25 May 1989, spoke about crude violation of Article 17 of the election law in the formation of national-territorial districts within the Latvian SSR, where steps were not taken to ensure equal numbers of voters per district; they varied from 28,800 to 127,300 with an average estimated number of 62,000. The deputy asserted that the districts with small numbers were established basically in rural rayons, which ensured a majority of the deputy mandates specifically from these rayons, despite the fact that a majority of the population (71 percent) lives in the cities. This fundamentally restricted the possibilities of the working class, and also the Russian-speaking population of the republic, to be elected USSR people's deputies. It is characteristic, the deputy stressed, that many leading directors of the Latvian People's Front [LPF] received votes and were elected specifically in these districts with small numbers of voters. From this, the deputy concluded that there had possibly been an intentional violation of Article 17 of the law to the benefit of LPF representatives; of 18 members of the LPF дума, 10 were elected from these small districts (IZVESTIYA 17 Mar 89).

In connection with the fact that misunderstandings also exist in other places and are possible in the future, the chairman of the congress's mandate commission proposed that it be established that, in publishing a list of the election districts, the Central Electoral Commission indicate not only the boundaries of the election districts and the locations of the district electoral commissions, but also the number of voters for the given district. Of course this would be an estimated number, and might

not coincide with the final one during the voting, but nevertheless the disparity will not be pronounced.

Another organizational point to which attention should be directed is connected with composition of the election commissions. It has become obvious that, now, the members of the election mission need to be knowledgeable, to have, first of all, juridical knowledge, that they must understand the law. Therefore, we think that it is possible to establish (if only for the all-union and republic level) that members of district election commissions, after these commissions have been formed, should be freed from their principle work (while keeping their salaries) for a certain period in order to obtain the special knowledge that is necessary for effective work within the commission. It should also be stipulated that members of such a commission, in accordance with a plan established by the commission, should be freed from their fundamental work (while keeping their salaries) in order to fulfill their responsibilities within the commission.

3. Practice has shown that competitiveness in elections is based on the standards of law and on the activeness of the voters, their collectives and associations. However, it has become obvious that such activity also demands juridical decisions and the more precise definition of a number of norms.

In the first place, should we make it mandatory to nominate by territorial district, for example, two or more candidates for each mandate? Or is the present neutral norm of the law—"any number of candidates may be included in ballots"—more warranted? When discussing this questions, many proceed from the established practice. And this indicates that the law permits an avoidance of competition, that it makes it possible to retain—and not only by natural means, but also by artificial measures—a single candidate who, moreover, is a representative of the apparatus. In this situation, the voters must demonstrate maximum activeness and must, by their negative votes, express their negative attitude toward the practice of having a single candidate (who is sometimes a person of high merit). However, this is not the whole matter. Another point is also important: We have a need for a kind of stereotyped behavior that would force citizens, sometimes even independently of their personal views, to participate in the reaching of decisions by democratic means. And it has turned out that precisely the presence of two or more candidates on one ballot also makes it possible to influence the personal participation of each person, at the same time awakening his political consciousness. Perhaps, in the beginning, this will only concern his attitude toward the ballot, but even this is not a bad thing.

Therefore, it is obviously worthwhile to think about whether it would not be justified to include a provision in the draft law on elections of USSR people's deputies stipulating that a ballot must include a greater number of candidates than there are mandates. On the all-union and the republic levels, such a norm seems expedient, though with one qualification: not that the total number

of candidates be greater than the total number of deputy positions (indeed this has already been assured), but that for each mandate there be two or more pretenders.

But we are also facing elections to local soviets. And, it is being asked, should such a rule also be introduced here? We suggest that, on this level, we can limit ourselves for the present to the general provisions of the constitutional provision cited above: that any number of candidates may be included in the ballot. It is hardly likely that, within every soviet, competitiveness will lead to the nomination of two or more candidates for each district. In villages and settlements, where people know each other well, they can also do without this. Besides, with the introduction of multi-mandate districts, many will probably take the path of nominating one or two more candidates than there are places, and this is also a natural alternative application of the norm. Thus, for elections to local soviets, it would follow to rely upon the discretion of the voters themselves, and not to aim for obligatory nomination of alternative candidates in all districts.

In the second place, more thorough consideration should be given as to whom we nominate as candidates for deputy. Let us recall that the draft all-union law on elections of USSR people's deputies contained the provision that candidates shall be nominated by labor collectives which, as a rule, have no fewer than 500 workers. This has been ignored and the number of workers has not had any importance for nomination. And there have begun to be nominations which, we think, cannot be termed anything but democratic "backlashes" [perekhlesty]. Proceeding on the basis formal authorization, collectives consisting of 7-11 persons (cooperatives, courts, the procuracy), 15-50 persons (editorial offices of newspapers, journals, food stores, barber shops), 30-40 persons (clinics, schools, professional and technical training institutions), nominated candidates on an equal basis with collectives of plants, institutes, universities, etc., which have numbers of workers ranging from 1500 to 50,000. Moreover, it was fairly rare that small collectives nominated their own workers; more often the nomination campaign aimed at ensuring organizational support for a fellow-townsperson (if the district contained various population points), a local director, a candidate supported by the apparatus, or simply a "good person." And this was not done casually—indeed, later, the nominating collective sent representatives to the district pre-election meeting (okruzhnoye predvybornoye sobraniye—OPS) and gave its candidate its support there.

However, we think that such nomination creates the impression of a lack of seriousness. If a candidate is nominated for a local—for a rayon, village, or rural—soviet, such a nomination is natural. But when we are talking about the Congress of USSR People's Deputies, substantial support is required. And in this case, large, developed collectives evoke more respect than uncoordinated, small ones. In our words, there is no allusion to a scornful attitude toward these collectives. We are

talking about something else: The small collectives should unite and present themselves as a common front in elections of deputies at the next highest level. And it is worth recalling here still one other provision of the draft, also an exclusionary one: Collectives which have less than 500 workers may hold joint meetings for the nomination of candidates for deputy. This rule probably should be included in the law. It gives the power of decision to such collectives, political effectiveness. At the same time, organizationally as well, an equalization of the rights of large and small collectives will be achieved. For the latter, joint nomination will serve as a particular type of conference. Republic election laws have taken experience into account and are establishing the numerical size of the nominating collective, and this is right.

At the same time, the question should be resolved of what kinds of collectives possess the right to nominate, i.e. of what to consider as being labor collectives. Economic and political understandings may not coincide here. For example, a branch of an enterprise that is located in another city, that comprises part of an industrial association of a factory, and is not a juridical person; a fishing trawler; and large scientific expeditions, together with the crews of vessels, that are wandering the oceans on assignment for scientific institutions—all these can be placed in doubt as independent labor collectives from the point of view of economic activity. But when nominating candidates for deputy and in an election campaign they have the right to consider themselves independent labor collectives.

Practice makes it necessary to answer still one more question: Does a single collective have the right to nominate several candidates for deputy or does it nominate only one? Evidently, in elections of peoples deputies at the top level, one collective should nominate a single candidate—and then will have to support him in the competition, to carry out agitation on his behalf. Many collectives have underestimated precisely this when nominating several candidates. Experience shows that collectives have frequently nominated more than one candidate and have then distanced themselves from participation in the election campaign, have literally cast their several candidates to the whims of fate. Those, however, who have taken a more serious approach to the nomination of a candidate, have settled for a single candidate but have stayed with him until the end. In elections of deputies to local soviets, of course, it is entirely permissible for one collective to nominate several candidates: both because in multi-mandate districts an entire list of pretenders is possible and also because frequently, within a population center, large enterprises encompass almost all workers and residents.

Thirdly, another problem has arisen along with the introduction of competition: How can we ensure nomination of the most worthy people as candidates for deputy, how do we counter the element of chance and the ambitious aspirations of individual personalities

who sometimes clearly overestimate their own capabilities either for deputy activities in general or for its highest level?

Legislation envisaged the OPS for these purposes. At it, representatives of the collectives which have proposed their own candidates, delegates from other collectives, and meetings of voters discuss all the candidates that have been named and decide to whom to give preference and whom to present for registration. The minuses of the OPS are obvious: Only a part (moreover a small one) of the voters decides for everyone who is best and, moreover, subjectivism and the influence of the apparatus is most real in this stage; in order to obtain extra votes at the OPS, as we have already noted, we are beginning to see artificial nomination of one and the same candidate at dozens of meetings of voters of labor collectives; violations, mistakes, and a subjective attitude have been knowingly permitted at the OPS (for example some collectives that have not proposed their own candidates have been able to send delegates to the OPS while others have none; in some places, meetings of voters by place of residence have been given an opportunity to participate in the OPS, and in some places they have not, which has provoked complaints both from working citizens and, especially, from retirees; there have also been complaints with regard to candidates; someone has been able to show that delegates have been wrongly designated, that apparatus workers, "convenient," and "obedient" people, etc. have received preference); at the district pre-election meetings themselves there have been so many procedural inconsistencies that many have left these meetings dissatisfied.

What should be done further so that there will be no element of chance in the nomination of candidates? The path which they have now chosen in local areas—to register everyone and then let the voters before the election and on election day determine who is worthy and who is incidental—seems not to be the best one. The basic mass of the voters still take an indifferent attitude toward nomination and, having received a ballot with two dozen names, are not in a position to determine their choice. Moreover, it is very difficult to understand the criteria of nomination when the candidates are each good in their own way. The upshot is the re-vote, and the ones left over for this are candidates who sometimes have collected no more than half of all the votes, or barely more than half. In a re-vote, only a relative majority is needed and, therefore, a person can become a delegate who by no means has the greater part of the voters of the district among his own "active supporters"; nonetheless, he is a deputy from everyone. The given approach also does not take into consideration either the financial side of elections or the fact that the voters participate less willingly in a re-vote.

Still another way consists of collecting signatures; this is a practice known in many countries and consists, in essence, of the voters supporting the election of a particular person within a district signing their names to special lists, which also indicate their own particulars,

including home address. Candidates who have accumulated a certain number of signatures are included in the ballot. Obviously such a method could also be used in our country for those who are nominated as a candidate by a territorial meeting of voters: as the initial point, this meeting could serve as the basis of a list of those who support a candidate. Naturally, as in other countries, it will be necessary for us to think about guarantees against falsification of lists and signatures.

Taking into account our country's special features, particularly the organization of labor activity and of a large part of a person's life according to the production principle, we think that, at the level of the supreme organs of power, the following is a promising method of selecting the most worthy candidate from what are originally dozens of possible ones: Immediately following a nomination, the collective and the candidate nominated by it immediately would begin to campaign for the given candidate, at the same time enlisting the support not of individual voters but of meetings of voters based on place of residence, not of individual members of labor collectives, but of meetings of these collectives, the decisions of which would be reached in accordance with procedures established by the law. And the law on elections indicates the minimum number of voters with the support of whom a candidate is registered. Every collective that holds a meeting would draw up a protocol that would reflect the voting. On the basis of the number of votes "for" it will become clear how many persons support a given candidate.

4. Legislation and practice relating to pre-election campaigning require certain elaboration. First of all, it is unclear from what moment this begins. In connection with this, many election commissions have begun to give a literal interpretation to Article 44 of the election law, which states that candidates from the moment of their registration have an equal right to speak out at pre-election and other meetings, conferences, sessions, in the press, and on television and radio. Attempts by candidates, and also by initiative groups and labor collectives, to organize meetings of nominated candidates with voters before this registration have not given support and sometimes have even been prohibited. Sometimes this led to a paradoxical situation, when candidates who had been nominated at the start of January began to meet with voters only after district pre-election meetings had been held and registration had taken place on 23-24 February, and this resulted in criticism both from candidates and from voters and labor collectives.

These criticisms appear to be justified. Just for a start, let's take the fact that, when attending a nomination meeting, a candidate for deputy (or a proposed candidate) may be placed in the position of being someone from whom they want to hear his political and life's credo. In expounding this he, willingly or unwillingly, campaigns in his own behalf. Secondly, the law stipulates that each nominated candidate has the right to be present at the OPS and to present the program of his future activities. Is it possible to come out there but not

permissible before the voters? In the third place, the law permits self-nomination. How can this be done without campaigning for voter support of one's own candidacy. Fourthly, it is precisely appearances in advance of the district pre-election meetings that provide support for a candidate for deputy, right up to his nomination by one collective or another; otherwise it turns out that the collectives must nominate a person whom they have not seen and not heard. In the fifth place, appearances immediately after nomination make it possible to include the voters in the election process. Republic election laws have permitted candidates to be a part of the campaign after their nomination.

Of course, it is following registration that the pre-election campaign enters its most decisive phase. Recommendations can also be given with regard to this stage. Thus, elections have shown that the voters have not actually had before them a political, social, and personal "portrait" of the candidate for deputy. Therefore, evidently, we should stipulate in the law that the program of a candidate for deputy should contain not only tasks, but also concrete paths for their solution, and that there be a possibility for public testing of candidates for deputy (this would afford the voters specific information about the candidate's degree of knowledge concerning legislation, about the level of his education, his intellectual world, his erudition, etc.) The right of the voters to obtain detailed information about the lives of a candidate, his family, relatives, material situation, income, etc. should also not be excluded. Answers to all such questions (while, of course, observing tact) will eliminate rumors and prejudices.

Discussion by the candidates should be a part of the pre-election campaign. Unfortunately, this form has been poorly utilized. Besides this, the law does not envisage this as being obligatory. And where, nevertheless, general meetings with candidates have been held (for example, on the Moscow Program on television), these have turned out to be a recitation by each of his own program and answers to the questions of television viewers (voters). But, indeed, there has been no kind of discussion, i.e. there have been no traces of any arguments with one another. Candidates, as a rule, have seldom attended meetings of this kind in labor collectives, each of them preferring to visit one or another collective on his own. Possibly, joint discussion by the candidates of certain kinds of problems at meetings of voters, with answers to their questions and statements of their own positions, can be mandated by the law.

Legislation has taken a definite step forward by giving candidates for USSR people's deputy the opportunity of having up to 10 trusted persons [doverennoye litso], i.e. a kind of staff for the candidate. But another, important question—that of campaign collectives and campaign workers—is for practical purposes avoided by the law. Overall, the representatives of those labor collectives which have been assigned to support the work of the election precincts [uchastok] have been engaged only very modestly in campaign affairs. Earlier, this was

simple: With a single candidate for deputy it was possible to go calmly from apartment to apartment, giving out information about him. Now, however, people are a little bit frightened: Won't they be accused of campaigning for one candidate and against another?

In order to eliminate such fears, it is necessary to do the following juridically: First, to stipulate by law that the precinct electoral commission will provide the voters with information about candidates for deputy and about their programs (now, it does not have such authority); Second, to stipulate that, at the request of a candidate for deputy, the collectives that have nominated him may put together groups of campaign workers who will have the right by all legal means to engage in campaigning on behalf of the given candidate (it is not excluded that such campaigners might be distributed by election precincts). And so, we are talking about separating information in pure form (insofar as this is possible) from campaigning. The electoral commissions are concerned with the former and campaign collectives of supporters of each candidate for deputy are engaged in the latter. Naturally it is necessary, either within the election law or within the law on glasnost, to stipulate permissible and impermissible forms of campaigning.

5. The experience of the election campaign has shown that it is necessary to resolve a number of questions connected with the organization of balloting... First of all, some citizens are uniquely interpreting their voting right as an opportunity to go wherever they want and to vote for whichever candidate they like. We think that this is an incorrect understanding of one's right and at the same time is also disrespectful of other voters.

As is known, a voter is bound to a deputy by definite ties in our country. He has the right, together with other voters, to issue mandates to his own deputy, to oversee his work, to require and hear his reports. Now let us suppose that a voter decides to take his voter authorization certificate and to go and vote in another district for someone whom he would like to see become a deputy. Have any relationships arisen between them that are of the kind which we have described? Certainly not. The voter is on his own, the deputy also. But such a move by voters, especially if there are thousands of them, can create an absolutely false picture: In that district the candidate will win by a majority of votes, not of voters from the district, but rather of other people who have come there with their voter authorizations. Thus, the will of the voters of the given district will be in fact distorted. Therefore, it is not expedient, we think, to issue certification for general use by an individual, one that is not supported by certification of temporary assignment, by a telegram or another document testifying that he must be away. And something else: Consideration has long been given to organizing advance balloting by such people—possibly utilizing ballots that are prepared by the commission itself—for candidates who have been registered as of the day these ballots are issued (of course, as now, not earlier than a ten days beforehand). Such a ballot

would be left in a sealed envelope at the precinct election commission and would be counted on the day of voting.

In these past elections, it became a widespread practice for labor collectives to send their own representatives to precinct electoral commissions. Some of the representatives were present only for the counting of votes; others sat in the polling stations all day, beginning with the sealing of the ballot boxes. This form of participation generally deserves a positive evaluation. But in some ways it needs to be more clearly defined. Thus, it is necessary to make direct provision for the possibility of representatives of collectives to be present in polling spaces because, up until now, the law only provides the right to be present at meetings of the electoral commissions. We should also specify more closely the form of the document that gives the right for such presence, the time periods for its presentation and for carrying out the decisions of the electoral commission in accordance with it, so that there will be time to appeal it. Finally, it is necessary to stipulate directly that representatives may be present, may observe, but may not interfere in the course of the election procedures, and if they do not agree with something, that they may submit their complaints, which will be immediately examined by the commissions. This is particularly important to note in this connection: In some places, representatives present at polls took upon themselves the role of voluntary helpers of the voters, particularly elderly ones, explaining to them what needed to be done with the ballot, how to cross out names, etc. But indeed this does not exclude the possibility of prompting them whom to cross out and, by so doing, of influencing the result of the election. Such a situation is extremely undesirable.

6. One other important complex of questions is connected with organizational and material support for the work of the electoral commissions and the conduct of elections. Practice shows that the electoral commissions are very strongly dependent upon the apparatus of the soviets (in the given elections—upon the executive committees). And this is explicable. First of all, the apparatus has specialists who have more than once been involved in elections, who have experience and not a bad understanding of the law; the commissions have primarily dilettantes. Further, all the measures which are designated by the commissions are carried out only in the case that they are supported by the apparatus. Even if it is not in open opposition, all the same, in the final account, the result that is achieved will be the one which the apparatus predicted, or, more simply, there will not be another one. Finally, the apparatus technically, organizationally, and materially supports elections with documents.

What can be done so that the commissions will be more independent? Certainly this should not be on account of rejecting the help of the apparatus. It is necessary simply to change the style of relations between the apparatus and its workers and the election commission. It would be worth including responsible workers from the apparatus

of corresponding soviets within the surrounding electoral commissions—this would make them organizationally responsible for implementing the decisions of the commission.

A clear-cut solution should be found to the problem of material support for elections—with the passage of a normative act. We are talking, first of all, about immediately placing appropriate state funds at the disposal of electoral commissions, which should be spent at their own discretion and not in accordance with projections by financial organs; the latter should be provided with reports and financial documents about the expenditure of funds. In the second place, in the list of matters for which the electoral commission has the right to spend funds must be made to include the printing not only of placards about the deputies, but also their programs, moreover in large numbers; probably, following registration, it will be necessary to have some kind of summary document (a brochure) about all the candidates, with their biographies and programs, which will be published using funds allocated to the commission. In the third place, there is a need to examine juridically the possibility of creating temporary monetary and material (paper, computers, xerox, video, motor vehicles) funds for deputy candidates, providing an indication of their sources (including contributions from citizens, cooperatives, and organizations) and introducing procedures for accounting and reporting (this is mandatory).

In conclusion, we note that there is a need for a certain amplification of the powers of electoral commissions and the ways these are implemented. In particular, it is necessary to increase the responsibility of district electoral commissions for the management of all election procedures, but simultaneously to specify what is meant by the concept of "management." Otherwise, some people will take the path of administration by injunction, by command. For example, the law says that this commission "organizes the nomination of candidates for deputy." Certain commissions have taken this literally, as meaning that they should choose candidates and conduct the meetings at which these candidacies are proposed. Frequently, the commissions have demanded that commission members necessarily must be present at such meetings scheduled to be held at the voters' labor collectives and places of residence; otherwise they declared the results of these meetings invalid and refused to accept protocols from them. Of course, this is an incorrect understanding by the commissions of their purpose. They should issue the call to collectives for the nomination of candidates and are obligated to verify that the law is observed in these nominations. But no more than this. And specifically all such points should be juridically specified as they apply to the powers of the commissions.

The Central Electoral Commission [TsIK] has had to assume the function of interpreting and clarifying procedures for applying the law on elections. In accordance with the Constitution, the functions of interpretation belong to the Supreme Soviet. We think that the law also

needs to be made more precise here. Frequently, the TsIK must decide questions operationally and, for the most part, has done so skillfully. This commission can be assigned to interpret procedures for applying the norms of the law with regard to specific situations, and those who do not agree with this can be afforded the right to appeal the decisions of the TsIK to the Supreme Soviet.

Thus, perfection of election procedures and legislation on elections is an important means for further democratization of the political life of society.

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Democratic Union Assessed as Party

90UN0414 Moscow *EKONOMICHESKIYE NAUKI* in Russian No 11, Nov 89 pp 79-84

[Article by Yelena Leonidovna Losoto, secretary of the Administrative Board of the USSR Journalists' Union and KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA commentator, under the rubric "Comments on Previously Published Material": "Where is the DS Leading Us?"]

[Text] *The remarks featured below were among the first responses to the article by A. Sergeyev, "Whither Today: On to Tomorrow or Back to Yesterday?"; published under this rubric in issue No 9, 1989. The editorial staff has noted already its utmost interest in establishing two-way communication with our readership regarding material from the journalistic genre (see EKONOMICHESKIYE NAUKI, 1989, No 9, p 121 and No 10, p 78). This will help us to determine more precisely whether it belongs in our journal.*

It is high time someone discussed in detail the content of the newspapers, bulletins and leaflets published and distributed by the so-called Democratic Union [DS] which calls itself the "opposition party". The events of July, when striking miners of the Kuzbass fittingly rebuffed emissaries from the regional departments of the DS, have aggravated this necessity.¹ The article by Doctor of Economic Sciences A. Sergeyev, "Whither Today: On to Tomorrow or Back to Yesterday?"², prompted me to write to EKONOMICHESKIYE NAUKI. The author's position with regard to the DS is in accord with my views on this score.

Theoretical Preamble: Is the DS a Party? I think so. It has party regulations, a platform, public and private(!) members, and its own Central Committee and press. The existence of private members turned out to be something new to me. Although I have been working with all types of "informal" organizations for a long time, I have never encountered this form of membership.

But is this really an opposition party? Absolutely. Its opposition to the CPSU, to socialism, to public and especially common ownership of the means of production, and generally to everything developed in this country after October, 1917 is open and in no ways

disguised. They find Marxism totally objectionable and demand abolition of its teachings. They mock Lenin and Leninism and they have declared that the October Revolution and the path chosen by the Bolsheviks was flawed from the beginning, by definition so to speak.

Over the past 70 years we have seen nothing analogous which existed legally so we must look to pre-revolutionary history. In my view, the Constitutional Democratic Party was the precursor to the DS; that is, it had vast amount of capital and supported a regime of bourgeois parliamentarianism.

I can predict the reaction: What! How did you come up with that? How can there be heirs to the Constitutional Democrats seven decades after the October Revolution if their corresponding economic roots were weeded out long ago?! Nevertheless, let us hear what an economic specialist has to say. After ascertaining that the DS, together with anarchic syndicalists, other "ists" and several "fronts", already is forming "in essence, an antisocialist party" which is demanding dissolution of the CPSU³, A. Sergeyev asks whether we have the foundation for the emergence of a multiparty system. Later, he offers the following view: "the answer apparently is yes if society has social groups with incompatible economic interests." Now, real life forces us to remove these "ifs"—such groups are a reality today. There are a significant number of cooperatives which are exploiting both consumers and those who work "under labor contracts" (i.e., for hire, in effect), and there are shrewd dealers in the "shadow economy", which not only has not shown a tendency toward curtailment as a result of the development of new types of cooperatives (as was hoped when the cooperatives were created), but which, on the contrary, has increased its turnover to many tens of billions of rubles. In other words, while the bulk of the population lives "from payday to payday", there is underway in this country an intensive process of initial accumulation of capital which is the basis for the development of a plutocracy and a new "Sovbour" [Soviet bourgeoisie] of millionaires and multimillionaires (whose joint capital, in my estimation, is no less than half a trillion rubles by any means)⁴.

Indeed, as soon as there developed in this country a "shadow economy", which controls things through its tens of billions of rubles and which, to be sure, grows into the ranks of the ruling powers in the form of corruption, should we be surprised that there also appeared a special political party for this hardly incorporeal "shadow"? A. Sergeyev is certainly absolutely right when in continuing the quoted text he writes: "Under the conditions which exist in the USSR, there are objective conditions for the existence of not one, but two parties: a communist party serving the interests of workers and collective farm workers, and also the scientific and technical intelligentsia (especially in the factory), and an antisocialist party which has as its social base the new private property owners and exploiters and the "intellectual bourgeoisie", so to speak (that part of the intelligentsia which advocates changing to the capitalist development path)"⁵.

Perhaps, some of the public and private (!) members of the Democratic Union do not know who they support. They say that they have no connection at all to the "shadow economy", but the DS is comprised primarily of well-educated people and they must know that to protect the interests of the shop-keepers, one need not be a shop-keeper himself.

The "shadow economy" also moulded the intelligentsia's corresponding opinions, but the conditions of pluralism and openness allowed its adherents make themselves known.

Reading and Commenting on the Words of the DS: (we will consider first of all those which express the essence of its position).

The 14 March, 1989 issue of the DS newspaper FREE WORD is indicative. The lead article is devoted to the Democratic Union's main triumph. I quote: "On 7 September, 1917 the republic was proclaimed by decree of the Provisional Government". Thus, Karenskiy's Provisional Government is our oppositionists' ideal!

Further, here is a direct quote from the lead article signed by D. Starikov (unabridged; ellipsis points correspond to the original): *So that the workers would move from protest to attack and so that the soldiers would be asked point blank whether they were with the people or with autocracy, a Czarist order to fire on the demonstration was needed. It came on 26 February and on 27 February, Czarist rule was over. The clever and noble leaders of the Russian liberals found themselves in the position of accoucheurs who had delivered for the first time. Because of the backwardness of Russian political life and the parallel organizational framework, the day for which several generations of the Russian intelligentsia had been preparing themselves came unexpectedly. They had not done sufficient, positive preliminary work on the creation of new organs of state control. A difficult but necessary political compromise between the bourgeoisie and the workers (which did not, of course, exclude fighting and rivalry), had not been reached by 27 February and would be all the more difficult to achieve under the conditions of a revolutionary crisis. For the struggle with the Provisional Government, the Soviets entered into an alliance with their own grave diggers, the Bolsheviks, but the Provisional Government found no allies and was defeated. This was in October.*

...An article devoted to the anniversary of the February Revolution is not a jubilee article: we know what happened during those joyous, promising days of March, 1917. The most democratic reforms in Russian history were left in the document case of historic records. 'Poisonous freedom carried us abruptly over the edge.' (S. Yessenin).

...The question of the coming end of the party-ocracy (and I am talking about nowadays) is closed to discussion. The question of how to lead our nation toward a democratic, pluralistic society remains open.

...In a speech at the 19th Party Conference, the crafty anti-reconstructionist Yu. Bondarev declared that the airplane of the Soviet state flew off into the sky without knowing its landing place. But there was a landing place in March, 1917 and the more difficult it will be to reach, the further we distance ourselves from it by traveling a path toward realizing the "great heresy" of the Bolsheviks at the cost of economic, political and spiritual impoverishment. Following the "aviation" analogy, we can say that we are at the "point of no return" from which it is still possible to return to the beginning of the formation of a civil society and a legal state.

We are setting out for a meeting celebrating the anniversary of the revolution, not with the red banners of February (the workers in 1917 did not know what they carried, we do know) but with the tricolor flags of the Russian Republic."

It is clear from the cited, extensive quote that we are supposed to cut out and discard 70 years of Soviet rule and return the country to that brief period when the Czarist autocracy was over but Soviet rule had not yet begun, and to restore capitalism with its corresponding bourgeois parliamentarianism. The DS is outspoken and does not flinch or hide behind a smoke screen of "improving" or "humanizing" socialism and the like, or hide behind a facade of its "new modifications", but speaks openly and directly about what it actually wants. Personally, I am impressed by this approach. I prefer a struggle of ideas against an open, frank enemy and not against lying, shifty demagogues. This suggests the idea certainly that the DS has adequate "public protection" and that it feels support under it and the "breath of the next rank" behind it. It suggests also the view that the "shadow economy" is so strong that the DS openly and loudly can make its claims for a political system more suitable to it; more suitable for it to legalize its capital and strengthen its new social status...

Here, for example, are three more characteristic fragments (in this case, shortened in the interests of conserving magazine space).

1. *"Many of us are doing the right thing by not rushing to hand in an application to join the party. Everything that the communists represent is clear to see. These people are riff-raff following only their own personal and career goals. There are practically no honest people among them; if there were, we would have heard them, or at least we would know about their existence... The Communist Party cannot be revived! It is time to put an end to the total supremacy of the ruling party. 'All Power to the Soviets!' 'Give Us a Multiparty System!'"—These were the slogans in their time of the officers and soldiers of Kronstadt who rose up in rebellion but today we have all the prerequisites to achieve this through a peaceful path."*

2. *Seventy years of intoxication with power and struggle against its own people has produced an orgy of lawlessness and genocide... the CPSU membership is a well organized gang of murderers.*

3. *...This band of power-lovers, hiding behind Marxist slogans, has turned the people into spiritual and social slaves and made them into robbers, bribers, alcoholics, drug addicts and physical and spiritual prostitutes.*

So, 'Down With the CPSU!'"

The DS is not satisfied with a single period of the 70 years of Soviet rule, including the present. One headline says it all: *"The Reconstructionists Bare Their Teeth"*

It is difficult to label all of this "peaceful means". As an experienced journalist, I know well that propaganda has its own arsenal. One can fight with kind words; figuratively speaking, one can use a water jet, or one can even throw bombs. DS propaganda uses the third version. This is comes across clearly from an article by its leader, V. Novodvorskaya, "Is Civil Protest Constructive?". "All the meaning and power of the DS", she writes, "comes not from the fact that we finally uncovered the truth (it has been known for a long time), but from the fact that we speak frankly about it; actually we preach, if not from the rooftops, then in the squares. Any Roman club or NII can expound ideas, but a political party uses ideas as objects of political struggle. In this, a fight with the government is unavoidable—a fight for a change in the system and a change of rule, not just to seize power but to take it from those who took it from the people and to give it back to the people..."

What is meant by "for the good of the people" can be seen in the following paragraph, which informs us that the DS has a clearly expressed political, economic and cultural western orientation; in other words, capitalistic. The DS sets out to fight "for an ordinary, satisfying, human life and to protect it from 'blinding darkness' and 'social utopia'". The DS supports all "committees", "movements" and "fronts" which weaken the country and are directed against its territorial integrity, and which strive to spoil the unified nation economic complex and eliminate social property. Moreover, it sets as one of its aims the establishment of these types of organizations. This apparently is also "for the good of the people".

...Alas, what haven't we seen done "for the people"! Throw the people back 70 years and wipe out everything they have done; and do it for them... The proletarian revolution, victory in the civil war, and industrialization—all this was the plotting of the "party members". Karenskiy—now he is the personification of the "people's dreams"...

This is really the essence of the matter. Of course, much of what reflects our completely real disgrace is wound around this core which is camouflaged and enveloped by these disclosures. Yes, the country faces rationing, it's true. Yes, there is trouble with the environment and with the management system; and there are no small problems with the internal party democracy now. But this hardly means now that we need look for a "proper life" for the people in a prerevolutionary regime, and not

looking for it there does not show a lack of "personal courage" (as suggested by V. Novodvorskaya).

People want (and should have) a better life. They are sick and tired of senseless, multibillion ruble programs that provide nothing for the people. It is the CPSU however which is the only real force capable of setting things right, not the latter-day Constitutional Democrats and other forces which, of course, longing to seize power, are taking advantage of this difficult time for the party.

Strictly speaking, it would not be bad for the "denounced" CPSU to turn things around. I am not a supporter of airing the fact of deviations from verbally proclaimed principles, but here is some "tit for tat" as they say. A. Chuyev, one of the leaders of the Democratic Union, sent around a letter to organizations and editorial boards exposing his own party now. He began, "I would be grateful to any independent magazine or newspaper which publishes this material; nor would I object if it appeared in the official press, if in so doing the meaning of what I have written is not distorted."

I joined the Democratic Union on June 4, 1988 after determining that its platform was Constitutional Democrat. False modesty aside, I can say that almost from the very beginning of my political work in the DS I acquired a reputation as a practical organizer... The next step in my political activities was the creation of a party newspaper which I thought was vitally necessary to spread the DS program and bring in the outlying areas...

As we see, this is not the lowest level man in the organization writing. He is well informed, knows his value to his comrades and does not hid it from anyone. Also, as a member of the TsKS [not further identified], he took part in the most sensational "internal party" intrigues: "As it turns out, two incompatible camps existed in the TsKS from the very beginning." As the author of the letter points out, one of them was headed by a man who clearly had psychological problems, the other, on the contrary, by an individual with exceptional qualities. A third faction arose which felt that the first leader was psychotic and the second a yes-man and opportunist. Things boiled over and there was a struggle for votes so that each could win for "his own". Then, A. Chuyev reports, "they decided to call a general meeting."

They waited for the right occasion. Then, after a drinking binge arranged by Ye. Debryanskaya at a city KS [not further identified] Conference when the delegates lost some things (including an overcoat costing 700 rubles, and other things), the MDS [not further identified] called a special meeting...

Early in the morning on the day of the meeting, three young men in the company of two ladies and a large dog were sent to a suburban residence where a banya, wine and an appropriate quantity of snacks awaited them. These young men were Igor Tsarkov, Aleksandr Eliovich, and I—the main players in the faction and the future intrigue.

We decided to do this so that the TsKS would resign at the special meeting."

So it continues: then there was a "purge of the opportunists", falsification of the elections, each accusing the other of being "extremist", and suppression of "internal party" democracy.

The author of the letter concluded that: "intolerance within the party toward and brutal suppression of even the slightest difference in thinking has become the main principle. The end does not justify the means. The wise men of the DS, to their shame, forgot this, as did I when I took part in their unscrupulous affairs."

Further on, the lyrics are the same: "Just how long can one live with a lie and keep silent about it?... May God forgive me."

It is to be assumed that God will forgive; this is not the problem. Will the people forgive? This is the real question...

In much of its material the DS condemns the "red terror". Of course, not a word is said about the white terror: about how the red terror was an answer to the white. That is, that is was an unavoidable defensive measure. Here is a gem of their composition (a leaflet): "On 5 September, 1918 the Bolshevik Government, seeing no other way to preserve the power which it had taken from the people (that is, the Provisional Government—Ye.L.), announced the introduction of the 'Red Terror'... Thus the building that is totalitarianism was erected. Its foundations were laid and theoretically drawn up by Lenin. This building stands to this day... The property which was taken (that is, expropriated private property—Ye.L.) is of no use to the robbers. The failure of our economy and our spiritual degradation is confirmation of that. We will soon erect a monument to the victims of Stalinism. Yet, are not the victims of the red terror also worthy of one? Was that not the beginning of the era itself of terror? We became martyrs in 1917 with the Bolsheviks' anti-people turnabout. We invite all enemies of terror and supporters of democracy (that is, everyone who hates socialism—Ye.L.) to join the Democratic Union meeting which will be held on 5 September at 1900 hours on Tverskiy Boulevard across from the Lira Cafe."

Among the many authors who are "denouncing" the terror, I encountered a familiar name: Andrey Novikov...

When the phone rang and I heard the familiar voice, I said to my office co-worker, "It is he..."

My co-worker immediately understood what I was talking about, stopped what he was doing and said, "Don't be afraid, I'm with you."

In those days, he was not working by then but was occupied with my salvation. Andrey Novikov, from the city of Andropov, threatened me with terrorist action if I refused, as before, to glorify him as a genius in philosophy and politics.

"You are no genius!" I told Andrey Novikov. You are a parasite and a hooligan! Why don't you do something useful..."

"I am not a parasite, but a genius!" he answered. I have a certificate attesting to my genius."

Indeed he really had such certification. Why very imminent Soviet philosophers gave him "documents" or what influenced them to do so, I do not know to this day.

My Goodness, this just doesn't happen in our journalistic life. The police turned him out of his place of residence but he came to Moscow one again, as it was explained to me, to throw his manuscripts onto the grounds of the American Embassy and to terrorize me. Then he suddenly disappeared.

So there you have it. Novikov: member of the DS, with social status—if not a "social mind", and author of many articles in the "free press". What of it? So now a "man with a certificate" also can publish his "brilliant" ideas.

Continuing: "That is enough about one statement on Stalinism as evil."

"I do not know to what extent the period of terror during 'military communism' was justified. I know only that any period of terror is capable of generating those 'objective situations' which supposedly call for and justify it. It could be that the first generation of Bolsheviks which selflessly gave their lives for the sake of an idea were delighted that, in so doing, they also took the lives of millions of other people who did not want to participate in their experiment."

"Bolshevism is political monism; they are synonymous. They are confident that they are the only ones who can bring happiness to mankind. They are confident that 'the end justifies the means', that 'victors will not be judged', that 'our way is the right way' and 'victory will be ours'."

"This leads to the elimination of all moral impediments and reckless adventurism in the beginning and, unavoidably, to the complete deliberate exclusion later."

Thus, it was really in the political monism of the first generation of Bolsheviks that the objective possibilities for Stalinism were laid."

...I would not want the reader, after becoming familiar with this material, to perceive the DS as a caricature. This feature is definitely present, but I would take the DS seriously, if for no other reasons than those which I gave at the beginning of this article. Indeed, here we have a real force for which socialism is the main impediment. It needs full play for private capital and private enterprise.

This corresponds fully to the structure which existed in Russia between February and October, 1917. Yes, the February revolution was their revolution and their triumph (to be sure, it is also bourgeois). Then they faced the 'red terror', it's true. It is also true that the "shadow economy" (secret capitalism under socialism) has been living in "red terror" conditions for 70 years now. Today the "Sovbour"

hopes overthrow the rule of the "terrorists". The emergence of the Democratic Union, one of the more obvious manifestations of these aspirations⁶, judging by the quoted texts, will not delay the white terror.

As I have already said, I support an open war of ideas. For this reason, I feel it necessary also to say something about those conditions, if it happens, under which we should conduct a "dialog" with the Democratic Union. In its publications I encountered a story (we will accept it on faith) about how the organs of law and order found no more fitting a way to deal with a member of the DS than to haul him a little way out of the city, take away his belt, cut the buttons off his trousers and set him free in that condition. This detail is symbolic in my opinion. Such methods still quite frequently substitute for war of ideas. Yet we can understand those who know that in a war of ideas there is nothing to win but no one else has another way for polemics. So then, why should we behave that way? Polemics must be raised to a worthy level, to the level of persuasive discussion. We have quite sufficient arguments to defend our historical choice as the optimal one. We need only raise our own propaganda qualifications.

Footnotes

1. However, the material which I managed to collect was distributed in Moscow so this review has a local flavor. The author is not undertaking a review of the DS in other regions.

2. See EKONOMICHESKIYE NAUKI, 1989, No 9

3. Ibid., pp 124-125

4. Ibid., p 124

5. Ibid., p 124

6. Unfortunately "one of" and not the only. I will cite without comment two newspaper excerpts. "...Before they announced in the hall that Yu. Afanasyev, B. Yeltsin, V. Palm, G. Popov and A. Sakharov had been elected co-chairmen of the inter-regional deputy group, some nimble people got into the foyer and were trading briskly in all sorts of samizdat leaflets. The headlines created hysteria: "A Party of Constitutional Democrats Has Been Formed!" (SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, 1989, 5 August). We do not really have to pay attention to hysteria, you may say. However, note the first of the cited list: "It seems to me," said peoples' deputy Yu. Afanasyev at a meeting with voters in the city of Elektrostal, "we must set the liquidation of state production as a long-term strategic task... I think that the gradual elimination of state property is the long-term path." Someone in the audience remarked, "This is a path to capitalism". Yu. Afanasyev: "I do not intend to avoid this question and can say that this is either a path toward capitalism or a path to somewhere in a different direction". (LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA, 1989, 20 June, p 2).

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Azerbaijan Forms NKAO Organizational Group*90US0367A Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian
7 Dec 89 p 1*

[Ukase of the AzSSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, signed by E. Kafarova, AzSSR Supreme Soviet Presidium chairman, and R. Kazyeva, AzSSR Supreme Soviet Presidium secretary, on 6 December 1989: "On Forming a Republic Organizational Committee on the NKAO of the Azerbaijan SSR"]

[Text] In conformity with the USSR Supreme Soviet resolution "On Measures to Normalize the Situation in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium resolves:

To form a republic organization committee on the NKAO of the AzSSR, consisting of:

Azadov, R.I., department chief for agroindustrial sectors, AzSSR Council of Ministers Administration of Affairs;

Velmamedov, S.M., deputy chief of the Department of Organizational, Party and Cadre Work of the Azerbaijan CP Central Committee;

Golubev, A.M., second secretary, Azerbaijan CP Baku Gorkom;

Dzhafarov, V.A., deputy chairman, AzSSR State Committee on the Press;

Kerimov, Sh.K., deputy chief of department for interethnic relations, AzSSR Council of Ministers Administration of Affairs;

Orudzhev, Z.D., secretary, Azerbaijan Council of Professional Unions;

Polyanichko, V.P., second secretary, Azerbaijan CP Central Committee;

Radayev, M.I., deputy chairman, AzSSR Council of Ministers.

With a recommendation of the candidates from the NKAO, their inclusion as part of the organizational committee is foreseen.

AzSSR Resolution Against Armenian Claims to NKAO*90US0367B Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian
7 Dec 89 p 1*

[AzSSR Supreme Soviet Presidium resolution signed by E. Kafarova, AzSSR Supreme Soviet Presidium chairman, and R. Kazyeva, AzSSR Supreme Soviet Presidium secretary, 6 December 1989: "On the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet Resolution 'On Reuniting the Armenian SSR and Nagorno-Karabakh'"]

[Text] The Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet, jointly with the so-called National Council of Nagorno-Karabakh, has passed an unconstitutional resolution, "On

Reuniting the Armenian SSR and Nagorno-Karabakh," on 1 December 1989, in which an attempt was once again made to infringe on the territory of the Azerbaijan SSR.

Despite the USSR Constitution and the Azerbaijan SSR Constitution, despite the existing practice of relations among the Union republics, as well as the standards of interethnic law, the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet has taken this illegal step at precisely the moment when a prospect had been outlined for normalizing the situation in the region, in connection with the USSR Supreme Soviet resolution of 28 November 1989, which recommended that the supreme soviets of the ArSSR and the AzSSR take all steps to normalize relations between the two peoples, to restore an atmosphere of trust and cooperation, and to establish normal economic and cultural ties.

Understandably, the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet resolution has no legal force whatsoever.

The Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium resolves:

To consider the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet resolution of 1 December 1989, "On Reuniting the Armenian SSR and Nagorno-Karabakh," an intolerable interference in the affairs of the sovereign Azerbaijan SSR, an infringement on its territorial integrity, and an action which does not contribute to stabilizing the situation in the region or restoring normal relations.

Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet Official on Election Preparations*90UN0528A Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA
INDUSTRIYA in Russian 19 Dec 89 p 1*

[Interview with L.N. Syroyegina, secretary, Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, by V. Roshchin, correspondent: "Who Are the Aspirants? Proceeding to the Elections"]

[Text] The regular session of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet adopted a decree scheduling elections of people's deputies for Belorussia and for local soviets. This republic's Election Day will be Sunday, 4 March of the coming year. The Central Election Commission has been formed, as have those for the Election Okrugs. Nomination of candidates for the office of Belorussian SSR people's deputies from 310 election okrugs will begin on 23 December.

[L. Syroyegina] Moreover, in accordance with the Election Law adopted for this republic, 50 deputies will be elected from public organizations. This right has been reserved for republic-level councils of war and labor veterans, as well as for societies of invalids, blind persons, and deaf persons. This decision was dictated, above all, by a feeling of humanitarianism and pity for people who, because of their physical limitations, cannot compete on an equal basis for deputies' seats. And it must be said that the quotas set for the least socially

protected groups of the population have been accepted with understanding by the republic's public opinion.

[Correspondent] Indeed, the decision cannot be termed a compromise with regard to those who defended the elections of deputies from the public organizations and those who opposed them. There was an absolute majority of such persons in the discussion of the Draft Law. Now, it seems, everyone is satisfied with the outcome of the discussion. But some persons have spoken about the danger that this quota could be taken advantage of by the apparatus officials, among whom there are quite a few in the same age-groups as the war and labor veterans.

[L. Syroyegina] That possibility has been excluded. The Law states precisely that the right to nominate candidates shall be enjoyed solely by representatives of those organizations, i.e., pensioners and persons engaged in public work. That's in the first place. In the second place, no person who values his own authority would take such a step. It would mean losing all respect of the people. And so there should be no false rumors regarding this matter.

[Correspondent] Nevertheless, Lyudmila Nikolayevna, the retention of a quota even for this category of the population is, in my opinion, not indisputable. Of course, the veterans and invalids will be pleased to have somebody to protect their interests in the parliament. But, you know, the deputies can expect intensive work there. And another thing. We had enough "wedding generals" in the past. Won't we obtain something like this now?

[L. Syroyegina] It's undoubtedly true that we must elect to the Supreme Soviet only persons capable of working hard from the viewpoint not merely of their businesslike, occupational qualities, but also of their physical condition. They will have to cope with enormous loads which are hard enough even for a healthy person. A good view of this can be obtained from looking at the work done by the USSR's people's deputies. In short, there are problems. Nevertheless, I think that these societies are capable of selecting and nominating for the republic's parliament the kinds of persons who will be able to perform fruitful work. Against the doubts which have been raised I can cite the following statistics: 2,300 of Belorussia's 7,280 voters are veterans of war and labor. That's almost one out of every three voters. This too is something to think about.

However, let's not restrict our conversation solely to the quota for veterans and invalids. I am more disturbed by something else: just how are we going to elect to the Supreme Soviet the most worthy persons in the territorial okrugs? We've abandoned the mechanism of the okrug-level, pre-election meetings, but we've not devised anything to replace it. And I'm not convinced that in all situations whereby any number of candidates can be included on the voting list a worthy choice will be made. Why do I say this?

Their positions will play against many of today's leading officials. Unfortunately, among the losers there could be not only those persons who have become bureaucratized, those to whom perestroika is alien, those who neither can nor want to communicate and share with people, but also very businesslike, up-to-date officials. They know what promises can be made to people, what cannot be promised, and what cannot be carried out. And, of course, voluble, superficially efficient candidates may appear more preferable than they. Thus, despite all the democratic quality of the elections, we have not ensured ourselves against random factors. Here a great deal will depend upon the stance adopted by the party organizations, trade unions, and the Komsomol. No matter how painful it may be, we must admit that they "slept through" the elections of the USSR people's deputies.

[Correspondent] In speaking about this, do you also have in mind the pre-election activity of the "informals," including the representatives of the Belorussian People's Front?

[L. Syroyegina] Not entirely. I've had occasion to encounter some of the "informal" leaders. Among them are certain sensible persons proposing intelligent ideas. Why not let them join in the business at hand, give them the chance to do some work in the soviets? Let them try and show us what they are capable of. I think that the voters themselves would be able to analyze their businesslike qualities. However, I'd like to be correctly understood. Despite all the problems and complexities of the present election campaign (its nature in this republic will undoubtedly be likewise affected by the attitudes connected with the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES [nuclear-power station]), I have no reason to make pessimistic forecasts. I'm convinced that our future parliament will turn out to be more capable of hard work than the present one. No matter what happens during the pre-election struggle, support will be given to those who have something to say to people, to those who possess a specific political perspective. I hope that the windbags and demagogues will not make it through.

[Correspondent] Don't you think that some of the potential aspirants to deputies' seats will now give it some careful thought before consenting to run for office? Because, after all, he would be thereby taking on quite a load of additional duties. Furthermore, he doesn't know whether he will be able to gain the voters' trust.

[L. Syroyegina] There is every reason to expect that candidates will weigh their chances more responsibly. What I have in mind is their work load and the level of their competence in certain matters. Because, after all, in our republic's Supreme Soviet only one-fourth of the deputies will be full-time members of the parliament; the remainder will have to combine their parliamentary duties with their service ones. The standing commissions will operate in a new way; the range of the matters to be considered will be expanded. The sessions will become

lengthier. And so every candidate for the office of deputy must get used to the idea that he will have to make a substantial contribution.

[Correspondent] The Supreme Soviet has not accepted the proposal made by many work collectives and their STK's [councils] concerning elections to be conducted by production okrugs. How do you evaluate this situation?

[L. Syroyegina] In my opinion, this idea does not hold water at the republic level. The working class's representatives have been accorded the right to contend on an equal basis in territorial okrugs. By law, a collective numbering 300 persons may nominate its own candidate. Enterprises with a lesser number of workers will be able to combine their forces. Opinions about some sort of infringement of the workers' rights are simply incorrect and unsubstantiated. In my opinion, it is a matter of whom we nominate for the republic-level parliament and what kind of authority our candidate will carry.

If we're talking about a city- or rayon-level Soviet, then it seems to me that it does make sense to nominate candidates by production okrugs. Inasmuch as enterprises will be making the transition to economic interrelationships with the soviets, then it would be feasible to form within them at the rayon level, so to speak, two chambers: deputies elected from the population (the territory), and those elected from an enterprise. In that case, we could speak about the possibility of combining their interests better.

People's Deputy Critical of Belorussian Leadership

18120029A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 48, 3-10 Dec 89 p 11

[Article by Alexander Zhuravlyov, people's deputy of the USSR: "Not to Miss a Chance; Byelorussia: Prospects of Development"]

[Text] Even now some leaders of the old type sometimes tell the people who are subjected to them: "Don't get so over-involved with all sorts of reforms. You better go to Byelorussia and see how well everything is organized there, how well they live—and follow the example." And they go. They go with the hope to find Byelorussia as the promised land, which manages somehow to live relatively prosperously and calmly, but at the same time "not sacrificing principles" and "not letting people slide". They seek in the Byelorussian experience proof that the majority of changes that have flooded the country could be avoided: one only had to follow more strictly the recipes of "developed socialism", which were prescribed in the stagnation times.

At present all of us understand best of all the language of the counter which we can see. When people come to Byelorussia, they see the contrast between the awful situation in the USSR as a whole and what we have in Byelorussia. In many respects the Byelorussian counter is even richer than the Moscow one. It is richer both in

food and in manufactured goods. People take with them furniture, plates, and knitted wear.

I won't quote figures. Whoever wants to, can find out for themselves from reference-books that Byelorussia's economic figures are among the best in the country. What are the reasons for Byelorussia's well-being? There are quite a few historical reasons. Let's take food. Miraculously the collectivization in the Republic didn't destroy the system of personal plots of land in the countryside. This was of great importance in the Republic, which had the highest percentage of rural population in the country till the mid-50s and practically no big cities. That's why Byelorussia had no hunger either before or after the war, as did the Ukraine and other areas. I remember how veal was sold in the markets in the mid-50s at quite agreeable prices.

But the advocates of "purity of principles" are attracted to Byelorussia not by the relative well-being. Or to be more precise, this doesn't attract them in the first place. The main thing is the style of management—the relations between "power" and "people". And here the advocates are right in their own way. This is what we see in the Republic.

Byelorussia is my native land, here I grew up. I have no dearer place in the world. Very responsive, kindly and talented people live here. They are very trusting and obedient—it is impossible to imagine them on strike, or crossing the road against a red light, even if there isn't a single car around.

These national features (though they are not the only ones) let the management system take shape. To be more precise, it is the command system which has achieved the limits of its capabilities. It is built on rigid administrative discipline, on clear subjugation of the bottom to the top, and on the Republican powers fulfilling all the orders of the all-Union leaders.

Historical reasons are also important. Recent history, having created a feeling of national pride in Byelorussians—the mighty development of guerrilla movement during the war and the remarkable postwar recovery—is connected precisely with this system.

The residents in the Republic would continue to stand such a system (or not to notice it), were it not for two events. They clearly showed one of the most dangerous properties of the command system—neglect for the people's needs, especially those that cannot be put into the framework of pre-planned figures.

Both events cover a tragedy. The first is Chernobyl. The deceit of people about the scope of polluted areas and the level of pollution, the lack of "pure" food products and elementary medicines in many places, and endless procrastination over the resettling of people from areas where life is impossible.

The second event was the cruel breaking up of a peaceful demonstration, devoted to the memory of victims of

Stalin's repressions on October 30, 1988. I now think about it in this way—if a principled assessment had been given at the time to the events in Minsk, then maybe the tragedy in Tbilisi on April 9, 1988 would have been impossible. October 30 should be seen as marking the beginning of the period throughout the country when the rise in public activity started to meet with the reaction of those who don't like this rise.

Both events showed that many leaders in the Republic are afraid to hold a dialogue with the people, speak rarely to the press or on TV, and are not seen at meetings. This paralysis and confusion were also present in the recent speech by the leader of the Byelorussian Communist Party at the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The inability to hold a dialogue inevitably told on the results of the spring elections of people's deputies of the USSR. Byelorussia was no exception. As soon as the voters discovered that the powers that be were against some candidate, that alone sharply increased the number of his supporters. And we can't say that these are not intelligent and clear-minded people among officials. There are some. But the fell victim to the style of dealing with people, dictated by the command system—the evil style that ignores and offends the people.

In September a demonstration was held in Minsk against keeping silent about Chernobyl aftermath. The official powers neither allowed nor banned it. However, the organizers were later sued in court. What for? For their just demands? This reduced the authority of the powers that be even more.

The people's political awareness continued to grow. So did the authority of the Popular Front of Byelorussia. It is distinguished among the Republic popular fronts by its calmness and carefully thought-out actions.

When seeking the explanation of this interesting feature we must deal with the national question in Byelorussia. The situation here is ambiguous. On the one hand, the national question is not at present the top priority for Byelorussia. Political and ecological problems are more acute.

But on the other hand, this doesn't mean at all that there are no national problems. On the contrary, the situation in the Republic has reached the point where people have nearly lost their national consciousness. Many Byelorussians sincerely regard Russian as their first language, and Byelorussian their second. I must confess, that as a Byelorussian and speaking Byelorussian fluently, I think in Russian. Many people in the Republic dismiss Byelorussian as the language of simple folk. Very often, young people find out that they are Byelorussians, not Russians, only when they get their passports at 16. This is the result of the annihilation of the national intelligentsia, especially in the 30s. The long history without their own state is another reason.

In short, the national problem creates very serious grounds for a conflict which is not so far off. If, of course,

we don't address the national movement politically. And for that we again need a dialogue—including one between the Republic's leaders and the Popular Front.

However, we do not see this at the top. The so-called Byelorussian cost accounting became another example of this. The discussion on how to switch over to cost accounting could become a serious theme and a constructive discussion in the Republic—something that could unite the most diverse forces. But the Byelorussian officials decided it all for their people, together with officials from Moscow.

The comparison of the Byelorussian cost accounting with cost accounting in the Baltic Republics makes much of it understandable. The Byelorussian version essentially limited itself to increasing taxes to the Republican budget from all-Union enterprises. The Baltic version centres on the question of property, on who'll dispose of the work done by the enterprises working in the Republic and who will decide what's beneficial for the Republic. If the number of national enterprises is small—up to 10 per cent, as in Byelorussia—then, no matter what the taxes are, the situation is such that the republic literally sells itself, its natural resources and manpower.

Moreover, Byelorussian cost accounting was established as distinct from the Baltic, not through open parliamentary discussions, but through the USSR Council of Ministers. This is hardly fair, because such a question is not the affair of a single Republic in relation to the centre, but deals with all the republics in the Union. But this road was convenient for the "contracting sides". The officials in Moscow got from at least one Republic support for the version of cost accounting which they would like every Republic to adopt. And the officials in Minsk got the desired percentage of taxes from enterprises. And yet, maybe we should not completely do away with the command system, since it secures in the Republic a relatively reasonable standard of living.

First, it is precisely relative. It is nowhere near the level of the industrialized countries.

Second, the command system is deceptive in that it provides solution that is really only a breathing space. The Byelorussians know this very well. Let's take the draining of swamps in the western regions. At first there were bumper harvests. And then? Then the fertile layer was blown away in many places and Byelorussian earth drifted almost to Italy. Another example is the present successes of the Republic's pig-breeding on the basis of large complexes. But what awaits us in the future? The pig-breeding complexes were built without sludge tanks or cleaners, and large amounts of run-off into rivers are polluting water and soil. And what will happen tomorrow?

Third, we can already discern the first signs of the problems ahead. One of them is the crisis of school education and its material basis. Children study in two

shifts up to grade 6-7 in classes of 40-45 pupils. The prestige of the teaching profession, traditionally high in Byelorussia, is falling.

Byelorussia is lucky. It has been given another chance. Perestroika started when Byelorussia had not as yet entered the period of economic depression which has so much complicated the situation in other Republics. But depression inevitably awaits us if we don't refuse the command system, which has outlived itself. It is better to start perestroika from a more favourable situation. While it is still possible.

Gomel First Secretary on Chernobyl Clean-up

90UN0601A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 23 Nov 89 p 3

[Interview with Aleksandr Adamovich Grakhovskiy, first secretary, Belorussian CP Gomel Obkom, by BELTA correspondents V. Kotov and A. Kryzhanovskiy: "Chernobyl—Our Pain and Concern"]

[Text] [Correspondent] Aleksandr Adamovich, in congratulating you on election to a high post, above all we ask: Do you regret having to leave the oblispolkom? After all, the times ever more persistently demand a return to power of the soviets. Is it also possible that an ispolkom chairman turns out to have more power than a first secretary?

[Grakhovskiy] Thank you for the congratulations. It should be said that I had sufficient power being an oblispolkom chairman. I was able to make many decisions independently. However, responsibility for the possible socioeconomic consequences prompted me in many cases to resort to collective reason. Not to hide behind someone, but for the purpose of avoiding mistakes, which always harm the people's interests. I have never considered it disgraceful to consult with the first secretary, with Belorussian CP obkom buro members, and with ispolkom members. I do not see an infringement on the rights of the soviets in this, or of my own rights personally, as chairman. Yesterday, at the oblast soviet session, we elected a new chairman. Really, will I, who have definite experience with soviet work, not help him? This would not be in the party spirit, it would not be comradely.

As far as limiting the power of the party and the soviets is concerned, today, when the country is in a difficult economic situation, it would be wrong to weaken party influence on economic activity. Moreover, with the new year, the republic and oblast are converting to the principles of self-support and self-financing. A tremendous field of work is opening up here for the party organizations, especially primary ones. What the forms and methods of work should be under the new economic conditions is another matter. Here, we must not permit redundancy, we must not replace the soviet bodies. However, to erect artificial barriers between the party and the soviets is to harm our common work.

It goes without saying, the present-day structure and the material and technical base of the soviets needs serious reconstruction. Which, incidentally, we are trying to do, both in local areas, as well as at the USSR Supreme Soviet session. However, I emphasize again that under no circumstances should we be divided along different sides and told who is more important. We have one power, soviet, and its chief meaning lies in showing concern for raising the people's standard of living and satisfying their spiritual and cultural needs.

[Correspondent] The Chernobyl calamity could not help but affect the mood of the people, their views and interrelations. How would you characterize today's moral situation in the oblast?

[Grakhovskiy] If I may, let me say a few words about traditions. Our kray has been international since the earliest times. The life paths of Belorussians, Russians, Ukrainians, and peoples of other nationalities have crossed here. There are more than 80 of them in the oblast. After the civil war, the Belorussians received landless Russian peasants on their meager allotments, and in the years of the fascist occupation, the residents of the burnt Belorussian countryside found shelter with their Russian brothers. Right now, in the border rayons of the three fraternal republics, Russians, Belorussians and Ukrainians have become related to one another and live with the same joys and concerns. The Belorussian language and our culture and traditions became native for most of them.

However, on the whole I would like the political situation in the oblast to be better. Many social problems are being solved slowly. This troubles people. We must improve the food supply and everyday services. We must build more housing and sociocultural projects.

We often hear that Chernobyl is the whole country's pain. I agree with this. However, this pain is somewhat sharper for us, who live and work here. I can in no way reproach my countrymen, with whom I have struggled against the consequences of the tragedy since April 1986. Of course, people expect help, specific and competent actions from physicians and scientists, from party and soviet leaders. How often, instead of this, do they get contradictory opinions from the pages of newspapers and journals? Yet, the occasional appearances of Minsk and local "emissaries," who are not averse to frightening people, in the affected areas do not help matters.

Indeed, we have many problems. Often the most essential things are lacking. After the accident, the cadre problem was aggravated. We are inviting those, in whom the pain of our wounded land is answered with pain, to go to the afflicted rayons and confirm their concern for the people through work. It is time that scientific institutions should already have their support points and laboratories here for constant work in the contaminated territory.

It alarms me that the subject of Chernobyl is becoming an opportunity for some, who strive for cheap popularity

with the people. It is possible that this will be displayed even more clearly during the election campaign to the supreme and local Belorussian SSR soviets. True, the voters are not who they were a year ago. They have begun to more deeply investigate the democratic processes of society and exactly evaluate those who lay claim to leadership. Therefore, I would very much like to ask everyone, involved with the fate of the people who live on the "sick" land, not to speculate on calamity, but to offer us aid and cooperation through specific, daily work.

[Correspondent] Two years ago, the Gomel Obkom Party Bureau and the oblast soviet ispolkom proposed the basis of a draft State Program for Eradicating the Consequences of the Chernobyl AES [Nuclear Power Plant] Accident. Finally, after long verbal battles, refinements and development, the program was accepted by the republic Supreme Soviet session. True, it must still be approved in the USSR Supreme Soviet for it to become law for Union departments as well. However, at a recent CPSU Central Committee Politburo meeting, the thought was expressed that it would be better to await the creation of a state-wide program for eradicating the consequences of Chernobyl, and that "three separate programs—Russian, Belorussian, and Ukrainian—are not quite a rational approach."

[Grakhovskiy] Your concern and doubt impress me: how much longer must we wait? Everyone knows that our oblast has suffered more than the others. Fifty-five percent of the contamination in the European part of the country is located in the Gomel area. More than 100,000 hectares of agricultural land have already been taken out of agricultural use. It will soon be reduced by yet another 140,000 hectares. Due to the accident at the Chernobyl AES, we have lost a whole large agricultural rayon, and a hectare contaminated with radionuclides cannot provide the same yield as a clean one. An outflow of able-bodied population has occurred from the zones of elevated radiation and this, unquestionably, is affecting the rates and quality of agricultural work. However, regardless of the complexity and difficulty, the oblast is fulfilling the assignments of the 5-year period in all basic indicators.

There is special attention for the social sphere of development. For example, this year the 5-Year Plan outlined putting 237 million rubles of capital investment into the non-production sphere, yet in the national economic plan we are allocating more by a factor of 1.7. Over recent years, more capital investments were made in health care alone, than in the 11th 5-year period, by a factor of nearly 3.

In the republic, not a single oblispolkom except ours has its own account in the Foreign Economic Bank. The earned hard currency of an oblast enterprise is deducted into the account, for acquiring modern medical equipment. This has made it possible to purchase imported equipment and devices for our treatment institutions, albeit not a great deal for the time being.

A year ago, the oblispolkom adopted a resolution to create a precision instrument-building laboratory under the GSKB of the Gomselmash Production Association, for producing medical equipment in oblast enterprises. Although the Gomselmash workers are now preparing the Polesye [Woodland] universal power facilities in series production, they have treated the medical order with full responsibility. Their instruments are already undergoing tests in oblast treatment institutions. The Korall, Gidroavtomatika, Elektroapparaty and other associations are also producing medical devices and instruments.

We hope that we will not be alone in this noble work. Meanwhile, unfortunately, the supply of medical equipment, instruments and medications for residents of the afflicted rayons is unsatisfactory.

As far as a state-wide program for eradicating the consequences of the Chernobyl AES accident, unified for Belorussia, the Ukraine and the Bryansk area, this approach does not contradict ours. Moreover, I think it is also necessary to have oblast and rayon programs.

It is the job of the country's government, in proportion to the development of republic programs, to coordinate them and organize their fulfillment. I, as a USSR people's deputy, and all republic representatives to the country's Supreme Soviet, should apply maximum efforts so that our program be approved as rapidly as possible.

Furthermore, we believe that a number of questions are imminent, and must be reinforced by separate legislative acts. These include ensuring the safety of human habitation in territories with an elevated level of contamination, legal defense for the afflicted population, the regulation of conditions for human habitation in the afflicted territory, and the use of contaminated lands. Without this, further work to eradicate the consequences of the accident will not be sufficiently effective.

[Correspondent] Aleksandr Adamovich, your speeches at the 12th session of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet, which discussed the draft of the program, and somewhat later in Moscow at the 1st Congress of Soviets, were sharply critical. Was this sparked by the fact that the situation is being aggravated?

[Grakhovskiy] I am more than certain that if they had helped us solve all problems with the material and technical and food supply, our situation here would be significantly better today. I should not have to take our pain to these high rostrums. Since 1986, we have been raising these questions, both orally and in writing. However, for a number of reasons they are not always resolved.

[Correspondent] To what are you referring?

[Grakhovskiy] There was no concept for safe human habitation in the contaminated territories, no well-founded medical standards for feeding the population

had been developed and approved, and a comprehensive assessment of the radiation situation was lacking. We repeatedly suggested reducing the oblast's delivery of agricultural production to republic and union funds, taking into account the damages and size and degree of radioactive contamination. However, the republic Gosplan and Gosagroprom are not taking these objective reasons into account. The matter has reached the point that, as I noted at the 12th Session of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet, last year the consumption of meat per resident in the oblast was only 63 kilograms, although it is 73 on the average in the republic. It seems that "zone of special attention" is only a pretty phrase.

We also have serious claims against the Ministry of Health Care and republic scientific institutions. I have already said that we did not commit the Chernobyl tragedy. We have a full right to demand that the interests of the people be protected by the state. Talk to the effect that they have already "given" us a great deal, that the people of Gomel want to "line their pockets" as a result of the accident, evoke disturbances. They should "give" us as much as we need, and the people of Gomel will do everything required of the oblast.

I want to stress that we, unfortunately, to this day are not getting full attention from the plan and directive bodies of the republic and the country. Moreover, ever more and more often we end up in the degrading role of petitioners, who spend their time at various kinds of calculations and justifications, who exhaust their nerves to prove legitimate requirements. I want to know whether or not the conscience of those leaders and specialists, who are creating artificial obstacles for us, is tormented?

[Correspondent] Unfortunately, mistakes have been made in the first stage of eradicating the consequences of the accident. Now the second stage is beginning, scientifically substantiated and economically proven. However, is there any guarantee that mistakes will not be repeated?

[Grakhovskiy] Hundreds of people have worked on the program—leaders of regions and departments, scientists and specialists. However, this in no way means that corrections will not be made in it, depending on the situation. In order to insure ourselves against mistakes, we need reliable scientific support for the program. Science is reconnaissance. Precisely the scientists should be the trail-blazers and work along with us, and the builders and decontaminators will follow behind them.

[Correspondent] Aleksandr Adamovich, we have not asked you a traditional question...

[Grakhovskiy] Let me guess—about plans? Today I do not know any leader who would issue a prescription for all cases in life, who would have a detailed program of action. We are all searching. I know the state of affairs in the oblast well, and for me the main thing today is to work persistently to implement the previously adopted programs for socioeconomic and cultural development.

Unquestionably, life will place new questions and problems on the agenda, and the oblast party organization will seek new answers and solutions.

[Correspondent] In speaking of great party officials, journalists usually avoid any details whatsoever related to the personal life of their heroes. Thus, through joint efforts the image of a party functionary is drawn, "all buttoned up." Could you briefly tell us about Grakhovskiy, the person?

[Grakhovskiy] I was born in the village of Dubrova in Zhlobinskiy Rayon. I was 4 months old when my father was arrested. Of my close relatives alone, 8 people were repressed. My mother, Yevgeniya Aleksandrovna, who was widowed at the age of 20, raised me. Right now, she is on pension. Well, everyone knows how we, the children of "enemies of the people," were treated then. After finishing school and trade school, I worked as a mechanic in a kolkhoz and later, as a brigade leader. I learned a great deal about life, its sorrow and happiness.

My wife, Lyudmila Ivanovna, works as a secondary school teacher and is also from a peasant family. Her parents lived in the village of Pogonnoye in Khoynikskiy Rayon, which was in the 30-kilometer zone.

My oldest son, Vladimir, works as an economist at the Minsk Automotive Plant, and the youngest, Yuriy, manages workshops at the Malinovshchinskiy Sovkhoz in Molodechnenskiy Rayon. My daughter, Yelena, is a fourth level student at the Moscow State University philosophy department.

In general, our family is ordinary. There are many such families. As far as I am concerned, no matter where I work, I will try to justify the people's trust.

Further Coverage of 9 December Estonian Party Plenum

Indrek Toome Speech

90UN0574A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 10 Dec 89 p 3

[Speech by Estonian SSR Council of Ministers Chairman Indrek Toome at the 16th Plenum of the Estonian CP Central Committee]

[Text] We are in a very strange situation. On the one hand we have the real and continuously-accelerating processes in the social life of Estonia and the rebirth of the hopes of our people for establishing an independent and economically-strong Estonia; and on the other, a deepening crisis situation in the party, increased contradictions in society as a whole, to include intra-party conflicts, and conflicting opinions. It is even more strange, since it was the party itself that until now has been the principal force in the process of perestroika, that has ensured democratic and stable development, and has been the real driving force and implementor of the changes already made.

One way or another, the situation is what it is, and it is normal. But there is something to think about. Especially at the present moment, as the rhythm of life is becoming more and more dynamic, as we are approaching free elections—and through them the birth of a new state authority, as we have set out to creatively break down the existing economic mechanism and replace it with a cost-accounting, self-regulating system. And all this under conditions in which the nationwide background is unclear, both in a political and in an economic sense.

In September 1988 the party brought forth a program of actions which met the aspirations of the people. And nevertheless, the year gone by has also brought forth many things which have led to criticism of the party actions on the part of a wide variety of forces, leading to intraparty schism and dissatisfaction.

Indisputably, the party should be at the center of our dialog today, in the sense that we must define together, honestly and not abruptly, a policy of party behavior in today's society and that of tomorrow. What should we undertake, and when? I am in favor of holding an Estonian Communist Party Plenum in the spring. But I think that, prior to the Congress, all the socialist-oriented groups in the Estonian CP should call a time-out in their activities—which might split the party into several. After the Congress it will be clear to all party members, how much the party has renewed itself, and the extent to which its new programs and regulations correspond with their own convictions; and then they will be able to make objective decisions on membership in the party.

Today the question of questions is—How will we be able to defend the interests of the people and democracy in Estonian society as it undergoes renovation? And defend these interests in fact; in such a way that the people sense that we are democrats, that they believe us; and not to be democrats in name only and follow our own interests exclusively, as the actions of certain political movements and leaders show so well. What is to be done? First of all, we must tie-in the ideological-theoretical and practical program of party actions with the development of society. In order to achieve success, we must act boldly, in new ways, and we must take into consideration the experiences which reach our ears every day from the other republics and from the other socialist countries of Eastern Europe. Unfortunately, of late the actions of the Estonian CP have not always coincided with these thoughts.

The past can be corrected by the future. And this is completely applicable to the party as well. At the very same time it seems to me that, although there is never enough time, we often act as if we live only in expectation of the future, forgetting that there is a present in which we have obligations, including the obligation to take one decision or another at this very moment, at the correct time. And, whereas people often say: let's not hurry, let's think some more, let's weigh things; in fact, no matter how much one weighs things, any decision is taken in the

course of a moment. The proper choice of this moment—is a reliable pledge of the success of the party. Today we must establish that the party's loss of influence can be explained largely by a poor sense of timing. And in politics, delay has very painful results. Here is an example to support this fact. The political reality of today, and that of yesterday as well, is that no single party or no single movement has a monopoly on the truth any longer. And this has nothing to do with our desires. And nevertheless, the party was not the first to raise the question of amending Article 6 of the Constitution; and that is a great pity.

More's the pity, that every true Communist would no doubt acknowledge that a Constitution which states that there is no higher source of authority than the people, is a good one. And in every democratic, law-governed state the people manifest their authority primarily by exercising their right to vote, as citizens. Then why hold onto obsolete privilege? Today every one of us is convinced that we must not. Moreover, we are convinced because we have long since actually had a multi-party system. But we are late to verify this fact, and come to the legitimate conclusions.

Comrades! The fact of the matter is that today I do not want to speak about the party and its program of actions and the practice of its activities, so much as I want to speak about the one real party mission of every Communist present here—to ensure the realization of the concept of IME [Self-Managing Estonia], to ensure genuine, healing transformations both in the economy and in social life.

In the report it was properly noted that, with the realization of IME we have entered a new stage. The period of theoretical and political support of IME, which culminated in the 27 November decisions of the USSR Supreme Soviet, is behind us. It no longer makes any sense to argue about the decision itself, or about ambiguity in this or that article, or about the fact that suddenly someone in Moscow is trying to meddle. They probably are trying to, no doubt about it. And all the same, the very act of making the decision was probably a very significant victory, which the forces of perestroika had been seeking in order to make radical transformations in the economic life of our huge country during the years of perestroika.

IME is now no longer the private business of some movement or other, or of some political force; republic cost-accounting for us is on the one hand, in the broad sense, a question of a larger policy of supporting perestroika; and on the other, it is for our people a means of finding themselves and a path to true openness and genuine independence in making decisions, a concrete and difficult path.

Are we ready for this? What must be done in order to be more radical, to strive for maximum success from the very first day of economic independence?

This today is the common concern and the common joy of our entire nation, and all communists.

Where are we today? What must be done in order to be a step farther along tomorrow?

We have been seriously occupied with establishing legal guarantees and laws for IME. IME requires 200 legislative acts, perhaps even more. But they are not needed immediately. For an operating base, we need about a dozen laws, or perhaps a few more. But they must be in such a form that they could be executed in real life. Laws on self-government and property, prices and taxes, banking business and circulation of money, land reform and wage reform—these are the most important ones. It is well that they basically exist at the present time. Some are already being discussed in parliament, others are being examined by the government, and so on. But what is bad is, that on the whole we are not prepared to apply them. For example, we have a principally-new budget, but we are still calculating revenues in the old way. And there's nothing you can do. We cannot adopt new prices and new taxes on 1 January, because both the law on prices and the law on tax-assessment must be supplemented by many normative documents, which we do not yet have today... Secondly, we must take into consideration the interaction of the new laws. It would probably not be proper to change prices and taxes without changing the wage system, and so on.

That is one side of the matter, the objective side. The second side is connected with human psychology. Here we often lapse into confused thinking, and find ourselves in the grip of its conservatism. And this hinders us; moreover, more than we care to admit. Let's take the budget, the drafting of which was often a genuinely painful process. Painful because, for the first time our true interests came forth; for the first time the opportunity arose to change something in a manner of our choosing. And nevertheless, we have no satisfactory results. And why? Because there isn't enough money? Yes, probably that too. But it is also precisely the fact that we can divide up only that which we actually have in our purse. Only one circumstance is disturbing: to a large extent we are still captive to the idea of trying to get some additional income from somewhere, forgetting that every balance has two sides. We can and must reduce expenditures. And there probably are some reserves, because the mechanism that has been in operation up to now was truly an expensive one. Reserves, and considerable ones exist both on the level of the republic, and that of the cities, rayons, and enterprises. We can search them out only if we reject the old routines. This is difficult, but it is necessary, and it is possible.

There are other obstacles on the path of concrete actions. For example, the budget and payments to the Union. In giving up 15.9 percent, or 340 million rubles, we place under threat both the invigoration of the economy, and the program of social restoration. On the other hand, the USSR Supreme Soviet has attributed to these figures the force of law. And our own people's deputies took part in

that process. Thus, we cannot accept this decision; but neither can we, acting by ourselves, refuse to pay. It is necessary to continue a genuine parliamentary dispute, whatever the decision the Supreme Soviet made yesterday.

I have cited these examples merely in order to generalize.

The immediate and complete establishment of IME is not realistic. But we must take as large a step as possible. By placing these thoughts on the daily agenda, we arrive at a situation in which we must be constantly thinking, all together, and must be prepared for the fact that after awhile, our solution will have to be supplemented. For example, like that which takes place with the budget. At year's end we can approve one version, but in the course of the next year, when we will be able to introduce new prices and new taxes, we shall also have to renew the budget. This is our present objective inevitability. We must consider this in our everyday activities.

In order to achieve true success in such a situation, we must reject attempts to politicize IME; we must rid ourselves of departmental and private interests, and must cast off attempts to win popularity for one movement or another with the help of IME, and so on. This is hard. No doubt about it. Those who affirm that politics never was a very clean business are right. That's the way it is. At the very same time, Estonia's economy today requires a sober, pragmatic approach, free from politics. Otherwise the entire cause of IME will be threatened. I hope we all have the wisdom to understand this.

True, there is a very important aspect, where politics are just what we need for the success of IME. This is the concept of actively enlisting our non-Estonian populace both to support economic reform, and to renew social life as a whole. This is a question in which the party itself can and must assert itself prominently.

Quite naturally, the government is primarily responsible for the economic policy of IME. As the leader of the government, I can assure you that we are fully aware of the degree of our responsibility here.

Presently our daily concerns are connected with far more than working out laws for IME. Resolving concrete problems of the economy is our main thrust. Providing material-technical supply, protecting the domestic market, supporting the people's standard of living, balancing the amount of money and goods; developing the social sphere and social security, the infrastructure of the national economy and the effectiveness of the economy, and the like—such are the daily concerns of the government.

We know full well that it is not enough that the people are fed, clothed and shod. It is necessary that the people have everything that makes life pleasant, that enriches a person. Decentralization of culture and education, and priority development of the financing of these spheres—

is one of the most important priorities of the moment. Not one of these problems can be called easy. There are no simple solutions here.

And that is precisely why the government deemed it necessary to reorganize the Administration of Affairs of the Council of Ministers. Yesterday the Supreme Soviet supported our initiative on modernizing the structure of republic administration, and on fundamental renovation of the government. A resolution was adopted on establishing the Bank of Estonia beginning 1 January 1990. All of these measures are necessary for organizational support of perestroika.

Comrades! One can err in many ways, but in order to act properly there is ordinarily only one possibility. It is hard to hit the target, and even harder to hit a target like IME. Like it or not, we will be able to do this only by working all together, constructively and purposefully.

I wish everyone strength and success in this.

Miik Titma Speech

90UN0574B Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in
Russian 10 Dec 89 p 3

[Speech by Estonian CP Central Committee Secretary Miik Titma]

[Text] After the preceding oration it is somewhat easier to speak, for I will not have to repeat what was already stated, even though at first I was thinking of speaking on these very problems. But now I shall try to single out only those questions which appear to be the most important ones for making a decision today.

First of all, has the Central Committee been passive, and could it have taken on a more active role? Many of the speakers have entirely forgotten the background system. Let us return to the real world. Whereas in Czechoslovakia and the GDR there is no longer any need to turn to the experience of Hungary and Poland, Bulgaria is still faced with that need. The ruling parties and their ideology were torn down the faster, the later the process began. This should eliminate the question on whether it was a matter of the ideological department not working hard enough, or whether this or that leader was too strong. Probably it was another matter, a much more serious one.

The second problem. If one looks at what is taking place throughout Eastern Europe, and then look at the national republics of the Soviet Union, even a blind man has to see that the nations are striving for state independence. This, just as after the First World War, is now manifest in Eastern Europe in full force. If we now look at things in this light, then perhaps it is not necessary to make accusations that the Central Committee changes its point of view too rapidly, as Gusev and Malkovskiy were saying. On the other hand, Laak noted that we are dragging things out too long.

Practically speaking, the Estonian CP Central Committee and its leadership were playing three roles, explained by the fact that we are speaking about the ruling party. First of all, affairs in Estonia must be handled wisely—in such a way that she might live and work, in spite of the enormous political awakening which has taken place and during which intrigue and all such things are inevitable. Secondly, we must not bang the doors in the central organs and adopt some declaration or another for effect, but maintain sincere and business-like contacts, and strive for all changes through these contacts.

Thirdly, the preceding speaker put it very well: it is not very smart to divide the Estonian CP on the national principle. One can speak very critically, abuse one another, and accuse one another of all sorts of mortal sins. Until now the Estonian CP has been the principal buffer between the Estonians and the Russian community, and this buffer has made it possible to carry on constructive policies in the republic. While carrying out these three roles there were, of course, mistakes; but there were also, obviously, successes. Let us think for a moment: if we start to eliminate the Estonian CP, just who will carry out these roles in Estonia and what will happen then?

Let us now examine the following question. Why is the problem of elections so significant in deciding the party's fate? I am sure that in the pre-election struggle Malkovskiy will present the very same slogans which he has until now, modifying them slightly. I am sure that in the elections, Pyldroos will stand for the very same positions that he has stood for up to now. And I am sure that the rest who run for office in the republic Supreme Soviet will speak from their own positions. What could a congress do before the elections? It could split us and create in fact a situation in which opportunities for other movements would seem to be much greater. And this is what it would necessarily do. But if we would hold an intraparty discussion, give everyone an opportunity to speak from their own points of view, as they present their political line, and after this convene a Congress—we shall then begin to build a party of a new type.

Here certain people are talking about a political platform. Laak, speaking on television yesterday, was no doubt correct when he stated that in Sweden it is very difficult to distinguish the platform of one party from another. The problem is usually elsewhere: what are the social interests, and what groups are joining together in an alliance, or are electing a single organization as an "umbrella."

When we do resolve the question of our future party, it will nevertheless be a party of a new type: a type of party which is capable of operating in conditions of the elimination of a monopoly on power, a party which is no longer an integral part of the state as it was until now, but one which competes with other parties. Consequently, this will be an alliance of forces of a certain political and ideological direction. After we have gone through the

elections, we will no doubt become more patient, we will understand this and will be able to wisely form the left wing of the future Estonia. What danger is most obvious today? A great many people are now trying to simply make a career of politics. Everyone is ready to create his own party: conservatives, liberals, and social democrats; there are even four or five pretenders. Considering the activity of my father, I have perhaps more right to this party than any of these pretenders.

But all this could lead to a disastrous dissipation of strength, and no effective political mechanism has sprung up among us. This is the very greatest danger. Hence the decision which we are now presenting to you: to hold a Congress when the elections are already behind us and when we can actually unify this common part to the maximum. We should not make any ideological claims on one another, but look at who could make what contribution to the general platform. Thus, we shall be able to preserve in Estonia a truly effective political mechanism and an effective political force. I am not certain that the Communist Party of Lithuania is operating as forward-looking and as wisely as it could. In Hungary the change of leaders had very sad consequences. One could say that the cause was a failure. Thus, we must think more deeply and then build a party of a new type.

Revised Estonian SSR Draft Law on Immigration
90UN0597A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in
Russian 16 Dec 89 p 2

["The Draft of the Estonian SSR Law on Immigration"]

[Text] The administration of the migratory processes in Estonian SSR consists in regulating the immigration from the other union republics and foreign states, the emigration from Estonian SSR, and the migration within Estonian SSR. The purpose of this Law is to regulate immigration into Estonian SSR.

The Law on Immigration sets as its goal the formation of a permanent population proceeding from the social and territorial succession, the organizing of the settlement in Estonian SSR of people who are closely linked with Estonian culture, and the regulation of immigration that guarantees an efficient rate of employment. At such time, provision is also made, with no detriment to the interests of the republic's permanent inhabitants, for the guaranteeing of the proper conditions for all persons living in Estonian SSR, on the basis of this Law.

The Law on Immigration is linked with Estonian SSR legislation that regulates questions of the native land, cultural autonomy, self-government, and emigration, and proceeds from the Universal Human Rights Declaration.

I. General Principles

Article 1. Subjects of the Law on Immigration and Types of Immigration

1) The subjects of the Law on Immigration are an individual or a family, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the local self-government that expresses the interests of the social and territorial association of people.

2) For purposes of the better structure of this Law and the normative acts evolving from it, the Law on Immigration classifies immigration into family migration; migration that is linked with the obtaining of an education; labor migration; and special migration. Pendulum migration is viewed as a special type of labor migration.

Article 2. Special Instances of the Application of the Law on Immigration

1) Pendulum migration in the borderland territories of Estonian SSR is regulated in the procedure that has been established by the Estonian SSR Government, with the intermediacy of the local self-governments and on the basis of understandings with them.

2) The internal migration of inhabitants of Estonian SSR is organized on the basis of an understanding with the local self-governments.

3) The temporary entry of persons into Estonian SSR and through passage over its territory are regulated in the procedure that has been established by the Estonian SSR Government.

Article 3. The Estonian SSR Migration Department

1) In order to implement the Estonian SSR Law on Immigration, the Estonian SSR Migration Department is created.

2) The statute governing the Estonian SSR Migration Department is approved by the Estonian SSR Government.

3) The Estonian SSR Migration Department implements the immigration policy that has been defined by Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet and the Estonian SSR Government, proceeding from the interests of the local self-governments that express the interests of the local population, as well as the immigrants' interests, and by acting as an intermediary among them.

4) The Estonian SSR Migration Department, for purposes of executing its duties, has the right to conclude agreements with enterprises, institutions, and organizations of foreign states and other union republics, and also favors the settlement in Estonian SSR of citizens of the Estonian Republic, exiled or illegally repressed individuals and their descendants, as well as other persons who are the bearers of the social and territorial succession of the Estonian population.

II. Types of Migration

Article 4. Regulation of Family Migration

1) When regulating family migration, assistance is rendered to unite families and preserve the integrity of the families during immigration into Estonia.

2) The settlement in Estonian SSR of children under the age of 16 years is resolved in conformity with their parents' wishes, but at such time consideration should be taken of the wishes of children older than 10 years. With regard to adolescents aged 16 to 18 years who do not form an independent family (who do not pertain to an independent family), the written consent of their parents or guardians is required.

Article 5. Regulation of Migration Linked With the Obtaining of an Education

1) The agreements between Estonian SSR and the other union republics or foreign states are the basis for planning the migration linked with the obtaining of an education.

2) A person arriving in Estonian SSR from other union republics for training purposes must have an official statement or invitation from the educational institution, as well as a permanent place of residence outside the confines of Estonian SSR.

Article 6. Regulation of Labor Migration

1) The Estonian SSR state policy concerning the rate of employment, and the attempt to achieve the efficient use of the available labor resources, are the basis for regulating the labor migration.

2) The initiative of the self-government to find jobs for the immigrants at the enterprises, institutions, and organizations that are situated on its territory is carried out by the Estonian SSR Migration Department in conformity with the state interests of Estonian SSR.

3) A person entering Estonian SSR by way of labor migration must have a permanent place of residence outside the confines of Estonian SSR, if a different procedure has not been established by the agreements with other union republics or foreign states.

Article 7. Regulation of Special Migration

1) Questions concerning the resettlement in Estonian SSR of military personnel who have been taken off the rolls in active military service and put in the reserves or retirement, and of former permanent residents of Estonian SSR who have been liberated from places of incarceration are resolved within the confines of the regulation of the special migration of permanent inhabitants of Estonian SSR.

2) The residing in Estonian SSR by personnel assigned to military units deployed in Estonian SSR, personnel in embassies, consulates, and representations, and refugees and persons requesting the granting of political asylum is regulated by agreements with the other union republics and foreign states.

3) The migratory records for persons sent from Estonian SSR to military service in other regions are kept in the procedure established by Estonian SSR Military Commissariat.

4) The migratory records for persons located at places of incarceration outside the confines of Estonian SSR are kept in the procedure established by Estonian SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs.

III. Establishment of Immigration Quota

Article 8. Immigration Quota

1) A quota is the maximum number of immigrants, which number is formed with a consideration of the recommendations made by the local self-governments. The Estonian SSR Law on Immigration regulates the settlement of persons in Estonian SSR in conformity with a quota that has been established for each calendar year.

2) The immigration quota and its structure, as subdivided by types and regions, for each calendar year are established by Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet in accordance with the recommendation of the Estonian SSR Government, simultaneously with the approval of the Estonian SSR State Budget and in conformity with it.

3) The quota encompasses all the persons residing in Estonian SSR.

IV. Residence Permits

Article 9. Classification of Residence Permits

1) Permits for residence in Estonian SSR are subdivided into temporary, fixed-period, and permanent.

2) The prerequisite for the obtaining of a temporary permit is the confirmed existence of means of subsistence that exceed the minimum standard of living, in the procedure established by Estonian SSR Migration Department.

3) A fixed-period permit is issued to a person having an understanding concerning training, work, or other activity in Estonian SSR.

4) A permanent residence permit is issued to persons who arrive in Estonian SSR as a result of family migration, and to persons who are linked with Estonian culture or who possess work skills or knowledge that are especially needed by Estonian SSR.

Article 10. Effective Period of Residence Permits

1) A temporary residence permit is issued for a period of no longer than 6 months.

2) A fixed-period residence permit is issued, as a rule, for a period of no more than 3 years. Persons who are enrolled as students (including military students and students at institutions of higher learning) are issued a

fixed-period residence permit that is determined by the duration of the training period.

3) If a person who resides permanently outside the confines of Estonian SSR marries a person who resides permanently in Estonian SSR, a residence permit is issued upon the first official request for 6 months, and upon the second official request is issued a residence permit for 5 years.

Article 11. Special Instances of Issuance of Residence Permits

1) A person for whom the effective period of his residence permit has elapsed, but who desires, after the termination of his labor contract or after graduation from an educational institution, to continue to live in Estonia, can, together with his close relatives (spouse, children, parents) make an official request for a permanent residence permit in the general procedure.

2) Close relatives of military servicemen (spouse, children, parents) are issued a fixed-period residence permit on the basis of their statement on the appropriate form.

Article 12. Limitations Accompanying Temporary and Fixed-Period Residence Permits

The place of residence of the person officially requesting a fixed-period residence permit is determined on the basis of the terms of the contract, after coordination with the local self-government.

Article 13. Residence Permit for Persons Who Have Committed an Administrative Offense or a Crime

The validity of a temporary or fixed-period residence permit for a person who has committed an administrative offense or crime is reviewed in the procedure established by Estonian SSR Migration Department.

Article 14. Termination of the Action of Residence Permits

1) Upon the expiration of the effective period of the residence permits, when they are terminated ahead of time, and also with regard to persons residing in Estonian SSR without a residence permit, the person is advised, in the procedure established by the Estonian SSR Government, that he must leave Estonian SSR.

2) The termination of the action of the residence permit can also occur on the initiative of the possessor of the residence permit.

Article 15. Issuance and Cancellation of Residence Permits, and State Duty

The procedure for issuance and cancellation of Estonian SSR residence permits, as well as the size of the state duty, are established by the Estonian SSR Government.

V. Work Authorizations

Article 16. Classification of Work Authorizations

1) Work authorizations are subdivided into fixed-period and permanent.

2) A fixed-period work authorization can be short-term (up to 6 months) or long-term (up to 3 years).

Article 17. Issuance and Termination of Work Permits

1) Upon arriving in Estonian SSR for work for a definite period of time, a person receives at Estonian SSR Migration Department a fixed-period work permit on the basis of an official request by the local self-government for work at a definite enterprise, institution, or organization.

2) The recipient of a fixed-period work permit must be permanently registered outside the confines of Estonian SSR if, in the corresponding union republic or foreign state, a different procedure has not been established.

3) Fixed-period work permits cannot be extended.

4) A work permit is terminated ahead of time in the procedure stipulated by the labor contract concluded with the appropriate person.

5) A person working on the border territory of Estonian SSR but living outside the confines of Estonia can be issued a permanent work permit if this is not established otherwise by an agreement between the self-governments.

6) The procedure for issuing and cancelling work permits is established by the Estonian SSR Government.

VI. Establishment of Benefits to Persons Who Have Been Overtaken by Migratory Processes

Article 18. Easing the Adaptation of Persons Who Have Settled in Estonian SSR

1) Estonian SSR Migration Department is obliged to take steps to assist persons who have received an Estonian SSR residence permit to adapt to the local conditions, for which purpose the Migration Department creates—in cooperation with the local self-governments, associations of the cultural autonomies, and public organizations, as well as with the persons who have received a residence permit—a system of courses in the Estonian language, culture, history, and state structure, and a system of educational programs.

2) The expenses linked with the adaptation of persons who have received a work permit are borne by the organization that requested the issuance of the work permit.

Article 19. Fund to Assist Persons Settling in Estonian SSR

For purposes of rendering assistance to persons settling in Estonian SSR, earmarked budgetary capital—the Estonian State Migratory Fund—is created under Estonian SSR Migration Department. The monetary means in that fund are formed from deductions taken from the

State Budget and from the funds of the associations of the cultural autonomies, organizations that were the initiators of people's resettlement, and other organizations and private individuals. The size of the deductions from the State Budget is established by Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet. The procedure for using the fund is determined by the Estonian SSR Government.

Article 20. Resettlement of Persons from Estonian SSR

1) Estonian SSR Migration Department is obliged, jointly with the other interested departments, to register all the persons resettling from Estonian SSR to other regions, who desire, in the event that they are absent for a period of no more than one year, to retain their status as a permanent resident of Estonian SSR and who assert this within the deadlines established by Estonian SSR Migration Department.

2) Questions linked with the granting of benefits to resettled individuals when resettling from Estonian SSR at their own request are regulated by agreements between the local self-governments of foreign states and other union republics, with the cooperation of the organizations that protect the citizens' rights, with a consideration of the person's wishes and his right to choose freely his place of residence.

VII. Organizing Information in the Migration Sphere

Article 21. Information linked with immigration

1) Estonian SSR Migration Department is obliged to acquaint a person who is arriving in Estonian SSR for residence or work with the rights and duties evolving from this Law.

2) The providing of false information by a person arriving in Estonian SSR for residence or work results in the cancellation of the residence permit and work permit.

3) Persons who have received a residence permit at Estonian SSR Migration Department are subject to mandatory record-keeping in the population registry.

4) Prior to the creation of the population registry, records pertaining to immigrants are kept by Estonian SSR Migration Department.

Article 22. Duties of enterprises, institutions, and organizations

To avoid limiting the citizens' rights and for purposes of rendering prompt assistance to persons having a residence permit or work permit, the enterprises, institutions, and organizations dealing with persons who have received a residence permit or work permit at Estonian SSR Migration Department are obliged:

1) work providers—to inform Estonian SSR Migration Department concerning the termination of the labor contract ahead of time;

2) educational institutions—to inform Estonian SSR Migration Department concerning the exmatriculation of students, their interruption of their curriculum, or their transfer to another educational institution;

3) law-enforcement agencies—to inform Estonian SSR Migration Department concerning all legal offenses pertaining to their competency that were committed by a person who has received a residence permit, or that were committed against such a person;

4) the civil-registry service—to inform Estonian SSR Migration Department immediately about any changes in the family situation of a person who has received a residence permit.

VIII. Other Legal Questions Linked With Immigration

Article 23. Operations with real estate, and rental contracts

1) Transactions involving the buying and selling of real estate (with the exception of real estate for production purposes) can be carried out only by a person having a permanent Estonian SSR residence permit.

2) In Estonian SSR, rental contracts can be concluded only with persons having a residence permit.

Article 24. Resolution of disputes

Differences of opinion that have arisen within the confines of this Law are resolved in the procedure established by the Estonian SSR Government.

Article 25. Responsibility for violating the Law on Immigration

Persons who are guilty of violating the Law on Immigration bear responsibility in the procedure stipulated by Estonian SSR legislation.

Article 26. Procedure for applying the Law on Immigration

This Law is not retroactive.

[End of draft]

Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Resolution, "The Draft of the Estonian SSR Law on Immigration"

Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet resolves:

1. To submit the draft of the Estonian SSR Law on Immigration for public discussion, by publishing it in the RAKHVA KHYAEL and SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA newspapers.

2. That the local soviets of people's deputies, state and public agencies, and the mass media summarize the recommendations and comments that have been received during the course of the public discussion and submit them, in summarized form, by 10 January 1990 to the Legislative Intentions Commission, Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet.

3. That the Legislative Intentions Commission, Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet, review and summarize the recommendations and comments received from the citizens, labor collectives, and state and public organizations with regard to the law draft, and report on them to Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet at the second reading of the draft.

A. Ryuytel, Chairman, Presidium of Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet,

A. Almann, Secretary, Presidium of Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet.

Tallinn, 6 December 1989.

Law on Estonian SSR Government

90UN0589A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 13 Dec 89 pp 1, 2

["Estonian SSR Law on the Government of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic"]

[Text] Chapter I

General Provisions

Article 1. The government of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic is the supreme organ of state administration of the Estonian SSR.

(1) The government of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic is the supreme organ of state administration of the Estonian SSR and is subordinate to the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian SSR.

(2) The government of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic is empowered to decide all questions of state administration assigned to its jurisdiction by the Constitution of the Estonian SSR and the present law.

Article 2. Composition of the government of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic. Procedures of formation of the government of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic.

(1) The government of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic is comprised of the chairman of the government of the Estonian SSR (prime minister) and ministers.

(2) The chairman of the government of the Estonian SSR (prime minister) and members of the government are named to and removed from their positions by the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian SSR.

(3) Upon removal of the chairman of the government of the Estonian SSR from his position, the government of the Estonian SSR shall resign in its entirety.

(4) The government of the Estonian SSR shall surrender its authority before the new membership of the Supreme Soviet at its first session.

(5) A member of the government of the Estonian SSR is appointed to and removed from his position upon recommendation of the chairman of the government of the Estonian SSR (prime minister).

(6) The Supreme Soviet of the Estonian SSR may appoint ministers to their positions irrespective of the number of ministers, but there shall be not more than 21 ministers.

(7) Deputy ministers, general directors of offices [vedomstvo] (departments), and directors of inspectorates of the Estonian SSR are appointed to and removed from their positions by the chairman of the government of the Estonian SSR (prime minister).

(8) In the event of the resignation of government of the Estonian SSR, it continues, upon the direction of the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian SSR, to exercise its authority until the formation of a new government of the Estonian SSR.

Article 3. The basic directions of the activity of the government of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic.

The government of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic, within the limits of its authority:

(1) creates conditions for development of a socially and economically strong and sovereign republic;

(2) concerns itself with the well-being and security of the population;

(3) ensures effective management of the economy, accelerated scientific and technical progress, and an improvement in the quality of work;

(4) develops in all ways commodity and money relations and partnership;

(5) realizes economic collaboration with the union republics and foreign countries;

(6) prepares draft laws of the Estonian SSR for submission to the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet;

(7) facilitates the development of independence of state administrative organs at all levels;

(8) concerns itself with preservation of the indigenous people and with the political and cultural development of Estonia's other national groups;

(9) ensures preservation of the natural environment and economical utilization of natural resources;

(10) concerns itself with implementation of the laws of the Estonian SSR, and also of the laws of the USSR and of international treaties and agreements which are in force within the Estonian SSR.

Article 4. Basic principles of the activities of the government of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic.

The government of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic:

- (1) is governed by the Constitution and other laws of the republic;
- (2) proceeds from the principles of broad democracy, openness in its activities, and consideration of public opinion;
- (3) ensures collegial examination of questions and personal responsibility of members of the government for the implementation of decisions that are passed;

Article 5. The responsibility and accountability of the government of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic

- (1) The government of the Estonian SSR is responsible and accountable to the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian SSR.
- (2) A newly formed government of the Estonian SSR presents a program of its activities for examination by the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian SSR.
- (3) The sessions of the government of the Estonian SSR are, as a rule, closed. Upon the decision of the chairman of the government of the Estonian SSR (prime minister) they may be conducted openly.
- (4) The government of the Estonian SSR ensures that its activities are open to the population.
- (5) The government of the Estonian SSR or a member of the government to whom an inquiry has been addressed by a deputy of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet is obliged to reply to this inquiry at a session of the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian SSR.
- (6) The government of the Estonian SSR examines recommendations of committees and commissions of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet, as well as proposals by deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian SSR, and informs them of the results of examination or of measures taken.
- (7) An expression of lack of confidence in the government of the Estonian SSR and early recall of the government of the Estonian SSR or of a member of it is a function of the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian SSR.

Chapter II

Competence of the Government of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic

Article 6. General questions of the competence of the government of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic

Within the limits of its authorities as envisaged by the Constitution of the Estonian SSR and the present law, the Estonian SSR government:

- (1) implements the program of economic and social development of the republic;

- (2) coordinates and directs the activities of the ministries of the Estonian SSR, offices (departments) of the Estonians SSR, inspectorates of the Estonian SSR, and other state organs and organizations;

- (3) directs and controls to the extent of its authorities the activities of executive organs of local self-government within the Estonian SSR;

- (4) organizes and controls the implementation of its own decisions.

Article 7. Basic powers of the government of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic in the field of social development, education, and culture

The government of the Estonian SSR:

- (1) carries out a unified social policy, ensures preservation and development of the Estonian language and culture;
- (2) implements and perfects a purposeful policy in the field of population and the family;
- (3) directs migration policy;
- (4) within the territory of the Estonian SSR, makes provision for cost-free general education and the possibility of obtaining professional training;
- (5) creates the material and technical base and the conditions necessary for the development of education, cultural, public health, and social security;
- (6) develops the strategic direction for development of housing and municipal facilities and services;
- (7) provides for the development of physical culture and sports;
- (8) creates special funds for social development, education and culture, directs activities connected with the preservation of historical and cultural monuments;
- (9) ensures development of the tourist and recreation industry.

Article 8. Basic powers of the government of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic in the field of economic development

The government of the Estonian SSR:

- (1) ensures strategic development of the economy of the Estonian SSR;
- (2) develops and submits to the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet draft legislation concerning long-term programs of economic and social development and takes measures for their realization.
- (3) organizes the development and realization of republic complex programs;
- (4) Develops and takes measures for protection and scientifically-based rational utilization of the land and

its mineral wealth, water resources, plant and animal life, for protecting the purity of the air and water, for ensuring the reproduction of natural resources and improvement in man's environment.

(5) takes measures for integration of the economy of the Estonian SSR into the economy of the USSR and the world economy.

(6) ensures a multiplicity of forms of property and organizational structures;

(7) concerns itself with decentralization of economic management, development of commodity-money relations, observance of the principles of cost-recovery and self-management in all areas of the economic activity of the republic and at all levels;

(8) conducts an innovative policy taking account of future developments in the structure of the economy;

(9) takes measures and allocates funds for the purpose of assisting regions and sectors of the republic's economy which find themselves in difficult circumstances or which require accelerated development;

(10) determines procedures for the utilization of special republic funds created for the purposes of economic development and disposes of them;

(11) ensures the organization of a unified system of accounting and statistics;

(12) organizes the development and introduction of state standards.

Article 9. Basic powers of the government of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic in the area of finances, credit, taxes, and prices

The government of the Estonian SSR:

(1) develop and implements republic policy in the area of finances, credit and taxes;

(2) develops and submits to the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet for its examination and approval draft legislation on the Estonian SSR state budget and organizes implementation of the state budget;

(3) implements and perfects republic policy in the area of prices and the price system.

Article 10. Basic powers of the government of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic in the area of labor and wages

The government of the Estonian SSR:

(1) conducts policy in the area of labor, employment and wages and takes measures for its improvement;

(2) formulates policy in the area of training, retraining, and improving the qualifications of personnel, ensures and organizes its implementation.

Article 11. Basic powers of the government of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic in the area of science and technology

The government of the Estonian SSR:

(1) conducts policy in the area of developing science and technology, ensures the material and technical base necessary for this;

(2) ensures development and realization of complex programs of development of science and technology;

(3) creates special funds for the development of science and technology.

Article 12. Basic powers of the government of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic in the area of ensuring legality

The government of the Estonian SSR:

(1) ensures the maintenance of public order and protection of the rights and freedoms of citizens;

(2) develops draft laws for the purposes of perfecting existing legislation;

(3) organizes control over the observance of legislation by ministries of the Estonian SSR, offices (departments) of the Estonian SSR, inspectorates of the Estonian SSR and by all enterprises, institutions and organizations situated and functioning on the territory of the Estonian SSR.

Article 13. Basic powers of the government of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic in the area of ensuring the security and military preparedness of the state

Within limits defined by the Constitution of the Estonian SSR, the government of the Estonian SSR takes measures to ensure the security and military preparedness of the republic.

Article 14. Basic powers of the government of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic in the area of foreign political activity

The government of the Estonian SSR:

(1) concludes treaties with the governments and organizations of other states;

(2) organizes the relations of the Estonian SSR with foreign states and international organizations, and also the receipt of information of interest to the sides and the exchange of this.

(3) reaches decisions regarding the opening of representations of the republic in other states and the opening of representations of other states within the Estonian SSR.

Article 15. Questions decided at sessions of the government of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic

Questions of carrying out state policies, social and economic problems, and also the course of fulfillment of the laws of the Estonian SSR and the decrees of the government of the Estonian SSR are examined at sessions of the government of the Estonian SSR.

Chapter III

Relationships of the Government of the Estonian SSR with Other Organs of State Administration

Article 16. Relationships of the government of the Estonian Soviet socialist Republic with the USSR Council of Ministers and with the councils of ministers of the union republics

(1) The government of the Estonian SSR cooperates with the USSR Council of Ministers and with the councils of ministers of the union republics.

(2) For purposes of ensuring continual ties between the government of the Estonian SSR and the USSR Council of Ministers and the councils of ministers of the Union republics, representations of the Estonian SSR may function in Moscow and in the capitals of the union republics.

Article 17. Relationships of the government of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic with the executive organs of local self-government

The government of the Estonian SSR:

(1) with the participation of executive organs of local self-government, organizes the administration of objects and branches of nationwide significance (electric power and communications networks, railways, motor vehicle roads, and other communications);

(2) Ensures implementation of the state's regional policy and direction by the state of the activities of local self-government in the area of social security, public health, popular education, culture, and environmental protection.

Article 18. Direction of Estonian SSR ministries, Estonian SSR offices (departments) and other organs subordinate to the government of the Estonian SSR

(1) The government of the Estonian SSR guides the work of Estonian SSR ministries and of committees and commissions of the government of the Estonian SSR and directs the activities of offices (departments) of the Estonian SSR and inspectorates of the Estonian SSR.

(2) The government of the Estonian SSR approves resolutions concerning the ministries and government committees of the Estonian SSR, offices (departments) of the Estonian SSR, and inspectorates of the Estonian SSR.

Article 19. Control of the government of the Estonian SSR over the activities of its organs

(1) The government of the Estonian SSR exercises control over the work of Estonian SSR ministries, offices

(departments) of the Estonian SSR and other organs subordinate to the government of the Estonian SSR.

(2) The chairman of the government of the Estonian SSR (prime minister) may require a report from each Estonian SSR minister and each Estonian SSR office (department) and inspectorate director.

(3) Within the limits of its competence, the government of the Estonian SSR has the right to annul the acts of Estonian SSR ministries, Estonian SSR offices (departments), and other Estonian SSR organs subordinate to the government.

(4) The government of the Estonian SSR may impose disciplinary penalties on ministers of the Estonian SSR and their deputies as well as on the directors, and their deputies, of offices (departments) of the Estonian SSR and of other organs subordinate to the government of the Estonian SSR.

Article 20. Ministries of the Estonian SSR

(1) The ministries of the Estonian SSR are the central organs of state administration.

(2) The ministries of the Estonian SSR are headed by ministers.

(3) The ministries of the Estonian SSR implement the policies of the government of the Estonian SSR, direct corresponding spheres of administration on the basis of the laws of the Estonian SSR and of resolutions and instructions of the government of the Estonian SSR, and verify their fulfillment within the limits of their own competence.

(4) The ministries of the Estonian SSR have the right, within the limits of their competence, to pass normative acts.

Article 21. The offices (departments) of the Estonian SSR and the Inspectorates of the Estonian SSR

(1) The offices (departments) of the Estonian SSR and the inspectorates of the Estonian SSR are established by the government of the Estonian SSR for purposes of direction, coordination, and control in questions of state administration, organization of economic life, and other questions which do not fall directly within the functions of the ministries.

(2) The offices (departments) of the Estonian SSR are headed by general directors and the inspectorates of the Estonian SSR—by directors.

(3) The offices (departments) of the Estonian SSR and the inspectorates of the Estonian SSR function within the administrative spheres of their respective ministries but are not subordinate to the ministries, and they maintain relations with the government of the Estonian SSR through the corresponding ministry.

(4) The offices (departments) of the Estonian SSR and the inspectorates of the Estonian SSR may within the

limits of their competence issue normative acts and control fulfillment of the laws of the Estonian SSR and the resolutions of the government of the Estonian SSR.

Article 22. Committees of the government of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic

(1) The government of the Estonian SSR forms committees of the government of the Estonian SSR for purposes of preparing important questions relating to development of the economy, policy in the area of finances, credit and prices, social policy, and policy in the area of popular education and culture.

(2) The committees of the Estonian SSR government are comprised of ministers of the Estonian SSR and, in cases of necessity and upon the recommendation of the chairman of the government of the Estonian SSR (prime minister), of scholars and specialists.

(3) The work of an Estonian SSR governmental committee is directed by the chairman of the government of the Estonian SSR (prime minister) or by a minister designated by the government of the Estonian SSR.

Article 23. Commissions of the government of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic

When necessary, the government of the Estonian SSR creates standing and temporary commissions for purposes of elaborating various specific questions, examining disagreements, and preparing draft laws and proposals. Their composition and procedures for their operation and for the submission and examination of their proposals are determined by the government of the Estonian SSR.

Chapter IV

List of Ministries of the Estonian SSR and Operating Procedures of the Government of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic

Article 24. Ministries of the Estonian SSR

The ministries of the Estonian SSR include the:

Ministry of Construction;

Ministry of Education;

Ministry of Justice;

Ministry of Trade;

Ministry of the Environment;

Ministry of Culture;

Ministry of Economics;

Ministry of Material Resources;

Ministry of Agriculture;

Ministry of Finance;

Ministry of Communications;

Ministry of Internal Affairs;

Ministry of Social Questions;

Ministry of Health;

Ministry of Transport;

Ministry of Industry and Energy;

Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Article 25. Meetings of the government of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic and procedures for the passage of decisions at meetings.

(1) The government of the Estonian SSR is a collegial organ.

(2) Meetings of the government of the Estonian SSR are held as necessary.

(3) The government of the Estonian SSR is legally empowered if not less than half the members of the government are present at a meeting of it.

(4) At meetings of the government of the Estonian SSR, decisions are approved by majority vote of the members of the government. In the case of an equal distribution of votes, the chairman of the government of the Estonian SSR (prime minister) has the deciding vote.

Article 26. The chairman of the government of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic (prime minister)

(1) The chairman of the government of the Estonian SSR (prime minister) heads the government of the Estonian SSR and coordinates its activities. The chairman of the government of the Estonian SSR represents the government of the Estonian SSR.

(2) The chairman of the government of the Estonian SSR (prime minister):

1) establishes the personnel composition of the government of the Estonian SSR and submits corresponding proposals to the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian SSR.

2) presents proposals concerning reorganization of the government of the Estonian SSR to the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet;

3) in urgent situations, approves decisions, when necessary drawn up in the form of governmental decrees, with regard to individual questions of state administration that fall within the competence of the Estonian SSR government, informing the government of this at its next scheduled meeting.

(3) In case when the chairman of the Estonian SSR government (prime minister) is temporarily unable to perform his duties, he is replaced by a minister designated by the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium at the recommendation of the prime minister.

(4) A minister performing the duties of chairman of the government of the Estonian SSR (prime minister) signs acts and official letters of the government of the Estonian SSR as follows: "Minister of the Estonian SSR on behalf of the Chairman of the Government of the Estonian SSR (Prime Minister)."

Article 27. Resolutions and decrees of the government of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic

(1) A decision of the Estonian SSR government that bears a normative character or is of general significance is legally formulated as a resolution [postanovleniye]. Resolutions of the government of the Estonian SSR are published in VEDOMOSTI ESTONSKOY SSR and when necessary are brought to general attention through the mass information media. A resolution of the government of the Estonian SSR is effective if it has been signed by the chairman of the government of the Estonian SSR (prime minister) and the minister of state of the Estonian SSR.

(2) Decisions concerning operational or other current questions are issued in the form of decrees [rasporozheniye], which are signed by the chairman of the government of the Estonian SSR (prime minister).

Article 28. The apparatus of the government of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic

(1) The government of the Estonian SSR has a state chancellery, headed by a Estonian SSR minister of state. The Estonian SSR minister of state functions under the direction of the chairman of the Estonian SSR government (prime minister).

(2) The structure of the state chancellery is approved by the chairman of the government of the Estonian SSR (prime minister).

(3) The Estonian SSR minister of state is appointed to and removed from his position by the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet based on the recommendation of the chairman of the Estonian SSR government (prime minister).

(4) The functions of the state chancellery and the responsibilities of the Estonian SSR minister of state are defined by a decision approved by the government of the Estonian SSR.

(5) An institute of government advisors is established within the state chancellery for the purposes of providing consultation to the chairman of the Estonian SSR government (prime minister) and its ministers with regard to complex questions of state administration and the economy.

(6) The governmental advisors are appointed to and removed from their positions by the chairman of the government of the Estonian SSR (prime minister).
Chairman of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, A. Ryuytel

Secretary of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, A. Almann
Tallinn on 6 December 1989

Estonian SSR Law on Local Government

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["Law of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic on the Basic Principles of Local Government"]

[Text] Chapter I

General Provisions

Article 1. The Concept of Local Government

Local government is the independent resolution of issues pertaining to local life, carried out within the framework of Estonian SSR laws by the inhabitants directly or through appropriate agencies, based on the interests of the inhabitants and the specific features of the development of the administrative territory in question.

Article 2. The structure of local government

(1) Local government is based on the administrative territorial division of the Estonian SSR.

(2) Local government is carried out on two levels. The primary level consists of volosts (or rural soviets, henceforth referred to as "volosts"), settlements and cities (cities under rayon jurisdiction, henceforth referred to as "cities"); the second level—of uyezds (rayons, henceforth referred to as "uyezds") and republic cities (cities under republic jurisdiction, henceforth referred to as "republic cities"); moreover, the government agencies of the latter simultaneously perform the functions of primary-level local government.

(3) Primary-level local government provides, in accordance with the laws on the volost and the city, proceeding from the interests of the inhabitants and within the framework of autonomous economic activity, for the resolution of questions of local significance.

(4) Secondary-level local government provides, in accordance with laws on the uyezd and the city, and proceeding from the interests of the inhabitants and the state's regional policies, for the balanced development of all spheres of life in the given administrative territory, for the implementation of the laws of the Estonian SSR, and for the monitoring of their execution.

Article 3. The exercise of local government

In accordance with the laws of the Estonian SSR, inhabitants exercise local government:

1. Directly through popular voting (referendum) or public discussion, as well as by way of civic initiative through various associations, or individually.

2. Through government agencies that are formed according to procedures established by the Estonian SSR Law on Elections to Local Soviets of People's Deputies, by this law, and by laws on the volost, uyezd and city.

Article 4. The basic principles of local government

Local government is based on the following principles:

1. Self-government, and independent decision making and exercise of administrative authority, proceeding from the interests of the inhabitants of the given administrative unit, the specific features of the development of its territory, and local capabilities.

2. Legality and the ensuring of legality.

3. The contractual nature of relations between the government agencies of various local government units, and also between them and other juridical and physical persons.

4. Regional cost accounting.

5. The consideration of public opinion and glasnost in work, and the accountability of government agencies to the population.

Article 5. Associations of local government units.

Local government units have, in accordance with Estonian SSR laws, the right to establish associations, which may pursue their interests on both the intrastate and the international level.

Chapter II

Local Government Agencies and Their Jurisdiction

Article 6. Local government agencies

(1) Local government agencies are:

1) the soviet of people's deputies (henceforth referred to as "soviet");

2) the volost, settlement and uyezd elder and the city mayor (chairman of the rural, settlement, rayon and city soviet);

3) the volost, settlement, uyezd and city ispolkom (the ispolkom of the rural, settlement, rayon and city soviet);

4) the auditing commission.

(2) The soviet is the representative assembly of the corresponding local government and consists of soviet members (people's deputies) who are elected by the administrative unit's inhabitants for a five-year term in accordance with the Law on Elections.

(3) The Soviet elects a chairman and deputy chairman of the soviet from among its members by secret ballot.

(4) The soviet, when necessary, forms commissions, elects commission chairmen from among its members,

and approves the membership of commissions, whose members may be both members of the soviet and other citizens.

(5) Under a soviet, as a consultative body, an assembly of village elders and elders of city regions may be formed at the primary level, and an assembly of volost and settlement elders and city mayors may be formed at the secondary level.

(6) Volost and settlement elders and city mayors are elected by the appropriate soviets by secret ballot; uyezd elders and mayors of republic cities are appointed by appropriate soviets. Proposals of candidates for them may be made either by soviet members, or—at the primary level—by the assembly of village elders and elders of city regions, or—at the secondary level—by the assembly of volost and settlement elders, the elders of city regions, and city mayors.

(7) The chairman of a volost, settlement or city soviet is simultaneously the volost or settlement elder or city mayor. The uyezd elder and mayor of a republic city is appointed by the appropriate soviet, and he may not be a member of that soviet.

(8) A volost, settlement and uyezd elder or city mayor, as well as the members of the corresponding ispolkom, must have a command of Estonian, Russian and other languages, in accordance with the requirements of the Estonian SSR Law on Language.

(9) The ispolkom is a collegial executive agency confirmed by the soviet on the recommendation of the elder or mayor for the term of its office; its membership includes the volost, settlement or uyezd elder or city mayor, his deputies, and members of the ispolkom (counsellors). The volost, settlement, city or uyezd secretary is an ex officio member of the ispolkom. The members of an ispolkom, with the exception of the volost or settlement elder or city mayor, may not be members of the corresponding soviet.

(10) The soviet elects an auditing commission by secret ballot; the chairman and deputy chairman of the commission must be members of the soviet.

(11) The auditing commission, on instructions from the soviet, exercises oversight over the activities of the ispolkom and the correctness of reporting, and also informs the soviet and the public of this.

(12) The soviet and the ispolkom have the rights of a juridical person. Other local government agencies have the rights of juridical persons if so stipulated by Estonian SSR legislation.

(13) The procedures for participation by the staff officials of local government agencies in entrepreneurial activities are regulated by Estonian SSR legislation.

(14) The jurisdiction and basic principles of local government agencies and the procedures for organizing their activities are established by this law, the laws on the

volost, uyezd and city, and other Estonian SSR laws; by acts of the Estonian SSR government stemming from such laws; and by decisions of the appropriate soviets and regulations governing the appropriate primary-level local government units.

Article 7. The Jurisdiction of local government agencies.

(1) Within the limits of their jurisdiction, local government agencies are independent. By mutual agreement they may delegate the right to decide questions belonging to their jurisdiction, together with the resources necessary to deal with them, to agencies at other levels of the administrative system. In the event that a dispute arises, a question is decided by a conciliation commission of the parties.

(2) The jurisdiction of a local government agency includes, on the basis of and within the limits established by Estonian SSR laws, the performance within its respective administrative territories of the following functions:

1. Administering its respective administrative territory.
2. Developing and implementing regional economic, social, cultural and demographic policies, and preserving the people's traditions and customs. Promoting implementation of the principles of cost accounting within its territory and the development of the territory's social and production infrastructure and municipal property.
3. Organizing general education; providing primary medical care and social security, and consumer, trade and other services to the population.
4. Creating the capabilities for providing inhabitants with housing.
5. Ensuring the general employment of the local population, and, together with the state migration service, resolving the questions of migration in accordance with Estonian SSR legislation.
6. Organizing the use of local resources and the local infrastructure.
7. Ensuring observance of the requirements of environmental protection and the provision of services and utilities.
8. Providing inhabitants with assistance in the event of natural and other disasters.
9. Ensuring public order and promoting the implementation of Estonian SSR legislation.

(3) Laws of the Estonian SSR may assign local government agencies the accomplishment of tasks in certain spheres of state administration. Assigning local government agencies any additional tasks not specified by laws is done only on the basis of an agreement concluded between the specific state agency and the soviet or ispolkom of the local government unit involved.

Article 8. Exclusive jurisdiction of the soviet of the primary-level local government soviet

A volost, settlement or city soviet decides the following questions, which belong to its exclusive jurisdiction:

1. In accordance with Estonian SSR laws on the budget, confirms the independent budget of the local government unit, as well as reports on the fulfillment of the budget and the utilization of additional nonbudgetary income sources. The draft budget, budget and report on its fulfillment are published for general information.
2. In accordance with Estonian SSR laws, sets local taxes, obligations and deductions, and resolves questions pertaining to the issuing and withdrawal of loans, as well as to the establishment of various obligations.
3. Resolves the questions of providing special benefits to physical and juridical persons with regard to taxes, obligations, deductions and stipends established by the soviet.
4. Establishes the legal regulations governing property that is under its municipal ownership, monitors the disposition and utilization of that property, and resolves the question of a change in that form of ownership and its combination on a cooperative basis with other forms of ownership.
5. Determines the basic guidelines for the development of the corresponding administrative unit, and confirms independent development plans.
6. Issues authorization and concludes contracts for the initiation of economic and construction activities within its administrative territory, in accordance with procedures established by Estonian SSR laws.
7. Checks on the fulfillment of contracts concluded with the soviet by all enterprises, institutions and organizations located within its administrative territory, and monitors their activities related to the fulfillment of normative acts on environmental protection, their utilization of land and natural resources, and their observance of sanitation regulations, regulations in the area of public health, and other requirements of Estonian SSR legislation.
8. Suspends the activities of an enterprise, institution or organization that are damaging the interests of the inhabitants of a given locality in spheres indicated in Point 7, or that violate the terms of a contract concluded with it; when necessary, applies other sanctions provided by Estonian SSR laws.
9. Establishes, on the basis of the inhabitants' interests and sanitation requirements, general procedures for providing services to the population.
10. Resolves questions of granting the use of land and other resources located within its administrative territory, according to procedures and within limits established by Estonian SSR laws.

11. Directs territorial planning activities within its administrative territory, and decides questions pertaining to the location of construction projects and the administrative center; presents petitions or issues conclusions on questions pertaining to the reorganization of the administrative unit and the changing of its boundaries, status and name; and decides questions pertaining to the conclusion of agreements on property relations that arise in these cases.

12. Considers citizens' petitions concerning settlement within its territory, and presents to the appropriate state agency its conclusion concerning the granting of permission for residence to newly arrived persons in accordance with Estonian SSR legislation.

13. Elects and removes from office the volost or settlement elder or city mayor, and approves, on the basis of his representation, the membership of the volost, settlement or city ispolkom and the wage fund for its office.

14. Hears the reports of the volost or settlement elder or city mayor and of the volost, settlement or city ispolkom on the implementation of the soviet's decisions.

15. Elects the chairman and deputy chairman of the auditing commission and the chairmen of other commissions, and confirms their membership and hears their reports.

16. Approves the statutes on the pertinent volost, settlement or city and makes amendments to them.

17. Presents proposals concerning approval of the seal and flag of its government unit and approves other symbols in accordance with Estonian SSR laws.

18. Exercises other powers within limits established by laws on the volost and the city.

Article 9. The volost, settlement and city ispolkom

(1) The volost, settlement or city ispolkom is the executive agency of the corresponding primary-level local government unit; it operates within the limits of the powers granted it by the soviet and protects the interests of its government unit. The volost or settlement elder or city mayor is the executive of the given ispolkom.

(2) The volost and settlement elder and city mayor are regular staff employees, and other members of the ispolkom may be regular staff employees. By decision of the soviet, they are paid wages from the appropriate local budget. The salaries of the volost and settlement elder and city mayor are set within limits established by the Estonian SSR government.

(3) The work of the ispolkom is supported by an office, within which structural subdivisions may be formed to deal with issues pertaining to one or several areas. The office's wage fund is approved by the corresponding soviet, and its staff positions are filled by the elder or mayor, together with the settlement or city secretary who heads the office.

Article 10. Volost, settlement and city regions

At the initiative of the inhabitants of an administrative unit, a volost, settlement or city soviet may form volost, settlement or city regions as self-governing subdivisions of the administrative territory. The soviet may delegate its powers for dealing with certain matters to such a subdivision's board or elder, whose status and powers are established by the laws on the volost, uyezd and city.

Article 11. The soviet of the uyezd and republic city

(1) The jurisdiction of the uyezd soviet and republic city includes the independent organization of those areas of life where the general interests of the inhabitants of several primary-level administrative units and of state administration interweave at the local level, or the organization of which has been delegated to it on the basis of contracts concluded with primary-level local government agencies.

(2) To coordinate its activities, the soviet may form a presidium, the membership of which includes the soviet chairman and deputy chairman, the chairmen of soviet commissions, and representatives of public organizations and movements represented on the soviet.

(3) The soviet chairman represents the soviet, directs the organization of its work, and directs the office that serves the soviet; the size of the office's staff and its wage fund are approved by the soviet.

(4) The soviet appoints and removes from office the uyezd elder and republic city mayor, sets his salary within limits established by the Estonian SSR government, and, based on the representation of the uyezd elder or city mayor, approves the staffing of the uyezd or city ispolkom and its wage fund, as well as the wage fund of the ispolkom's office.

(5) The soviet exercises other powers in accordance with the laws on the uyezd and the city.

Article 12. The uyezd elder, mayor of a republic city, and ispolkom of the uyezd and the republic city

(1) The uyezd elder or city mayor is the executive of the corresponding uyezd or city (republic-city) ispolkom, and is accountable to the soviet for the execution of its decisions; organizes the implementation of state policies and oversight over the execution of the laws in the given uyezd or republic city; is accountable in this area to the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet and government; and may take part in the work of the government with the right to speak but not to vote. The uyezd elder and republic-city mayor reviews for consent, according to procedures stipulated by Estonian SSR laws, the candidacies of executives appointed by republic agencies to the uyezd or republic city. Motives must be specified for his refusal of consent.

(2) The uyezd elder or city mayor is subject to confirmation by the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet no later than within a month after his appointment by the appropriate

soviet. In the event that his candidacy fails to be confirmed, the soviet appoints a new uyezd elder or city mayor within two weeks after the Supreme Soviet has adopted its decision; in the event that the candidate who is presented fails to be confirmed, the matter is resolved by the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet.

(3) The uyezd or city (republic-city) ispolkom includes the deputy uyezd elders or city mayors and the uyezd or city counsellors, who are confirmed by the soviet for the duration of its term on the basis of a representation by the uyezd elder or city mayor.

(4) The uyezd or city (republic-city) ispolkom has an office that is headed by an uyezd or city secretary confirmed by the republic government on the basis of a proposal by the elder or mayor in question.

(5) Each uyezd or city counsellor may have his own working staff as part of the respective office.

(6) The uyezd elder, republic-city mayor, members of the uyezd or city ispolkom, and employees of its office are paid out of the uyezd or city budget within limits established by the Estonian SSR government.

Chapter III

The Bases of the Economic Activities of Local Government

Article 13. Municipal property

(1) The economic activities of local government are based on municipal property.

(2) Municipal property is property belonging to the inhabitants of a given administrative territory through the soviet of the local government unit.

(3) Municipal property consists of the property that has been transferred to local government units by the state according to Estonian SSR legislation, as well as the property of municipal enterprises, institutions and organizations that have been established by local government agencies, the property acquired by them, and other property, including budget and nonbudget funds.

(4) The property that is under municipal ownership is owned, disposed of, and utilized, in the capacity of property owner, by the inhabitants of the administrative territory in question through local government agencies. Municipal enterprises, institutions and organizations act with respect to municipal property by right of operational management in accordance with Estonian SSR legislation.

(5) The legal regulations governing property under municipal ownership are determined by local government agencies in accordance with laws of the Estonian SSR and contracts.

Article 14. Municipal enterprises, institutions and organizations

(1) Municipal enterprises, institutions and organizations are production and transportation enterprises; municipal-service, consumer-service, trade and public-dining enterprises; financial and cultural institutions; and health-care, social-security and public-education institutions established by local government agencies or transferred to them by the state; and other enterprises, institutions and organizations based on municipal property.

(2) The procedures for the formation of municipal enterprises, institutions and organizations, and their legal status and the bases of their activities are determined by the soviet of the local government unit on the basis of Estonian SSR legislation.

Article 15. The moneys of the local government unit

(1) Each local government unit has its own independent budget.

(2) Relations between the state and local budgets, and also among local budgets of various levels are regulated by Estonian SSR laws on the budget and taxation.

(3) Revenues assigned to the local budget go, as a rule, to the budget of the primary-level local government unit. The soviet of an uyezd or republic city has the right, on the basis stipulated by Estonian SSR laws, to approve taxes and tariffs that go to the budget of the uyezd or republic city. This budget is formed in accordance with the functions performed from taxes and deductions from the budgets of primary-level local government units, and the state budget.

(4) Allocations from the state budget to the budgets of local government units are made on the basis of the requirements of improving the economic structure, of regional development, and of regional policies, according to procedures established by the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet.

Article 16. The functions of local government agencies in the area of economic activities

(1) Local government agencies independently draw up and approve plans for the development of their administrative territories.

Local government agencies may, in accordance with Estonian SSR legislation and by mutual agreement, draw up and confirm joint plans or more narrowly defined special-purpose programs for the development of several administrative territories

(2) In accordance with procedures established by Estonian SSR laws, local government agencies grant the use of their territories and their natural resources, and organize the utilization of natural resources and environmental protection.

(3) The government agencies of an uyezd or republic city organize, on the basis of the corresponding republic system, an information system necessary for the organization of economic activities on their administrative

territories, and also keep records on able-bodied people. In cooperation with republic agencies, they organize the general training of manpower and the retraining of manpower that has been released from work.

Chapter IV

The Legal Guarantees of Local Government

Article 17. State regulation of the local government system

(1) State regulation of local government and the jurisdiction of appropriate state agencies with respect to local government agencies are established by the Estonian SSR Constitution, this law, the laws on the volost, uyezd and city, the Law on the Estonian SSR Government, and other Estonian SSR laws and acts of the Estonian SSR government stemming from them.

(2) State agencies exercise oversight over the legality of the activities of local government agencies.

(3) Either directly or through associations of government units, local government agencies take part in the drafting and discussion of normative acts pertaining to their activities.

Article 18. The changing of the boundaries and names of administrative units, the formation of new administrative units, and the abolition of administrative units

(1) The boundaries and names of administrative units may be changed by the Presidium of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet, taking into account a petition by the appropriate soviets adopted at the initiative of their inhabitants.

(2) In forming new administrative units and abolishing administrative units, the Presidium of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet takes into account the opinion of the inhabitants and soviets of the territories in question.

Article 19. Ensuring the exercise of local government

(1) A soviet has the right, on the basis of its jurisdiction, to make decisions that are binding on all physical and juridical persons within the territory of the corresponding administrative unit, the failure to carry out entails liability in accordance with Estonian SSR laws. In cases established by the laws on the uyezd and the city, an uyezd or city (republic-city) soviet may adopt decrees on matters lying outside its jurisdiction that acquire a generally binding force within the territory of the uyezd or city following their confirmation by a competent state agency.

(2) Volost, settlement, city and uyezd ispolkoms and the ispolkoms of republic cities adopt decrees, and volost, settlement and uyezd elders and city mayors adopt orders.

(3) Proceeding from the interests of the population of an administrative territory, the soviet of the local government unit and its ispolkom (with the soviet's approval) have the right:

1. To suspend the implementation of decisions of juridical persons within their administrative territory in the event that they are contrary to Estonian SSR legislation or decisions that have been taken by the local government agency within the limits of its jurisdiction, until a competent state agency has resolved the issue. The local government agency bears material liability for the unlawful suspension of the implementation of decision of a juridical person.

2. To revoke approval of the project plans and production and economic feasibility studies for facilities being built on their administrative territory, and also to revoke decisions to grant land for their construction, or to prohibit construction, if the building client or the land user violates contracts concluded with government agencies or the requirements of Estonian SSR legislation.

3. To require or to organize the conducting of additional environmental-impact or other necessary expert reviews of facilities that are under construction and in operation, and of technologies that are being used.

4. To establish higher requirements with regard to protection of the environment of their administrative territory and, in the event that they are violated, to apply administrative sanctions.

(4) Juridical and physical persons have the right to appeal the orders of a volost, settlement or uyezd elder or city mayor, as well as the decrees of an ispolkom, to the appropriate soviet, and to appeal the decisions of a soviet to the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet.

(5) The soviet of a primary-level local government unit has the right to protest to the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet or government the decisions of the relevant secondary-level local government agency on matters pertaining to the soviet's exclusive jurisdiction, the resolution of which by the secondary-level local government agency has not been stipulated by an appropriate contract.

(6) The soviet of a secondary-level local government unit has the right to suspend the decisions of primary-level local government agencies that are contrary to Estonian SSR legislation. In the event of a dispute, a final decision on the question is rendered by the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet.

(7) The Estonian SSR government may protest the decisions of an uyezd soviet or soviet of a republic city if they are contrary to legislation of the Estonian SSR, and may also, on grounds stipulated by Estonian SSR law, suspend or revoke the decrees of the ispolkom of an uyezd or republic city, or the orders of an uyezd elder or

mayor of a republic city. In the event of a dispute, a final resolution of the issue is made by the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet.

Article 20. Organization of the work of local government agencies

(1) The operating procedures of local government agencies are determined independently by the appropriate soviets on the basis of the principles established by this law or other Estonian SSR laws. The operating procedures of a volost, settlement and city government agency are established by the statute on the given volost, settlement or city.

(2) A soviet is convened for its first session by the ispolkom of the previous soviet no later than within one month after election day.

(3) A meeting of a soviet is deemed official if more than half of the elected soviet members take part in it, except for cases in which Estonian SSR laws establish different procedures.

(4) The decisions of a soviet are made by a simple majority of votes, except for cases specified by Estonian SSR laws, when a question is decided by a two-thirds majority of the votes of soviet members participating in a meeting.

(5) Decisions of a soviet are made by open, secret or roll-call votes. The requirement for holding a roll-call vote takes precedence over the requirement for secret voting, and the requirement for secret voting takes precedence over the requirement for open voting. Estonian SSR laws may establish a range of issues on which only secret votes are taken.

(6) Meetings of a soviet are open. The soviet may also establish cases in which a closed meeting is declared.

(7) A soviet is deemed incapable of operating and is subject to reelection if it fails to achieve a quorum at least three times in two months.

(8) As a rule, the members of a soviet perform their duties without pay. By a decision of the soviet, its members may be compensated out of the local budget for expenses incurred in carrying out certain assignments, or they may be released from their principal employment with the payment to them of appropriate compensation out of local budget moneys. A decision taken by a soviet to release its member from his principal employment is binding on the management of the soviet member's place of employment.

(9) A soviet may specify cases in which a soviet member is removed from the decision of a specific question.

(10) The meeting of the ispolkom of a local government unit is convened by its head and is official if more than half of the ispolkom members take part in the meeting. Decisions of the ispolkom are made in open voting by a

simple majority of votes, and in the event of a tie, the vote of the head of the ispolkom is decisive.

(11) The meeting of a commission formed by a soviet is convened by its chairman and is official if more than half of the commission members take part in the meeting. A commission decision is considered to have been made if more than half of the commission members have voted for it in open voting.

Chapter V

Final Provisions

Article 21. Regulation of the establishment of local government

(1) In the initial period of the administrative reform, the procedures for the formation of the regional government system are regulated by the appropriate decrees of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet, the Ukase of the Presidium of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet "On the Establishment of a Self-Governing Administrative System," and other normative acts of the Estonian SSR.

(2) When the present law takes effect, the Law on the Estonian SSR Settlement and Rural Soviet of People's Deputies, the Law on the Estonian SSR Rayon Soviet of People's Deputies, and the law on the Estonian SSR City and City Rayon Soviet of People's Deputies lose legal force in the respects in which they are contrary to the present law.

Article 22. The functions of secondary-level local government when primary-level local government is established

A secondary-level local government unit performs the functions of the primary-level local government unit to the extent stipulated by the normative acts cited in Article 21, Part I of the present law until the government of the primary-level administrative unit in question is legally recognized according to procedures established by the aforementioned normative acts.

A. Ryuytel, chairman of the Presidium of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet

A. Almann, secretary of the Presidium of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet.

Tallinn, 10 November 1989

Estonian Komsomol During Transition Period

90UN0611A Tallinn MOLODEZH ESTONII in
Russian 15 Dec 89 p 1

[Article by T. Volodina: "Komsomol: Transition Period. First Landmarks"]

[Text] The first Estonian Komsomol Central Committee plenum after the 21st Estonian Komsomol Congress was held on 14 December.

It is no secret to anyone how Komsomol plenums were held in the past: a previously written "script," a few mandatory speeches in the debates, and bored silence in

the hall. In any case, the question of what would happen with the Komsomol troubled few: its fate seemed clear—everything would remain as before. The current Estonian Komsomol [LKSME] Central Committee Plenum was held under unusual conditions. As everyone knows, the November LKSME Congress proclaimed the independence of the LKSME and announced a transition period until 1 March 1990, on the expiration of which the activity of the Estonian Komsomol, based on the now existing Statutes, will be considered finished. Now the question: "So, nonetheless, what will happen afterwards?" is not only not indifferent to activists, but also to those who have no relation to the organization whatsoever.

There were four items on the plenum agenda: "On the Status and Regulations of the LKSME Central Committee," "On the Authorities of the LKSME Central Committee Secretariat During the Transition Period," "On the Status of the LKSME Consulting Council," and "On Time Periods for Publishing Draft Program and Statutory Documents Proposed by Initiative Groups."

Ayvar Rauam, first secretary of the LKSME Central Committee, gave a brief report.

After a detailed discussion, the plenum passed two documents: "On the Status and Regulations of the LKSME Central Committee" and "On the Authorities of the LKSME Central Committee Secretariat During the Transition Period." As a result of the vote, the draft resolution "On the Status of the LKSME Consulting Council" was not accepted for a basis. In the course of discussing it, it was revealed that the question of creating such a council is within the secretariat's competence.

Igor Radkin, first secretary of the LKSME Morskiy Raykom, Tallinn, made a proposal at the plenum to create an organization committee, made up of LKSME Central Committee members, to reorganize the Estonian Komsomol on the basis of KSME program documents.

Leonid Palko, All-Union Komsomol Central Committee instructor, participated in the plenum's work.

T. Volodina

On the Status and Regulations of the LKSME Central Committee

In accordance with the resolutions of the 21st Komsomol Congress, its leading body is the Central Committee.

1. LKSME Central Committee members are delegated by the higher collective bodies of rayon and city organizations in the transition period, and their authorities confirm Central Committee plenums. The term of office for LKSME Central Committee members expires on 25 May 1990.

2. The LKSME Central Committee confirms the authority of the secretariat and submits resolutions to it for implementation, as well as hears the secretariat's report on the fulfillment of these resolutions.

3. The LKSME Central Committee hears information from the LKSME Auditing Commission and makes the appropriate decisions.

4. The LKSME Central Committee has the right to create a LKSME consulting council made up of representatives of organizations, petitioning on legal succession, or of their initiative groups.

5. The LKSME Central Committee approves the results of negotiations on matters of legal succession and definitively resolves questions related to legal succession at its final plenum.

6. The work of an LKSME Central Committee plenum is directed by its secretariat.

7. The LKSME Central Committee approves agreements concluded by the LKSME with other organizations.

8. The LKSME Central Committee approves the budget of the LKSME in the period until 25 May 1990.

9. The LKSME Central Committee shall repeal decisions by the secretariat which contradict the resolutions of the 21st Estonian Komsomol Congress.

On the Authorities of the Estonian Komsomol Central Committee Secretariat During the Transition Period

The Estonian Komsomol Central Committee Secretariat:

1. implements the resolutions of the LKSME Central Committee;

2. discusses and resolves organizational matters;

3. convenes the LKSME Central Committee and directs its conferences;

4. possesses, takes care of, and uses the property and monetary resources belonging to the LKSME, as well as develops economic activity on the basis of the existing base, without the right to transfer this property to others, and can lease property in the period until 25 May 1990;

5. tracks, along with the LKSME Auditing Commission, the account and financial and economic activity of LKSME gorkoms and raykoms, including the activity of cooperatives and centers created under LKSME gorkoms and raykoms;

6. supports close ties with LKSME gorkoms and raykoms or with the leadership of the organizations being created to succeed the LKSME, and organizes the exchange of information among them;

7. sees to it that the resolutions and activity of LKSME gorkoms and raykoms conform to the resolutions of the 21st LKSME Congress;

8. in the event of the elimination of LKSME gorkoms and raykoms, ensures the transfer of LKSME Central Committee attributes (banner, seal) and account and financial documentation at the end of the transition

period, and decides all questions related to elimination; in the event of eliminating LKSME city and rayon organizations without legal successors, it decides questions related to the property of the organization;

9. conducts negotiations with the All-Union Komsomol Central Committee on interrelations between the Estonian Komsomol and the All-Union Komsomol;

10. interacts with the leading bodies of the Estonian SSR on matters concerning the organization;

11. participates as an observer in public and consulting bodies;

12. directs the LKSME Central Committee apparatus, hires and releases apparatus employees, and determines the number of employees, salary, and official responsibilities;

13. preserves and develops existing friendly and cooperative ties with foreign youth organizations;

14. creates working commissions to solve problems related to the status of press organs, the "Sputnik" BMMT, and the KMO of Estonia, as well as other working commissions for resolving other questions which arise;

15. comes to an agreement with the All-Union Komsomol Central Committee on a procedure for choosing delegates to the 21st All-Union Komsomol Congress;

16. is the executive body of the Estonian Komsomol Central Committee, having no right to represent all members of the Estonian Komsomol or to make political statements, not concerning LKSME intra-organizational matters, in the name of the organization.

Estonian Youth Union Draft Statutes

90UN0610A Tallinn MOLODEZH ESTONII in
Russian 14 Dec 89 pp 1, 4

[Draft: "Estonian Youth Union Statutes"]

[Text] I. Essence of the Estonian Youth Union and the Principles of Its Operation

1. The Estonian Youth Union [SME] is an independent social-political organization that unites the youth of Estonia on the basis of the principles of humanitarianism and democracy, with the goal of creating, by means of the joint activity of all the democratic forces, a law-governed state in Estonia as a guarantee of the economic prosperity and the possibility of using the diversity of the types of activity of all the inhabitants of Estonia.

2. The SME operates within the confines of the republic's Basic Law and has its own Program and Statutes. The SME is part of the republic's political system, on a par with all the legally recognized public organizations, associations, and movements.

3. In addition to the basic goal declared in paragraph 1 of these statutes and the carrying out of that goal, the SME sets as its task the identifying, publicizing, and resolution of Estonia's youth problems.

4. The SME respects the individual and his freedom.

5. The SME defends the rights and interests of its members.

6. The organizational activity of the SME is based on:

a) the honesty of the organization's members and on mutual respect;

b) the collective nature of the decisions and the joint nature of leadership;

c) the elected nature and reportability of the governing agencies;

d) the sense of responsibility;

e) self-regulating competition.

7. To achieve the goals stated in these statutes, the SME has the right to:

a) carry out legislative initiative;

b) nominate candidates for election as deputies to the republic's legislative agencies and agencies of local self-government;

c) engage in publication activity.

8. The SME can become a member of republic, regional, all-union, and world associations and unions, while retaining at such time the right to leave them freely.

II. SME Members and Their Rights and Duties

9. Any young person in Estonia can become an SME member if he recognizes the SME Statutes, supports the SME General Program, has paid entrance dues, and pays membership dues. An SME member has a membership card.

10. Persons are admitted as SME members by the primary links on the basis of a personal statement.

11. An SME member has to right to:

a) to participate in the political, cultural, and economic activity of the SME;

b) to use the freedom of speech and thought, by expressing criticism, his position and recommendations with respect to the SME governing agencies and the activity of SME;

c) to participate in the discussion and resolution of the problems pertaining to his primary link;

d) to be empowered to represent the primary link of which he is a member, or the primary links that have empowered him to do so;

e) to choose freely one or more primary links in which he is a member;

f) to become, if he so desires, an individual (independent) SME member;

g) to strive for protection and assistance from the SME (including material assistance);

h) to be a member of other public associations whose activities and goals do not contradict the SME Statutes and SME General Program;

i) to leave the SME freely.

12. An SME member is obliged:

a) to follow the SME Statutes and to act within the context of the goals set in the program;

b) to execute the decisions of the SME governing agencies;

c) to guarantee, by his own dignity, the organization's authority.

13. The first link of the SME deals with problems of the ethics of the SME member. A person's membership in the SME can be revoked only on the basis of a decision by the SME leadership.

14. The SME can have support members, that is, members who operate independently within the context of the goals and principles of the SME Program, but who cannot or do not wish to act in any SME primary link.

14.1. A support member has the right:

a) to have a support member's identification card, which is issued by the SME leadership;

b) to participate in the political, cultural, and economic activity of the SME;

c) to choose freely one or more primary links in which he can develop his actions at his own discretion;

d) to request assistance and protection from the SME (including material assistance).

14.2. An SME support member is obliged, by his own dignity, to increase the authority of the SME.

III. SME Structure

15. The SME is formed from individual members and members who have been united into primary links, as well as support members operating under the organization.

16. The SME structure is formed from the individual members, primary links, primary links with the right of representation, and the governing agencies.

17. The primary links...

17.1. ...are created in conformity with the SME Statutes and operate within the context of the SME General Program. They can have various names.

17.2. ...can be created on the basis of a common place of work or training, territory, place of residence, common interests, hobby, or activity, etc.

17.3. ...are created if the link unites no fewer than two SME members or persons desiring to become SME member, and if they are registered by the primary link under the SME leadership.

18. A primary link with the right of representation:

18.1. ...is created if, for that purpose:

a) it unites at least five SME members or persons desiring to become SME members, who are registered under the SME leadership;

b) at a primary link general meeting (general council) at which no less than three-fourths of the total members are present, by a majority of votes of no less than two-thirds, a representative (authorized agent) has been elected to the Council of SME Representatives, as well as the leader (leaders) of the primary link;

c) together with the minutes of the meeting (general council previously mentioned (paragraph 18.1b), the Council of SME Representatives is furnished a notification of the use of right of representation.

18.2. ...the representative participates in the work of the Council of SME Representatives and is reportable to his primary link.

18.3. ...which does not use its right of representation in the Council of SME Representatives is considered to be an ordinary primary link.

19.1. All the primary links have to right independently to adopt their status, regulations, action program, and platform, one copy of which is submitted to the SME leadership.

19.2. The leaders of the primary links are reportable to their primary links.

20. The primary links can voluntarily joint associations and delegate to the Council of SME Representatives a representative (representatives): for each three primary links, one representative.

21. Primary links with the right of representation that have voluntarily united can delegate to the Council of SME Representatives a common representative (common authorized agent).

21.1. At the Council of SME Representatives, the common representative has a number of votes that conforms to the number of primary links that delegated him.

21.2. The common representative renews his mandate no less frequently than once a month, by submitting to the Council of SME Representatives a written decision enacted by the appropriate general meeting (general council) of the primary links that delegated him.

21.3. If the sessions of the SME Council of Representatives are conducted less frequently than once a month, the common representative renews his mandate by the beginning of the session of the Council of Representatives.

22. The governing agencies of the SME are: the SME General Council; the Council of SME Representatives; the SME Board; and the SME Auditing Commission.

23. The SME Council of Representatives is a legislative working and representative agency of the SME that is formed from authorized agents of the primary links with the right of representation and of the representatives of united primary links.

23.1. The SME Council of Representatives:

- a) discusses the situation in Estonia;
- b) discusses the situation of youth in Estonia;
- c) discusses fundamental organizational questions;
- d) makes general organizational decisions;
- e) appoints the chairman of the SME Board and approves the Board makeup;
- f) appoints the chairman of the SME Auditing Commission and approves the makeup of the Auditing Commission;
- g) monitors the execution of the SME Statutes, program, and its own decisions;
- h) monitors the work of the Board;
- i) receives reports from the Auditing Commission.

23.2. The SME Council of Representatives is convoked:

- a) by the chairman of the SME Board or his first deputy and when necessary, but no less frequently than once every three months;
- b) by two-thirds of the SME representatives;
- c) by no less than half the SME members.

23.3. The SME Council of Representatives can make decisions if no less than half the representatives are present.

23.4. If an SME primary link with the right of representation does not send its representative to the Council of Representatives more than two times in a row, it is felt that that primary link is rejecting its right of representation.

23.5. The SME Council of Representatives makes a decision if no less than 50 percent + 1 of the persons taking part in the vote signify "aye."

23.6. The members of the SME Board and Auditing Commission have the right of a consultative vote in the Council of Representatives.

24. The SME Board is an executive agency that directs the work of the SME during the intervals between sessions of the SME Council of Representatives.

24.1. The SME Board organizes:

- a) the fulfillment of the program and decisions of the Council of Representatives;
- b) the economic-financial activity;
- c) the temporary and permanent working groups and the Administration of Affairs;
- d) sessions of the Council of Representatives;
- e) the keeping of records for members, having the right, when necessary, to stop their membership temporarily until the final decision by the Council of Representatives;
- f) cooperation with other organizations;
- g) measures and actions;
- h) foreign ties;
- i) the dissemination of information concerning the organization.

24.2. The chairman of the SME Board:

- a) is simultaneously the chairman of SME and represents the organization within the confines of his powers;
- b) staffs the Board;
- c) convokes and conducts sessions of the Council of Representatives.

24.3. During the absence of the Board chairman, his place is taken by his first deputy or the deputy who is simultaneously the chairman of the SME Program Commission.

24.4. The SME Board and its chairman are subordinate only to the SME Council of Representatives, are reportable to it, and bear responsibility to it.

24.5. The SME Board and its chairman are obliged to provide a financial report to the SME Auditing Commission.

24.6. The SME Program Commission monitors the implementation of programs, prepares document drafts, and develops contacts with other organizations.

25. The SME Auditing Commission is an independent control agency that monitors the economic-financial

activity of the SME during the intervals between sessions of the SME Council of Representatives.

25.1. The SME Auditing Commission monitors:

- a) the legality of the acquisition of property and the sources of income;
- b) the promptness of SME receipts;
- c) the legality of the use of SME funds;
- d) the SME balance sheet, submitting recommendations and reports to the SME Council of Representatives and Board.

25.2. The chairman of the SME Auditing Commission:

- a) staffs the Auditing Commission;
- b) manages its work;
- c) approves the auditing agencies of the associations of primary links.

25.3. The SME auditing commission and its chairmen are subordinate only to the SME Council of Representatives, bearing responsibility to it and being responsible to it.

26. The SME General Council is the highest legislative agency, whose competency includes:

- a) the making of additions, corrections, and amendments to the SME Statutes and the SME General Program;
- b) the termination of the activities of an organization.

27. The SME General Council is:

- a) a general meeting, in which no fewer than three-fourths of all the SME members take part;
- b) a session in which no fewer than three-fourths of the authorized representatives of all the SME members, who, in confirmation of their powers, represent their mandates, take part.

28. A decision of the SME General Council is passed if no fewer than two-thirds of the authorized representatives have voted in favor of it.

29. An SME General Council is convoked by the SME Council of Representatives or by its authorized representative.

IV. SME Funds and Economic Activities

30. SME funds are the common property of its members, forming part of the republic's social property.

30.1. SME funds are formed from:

- a) entrance fees;
- b) membership dues;

c) donations, grants, and subsidies;

d) income from the economic and foreign-economic activities of SME;

e) other receipts.

30.2. SME funds are divided into:

- a) SME general funds;
- b) funds of associations of primary links;
- c) funds of primary links.

31. The procedure for using the SME general funds is defined by the SME Council of Representatives.

31.1. SME general funds are formed from:

- a) entrance fees;
- b) income from the economic activities of SME;
- c) donations, grants, and subsidies;
- d) other receipts.

31.2. The procedure for using the funds of associations of primary links is defined by their legislative authorized agency.

31.3. The funds of associations of primary links of SME are formed from:

- a) grants, donations, subsidies;
- b) income from economic activity;
- c) other receipts.

31.4. The procedure for using the funds of primary links is defined by the primary link at a general meeting.

31.5. The funds of primary links are formed from:

- a) membership dues;
- b) grants, donations, and subsidies;
- c) income from the economic activity of the primary link;
- d) other receipts.

32. SME funds are used primarily:

- a) to carry out the tasks enumerated in the Program;
- b) to develop the organizations;
- c) to develop international ties;
- d) to organize economic and organizational work;
- e) to pay wages, scholarships, prizes, honorariums, and material incentives to SME activists.

33. SME is (primary links and associations of primary links are) a juridical person and has (primary links and associations of primary links can have):

- a) the right to open and close cash and current accounts (including currency accounts), as well as special accounts at credit institutions;
- b) the right to carry out financial operations;
- c) the right to conclude contracts;
- d) the right to develop tourism, including international;
- e) the right to develop economic activity, including foreign-economic;
- f) seal, corner stamp, printed forms, logo;
- g) other rights that have been stipulated by the law.

34. SME funds are acquired and used in conformity with republic legislation. A person who is guilty of violating legality is answerable in conformity with the legislation that is in effect.

V. Conclusion

35. SME Statutes and General Program are accepted at the constituent meeting and go into effect as of the moment that they are accepted.

36. The SME receives the status of juridical person with the corresponding rights and duties, from the moment of registration, in the legally stipulated procedure.

37. SME ceases its activities:

- a) with the cessation of the activities of all the primary links;
- b) in instances that are stipulated by the Law;
- c) by decision of the SME General Council.

[End of draft]

These Statute drafts and emblems are submitted for general discussion. We hope that the recent half-century has not succeeded in causing the final hardening of young people and has not forced them to refuse to implement their truths and ideals.

Telephone numbers for recommendations concerning the SME Statutes and emblems: 44-44-62, 44-12-64, 44-60-22, 44-16-52, on work days from 1000 hours until 1700 hours.

Please send recommendations, wishes, and opinions to: 200107, Kentmanni, 13, Leninskiy Raykom of Estonian Komsomol. Sketch of SME emblem.

The emblem symbolizes a white shield with a depiction of the silhouette of the sun. The sun is the source of growth, light, heat, and life. The shield is its protection. The white color symbolizes the purity of thoughts, words, and actions.

On the whole, the emblem symbolizes the existence of an organization whose basic task is the protection of its members and whose goal is their happy life. The color also emphasizes the principles of choice of means. In the original, the sun and the edges of the shield (which are black in the figure) are gold.

Uzbek Supreme Soviet Announces Ministerial Reorganization

90US0097A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian 3 Sep 89 p 1

[Decree issued by Presidium Chairman M. Ibragimov and Presidium Member Kh. Gulyamov: "Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek SSR"]

[Text] On the reorganization of the Ministry of Motor Transport and Highway Management of the Uzbek SSR, the State Committee of the Uzbek SSR for Labor and Social Welfare and Education of the Ministry of the Building Materials Industry of the Uzbek SSR

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek SSR resolves:

1. To reorganize:

(a) The Ministry of Motor Transport and Highway Management of the Uzbek SSR into these republic ministries: the Ministry of Motor Transport of the Uzbek SSR and the Ministry of Highways of the Uzbek SSR;

(b) The State Committee of the Uzbek SSR for Labor and Social Welfare into a union republic State Committee of the Uzbek SSR for Labor and Social Issues and the Republic Ministry for Social Welfare of the Uzbek SSR.

2. To create a Republic Ministry of Building Material Industry of the Uzbek SSR.

3. To introduce into the Law of the Uzbek SSR of 21 December 1978 "On the Council of Ministers of the Uzbek SSR" (Register of the Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek SSR, 1978, 36, article 527) the following changes and additions:

—in article 26, replace the words "Ministry of Motor Transport and Highway Management" with "Ministry of Highways"; to supplement this article with the words "Ministry of Building Materials Industry," "Ministry of Social Welfare";

—in article 27, replace the words "State Committee of the Uzbek SSR for Labor and Social Welfare" with "State Committee of the Uzbek SSR for Labor and Social Issues."

Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek SSR M. Ibragimov; for the Secretary, member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek SSR Kh. Gulyamov.

Uzbek SSR Transport Minister Named

90US0097B Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
10 Sep 89 p 1

[Decree issued by Deputy Chairman A. Romanovskiy and Presidium member Kh. Gulyamov: "Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek SSR"]

[Text] Tashkent, 9 September 1989—On the appointment of Comrade L. Akhmetov as Minister of Motor Transport of the Uzbek SSR

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek SSR resolves:

—to appoint Comrade Lerik Akhmetov to be Minister of Motor Transport of the Uzbek SSR.

Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek SSR A. Romanovskiy; for the Secretary, member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek SSR Kh. Gulyamov.

Uzbek Highways Minister Appointed

90US0097C Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
10 Sep 89 p 1

[Decree issued by Deputy Chairman A. Romanovskiy and Presidium member Kh. Gulyamov: "Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek SSR"]

[Text] Tashkent, 9 September 1989—On the appointment of Comrade R.R. Yunysov as Minister of Highways of the Uzbek SSR

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek SSR resolves:

—to appoint Comrade Rustam Rasulevich Yunysov to be Minister of Highways of the Uzbek SSR.

Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek SSR A. Romanovskiy; for the Secretary, member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek SSR Kh. Gulyamov.

Personnel Changes Made At 30 September Uzbek CP Plenum

90US0097D Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
1 Oct 89 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Informational Communique on the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Uzbek CP"]

[Text] On 30 September 1989 the 27th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan was held. Chairman of the Central Committee Commission on the Agro-Industrial Complex, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Uzbek SSR D.D. Berkov, gave a speech "On the Course of Implementation of the Resolutions of the 11th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Uzbek CP on Improving the Provision of Food to the Population,

Developing the Storage Base, and Reorganizing Agricultural Production in the Republic."

The Plenum examined organizational issues.

In connection with his appointment as permanent representative of the Council of Ministers of the Uzbek SSR to the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the Plenum relieved Sh.Z. Komalkhodzhaev from his responsibilities as secretary and member of the Bureau for Socioeconomic Development of the Central Committee of the Uzbek CP.

The Plenum elected A.I. Ikramov, head of the chief administration of educational institutions and external relations of the State Agro-Industrial Committee of the Uzbek SSR, to be a member of the Central Committee and R.A. Popov, who works as second secretary of the Tashkent Oblast Party Committee, secretary and member of the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Uzbek CP.

The Plenum elected first secretary of the Tashkent Oblast Party Committee A.I. Fazylbekov to be a candidate member of the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Uzbek CP.

In connection with their departure from the republic, the following Central Committee members have been relieved of their duties: A.V. Kozyr, former second secretary of the Fergana Oblast Party Committee, and candidate member of the Central Committee V.I. Balal, former head of the Department of Party-Organizational and Cadre Work for the Fergana Oblast Party Committee.

The Plenum elected D.D. Berkov to be a member of the Central Committee Commission on Party-Organizational and Cadre Work, having relieved him of his responsibilities as chairman of the Central Committee Commission on the Agro-Industrial Complex. A.I. Ikramov was elected chairman of that commission.

The Plenum elected R.A. Popov to be chairman of the Central Committee Commission on Socioeconomic Development, having relieved him of his responsibilities as member of the Central Committee Commission on Party Organizational and Cadre Work.

The Plenum accepted a proposal to convene the 22nd session of the Uzbek CP in August-September 1990.

The Plenum made a decision to work out a platform for the Uzbek CP for the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek SSR and the local Congresses of People's Deputies.

Participating in the debates on all the issues discussed were Comrades B.A. Allamuradov, first secretary of the Namangan Oblast Party Committee; M. Navruzova, chairman of the Kalinin kolkhoz, Babkent rayon, Bukhara oblast; P. Khudaerov, director of the Iskra sovkhoz, Gagarin rayon, Surkhandaryin oblast; U. Utegenov, a fisherman from the Amudary kolkhoz, Muynak

rayon, Karakalpak ASSR; G.G. Neklessa, editor of the magazine *Mukhbir* (Correspondent); A. Makhmudov, chairman of *Uzbekbriyash*; A. Mutalov, grain minister of the Uzbek SSR; N.A. Belogurov, head of the Central Asian Railway; I.Kh. Dzhurabekov, first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Uzbek SSR, chairman of the republic State Agro-Industrial Committee; D.S. Yadgarov, first secretary of the Bukhara Oblast Party Committee; M. Isakova, milkmaid at the Fifty Years of the Uzbek SSR kolkhoz, Tashkent rayon, Tashkent oblast; M. Ruzmatov, chairman of the Akhunbabaev kolkhoz, Srednechirchikskiy rayon, Tashkent oblast; B.Zh. Khakimov, chairman of the Namangan Oblast Executive Committee; A.I. Fazylbekov, first secretary of the Tashkent City Party Committee; P.S.

Maksudov, director of the Uzbek Refractory and Heat-Resistant Metals Industrial Complex; G.Kh. Sidakov, director of the No. 2 Yangiabad Ore Administration, Tashkent oblast; I.A. Mandanov, steel founder at the V.I. Lenin Uzbek Metallurgical Plant; Sh. Khazhimuratov, chairman of the Uzbek SSR State Committee on Statistics.

The Plenum approved the corresponding proposals on the issues discussed.

First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Uzbek CP I.A. Karimov gave a speech in closing the Plenum.

Executive of the Central Committee CPSU V.N. Lavrantyev took part in the work of the Plenum.

Ethnic Composition of Industrial Managers Reported

904A0132A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 2, 13-19 Jan 90 p 5

[USSR State Committee for Statistics data: "In the Language of Figures"]

[Text]

Nationality Composition of Managers of Industrial, Agricultural, Transportation, Communications, and Construction Enterprises and Organizations as of 1 January 1989 (According to data from the USSR State Committee for Statistics)

Republic	Native Nationality	Percentage of Native Nationality Among Managers
RSFSR	Russian	77.3
—Karelian ASSR	Karelian	9.0
—Komi ASSR	Komi	18.3
—Mari ASSR	Mari	26.4
—Mordovian ASSR	Mordovian	37.9
—Chuvash ASSR	Chuvash	59.2
—Kalmyk ASSR	Kalmyk	48.1
—Tatar ASSR	Tatar	64.1
—Dagestan ASSR	Nationalities of Dagestan	83.8
—Kabardino-Balkar ASSR	Kabardinian and Balkar	69.8
—North Ossetian ASSR	Ossetian	75.5
—Chechen-Ingush ASSR	Chechen and Ingush	71.5
—Bashkir ASSR	Bashkir	24.2
—Udmurt ASSR	Udmurt	30.8
—Buryat ASSR	Buryat	36.7
—Tuva ASSR	Tuvinian	39.6
—Yakut ASSR	Yakut	38.2
Ukrainian SSR	Ukrainian	79.0
Belorussian SSR	Belorussian	77.7
Uzbek SSR	Uzbek	67.6
—Kara-Kalpak ASSR	Kara-Kalpak	35.5
Kazakh SSR	Kazakh	39.5
Georgian SSR	Georgian	89.3
Azerbaijan SSR	Azerbaijani	93.8
Lithuanian SSR	Lithuanian	91.5
Moldavian SSR	Moldavian	49.8
Latvian SSR	Latvian	63.1
Kirghiz SSR	Kirghiz	55.1
Tajik SSR	Tajik	66.3
Armenian SSR	Armenian	99.4
Turkmen SSR	Turkmen	71.8
Estonian SSR	Estonian	82.2

Chairman Explains Armenian Terminology Committee Work on Language Issue

90US0278A Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian 16 Nov 89 p 3

[Armenpress interview with O. Bagdasaryan, chairman of the Armenian SSR Council of Ministers Terminology Committee: "State Control Over the Use of the State Language"]

[Text] Public discussion is continuing on the draft of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee Ideological Commission Decree "On Measures for the Further Improvement of the Use and Comprehensive Employment of the Armenian Language."

In this connection, the Armenian Information Agency correspondent interviewed O. Bagdasaryan, Chairman of the Armenian SSR Council of Ministers Terminology Committee, who stated:

Never before has the problem of the development of the national languages been so urgent as now, in the era of perestroika and the renewal of Soviet society. The party today is motivated by the fact that the native population of all the union republics has the right to make its language the state language, and to create the legal conditions for preserving and developing this language. As was pointed out at the September Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, "It is a political matter, because we are talking about our peoples' sense of self, their understandable striving to preserve their national identity."

Confirmation of this striving, this manifestation of concern and civic attitude toward the state language, is the draft decree of the Central Committee's Ideological Commission, a decree which, despite certain shortcomings, must be accepted and welcomed.

As was to be expected, the draft decree has evoked considerable response. Great interest and concern for the national language is natural and understandable. Language, after all, reflects a people's history, its past and present, its priceless spiritual treasure, its image and character.

The ancient Armenian language is a rich one. In the words of Avetik Isaakyan, "it embodies the spirit of the Armenian people. Every word is a particle of its soul. These words reflect and incarnate our grief, our deprivations, our joys and sadness, our dreams, hopes, aspirations, and love—our whole people...."

The Republic Press has already published a number of proposals on the draft decree of the Central Committee's Ideological Commission. I should like mainly to touch upon the matter of state concern and state control in regard to language.

During the Soviet period, all of our union republics have set up official organs for terminology work, titled variously committee, commission, council, or whatever. They do not have uniform status, and they are subordinate to various jurisdictions in the various republics.

Moscow's Nauka Publishing House has published a collection titled "The Development of Terminology in the Languages of the Union Republics of the USSR," which states, in particular, that the terminology organs that have been set up in the union republics function primarily within the academies of sciences, yet such academies cannot make the use of recommended terms obligatory. That power is vested in the republic governmental organs, in particular, the Councils of Ministers. A number of terminology committees and commissions are subordinate to the Councils of Ministers of the union republics, which enables them to obligate all organizations, institutions, enterprises, and citizens to use the terms recommended by the terminology committees.

In August of this year, for example, the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee and the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and Council of Ministers passed a decree on the State Georgian Language Program, by means of which a permanent state commission (yes, a state commission) for the Georgian literary language was set up under the Georgian SSR Council of Ministers, invested with the appropriate authority; the commission is to monitor the use of the Georgian language. By the same decree, consultative and control commissions on the use and preservation of the purity of the Georgian literary language are to be set up under the ispolkoms [executive committees] of the Soviets of People's Deputies in all of the republic's cities and rayon centers.

As is well known, a terminology committee was created in our republic back in 1933, at first under the Armenian SSR Ministry of Education, and then, from 1955, under the Armenian SSR Council of Ministers.

According to its statute, the committee is to:

work out and establish principles and norms of terminology and term-formation, transcription, orthography, orthoepy, and punctuation in the modern Armenian language;

discuss and resolve all disputable questions of spoken and written Armenian in accordance with existing norms and principles, make choices among parallel terms and words in the literary language, specialized and terminology dictionaries, and make the appropriate decisions;

study the language and style of periodicals (newspapers, journals), books, television and radio, as well as protocols, decisions, and various correspondence of the ministries, departments, sessions of the Soviets of People's Deputies, and meetings of the ispolkoms, and distribute the results of such study as appropriate.

The terminology committee's decisions in all spheres of the use of the Armenian literary language are to be binding on all ministries, departments, and other state organs, social organizations, institutions, enterprises, educational and scientific establishments, creative unions, publishing houses, the press, and television and radio of the Armenian SSR.

In its activities, the terminology commission is to be guided by two main principles:

First, it is to resist foreign-language borrowings, the excessive use of foreign terms and words, guided by the well-known Leninist tenet that it is necessary to declare war against the excessive borrowing of foreign words.

Second, considering that no language can become rich and developed if it remains confined in its own national shell, the committee is to encourage the adoption of all words which, under present conditions of mutual contacts between nations, new social relations, and the development of the economy, science, technology and culture, have become an organic part of our language and unquestionably enrich it. At the same time, it is to oppose any disordered process of borrowing, any tendency to translate or "Armenianize" all terms. Passionate advocates of innovation sometimes concoct words and terms which do nothing to enrich our language.

Today, at the present stage of development of socialist society, when special importance attaches to questions of the USSR's language and nationality policies, and any forms of encroachment on the national cultures are being decisively condemned, a concerned approach for the native language in all spheres of life and the creation of legal conditions for the preservation and development of the language constitute a vital task.

Hence the necessity of state control in regard to the native language. Professor Rachiya Mirzoyan was right when he wrote in his article "A State Approach to the State Language" (YEREKOYAN YEREVAN, 18 September) that in order to exercise control over the implementation of the state law proposed for adoption it is necessary to create an **Armenian SSR State Committee for Language**, invested with the same rights as other state committees. "In the long run," the author of the article wrote, "it may be set up by expanding and raising the status of the Armenian SSR Council of Ministers Terminology Committee."

Writer Gevorg Devrikyan made the same proposal in his article, "Our Native Language Unites Us" (YEREKOYAN YEREVAN, 4 October).

At any rate, the point is to establish the appropriate control over the use of the native language. People who deny the necessity of state control over the use of the native language are deeply mistaken. They advise against interfering in language development, they advise allowing everyone to write and speak as they please—

that is, merely to play with language, to impose their taste on others, to make language an arena for experimentation.

One other matter. In the draft decree, the terminology committee is responsible for working systematically on the further development, convergence [sblizheniye], and mutual enrichment of the two branches of the Armenian language, enlisting for this purpose Armenologists of the republic and the whole country as well as specialists abroad.

This is also of concern to our countrymen in diaspora [spyurk]. The fact is that, as foreign Armenian newspapers have stated, the absolute majority of persons who speak Western Armenian today are bilingual.... In addition to Armenian, the Armenian abroad uses the language of the country where he lives. As a result, his spoken language increasingly comes to include foreign borrowings, words which are different in the various communities, thus posing an obstacle to uniform and homogeneous development of the Western Armenian language.

It is no accident, therefore, that the Western Armenian press has been publishing proposals to establish a common terminology commission for our two literary languages, one which would consist of members of a terminology council of the Western Armenian literary language and the terminology committee of the Eastern Armenian language.

It is a proposal that merits study and attention. In this regard, it would be desirable to convene in Yerevan in 1990 a combined scientific conference of the terminology committee under the Armenian SSR Council of Ministers, the Committee for Cultural Relations with Armenians Abroad, and the R. Acharyan Institute of Language of the Armenian SSR Academy of Sciences, devoted to the further development, convergence, and mutual enrichment of the two branches of our language, inviting foreign Armenologists and representatives of the press and community.

Language, O. Bagdasaryan stated in conclusion, is the nation's priceless treasure, the foundation of its existence and perpetuity. It cannot develop and enjoy broad use without the necessary control and concerned promotion by state organs.

This is the main purpose of the future law on the Armenian language, which our people are awaiting.

Achievements of Armenian National Movement Session Reviewed

90US0278B Yerevan KOMSOMOLETS in Russian 16 Nov 89 p 2

[Article by Special Correspondent S. Arutyunyan: "The Times Will Judge"]

[Text] For three days the Shaumyan Palace of Congresses was abuzz with excitement. About a thousand

delegates had been convened by the AOD [Armenian National Movement] Constituent Congress. There were only two items on the agenda: approval of the Program and Charter and election of the Council. Despite the precision and specificity of the tasks, nevertheless, and despite even the direct television broadcast of the two final days of the Congress, people expected that the Congress would answer all (!!!) the questions that concerned them. They not only expected answers but also ready "recipes" and solutions. The impatience and demanding maximalism of all the people observing the work of the Congress so closely can be understood: there is not a person in all of Armenia today who is not deeply concerned for the fate of Artsakh and for tens of thousands of refugees, not a person who is not concerned for the republic's and nation's future.

For this reason, everyone believes he has the right to his own opinion, the right to demand the maximum from the delegates and the initiative group in the Presidium, based on the extremely high degree of unity and like-thinking that was manifested at the rallies. This is why so many were puzzled by the differences of opinion that arose during the discussion of the Program and Charter, the positions of particular delegates and officiators at the meeting. This is why so many reproaches were expressed by both sides after the Congress. The "traditionalists," who were most comfortable with the conflict-free procedures of previous assemblies, were shocked by shouts from the audience, people walking freely about the hall, the lack of discipline, and the long lines to the microphone and the speaker's stand. The proponents of extreme forms of democracy were agitated by the "dictatorship" of the presiding officers who attempted to avoid endless, futile debates and to confine people's seething emotions to the Procrustean bed of time limits. It was not always possible to maintain a reasonable balance. That was only natural. After all, the organizers and participants of the Congress had had experience in street-style, rally-style democracy, but not much parliamentary experience, and the difference between them is just as enormous as the difference between a rally of half a million people, in which a slogan—simple, understandable, and brooking no alternative ("Miatsum"—Reunification) is followed by hands raised in the air, and a Congress working out a program, strategy, and tactics, making final selections out of a dozen proposed alternatives.

At rallies, questions of tactics are not decided nor strategies refined. A rally loves ready solutions, and the voice of one, two, or a dozen people who do not agree cannot play much of a role among the mass. A rally does not accept the rights of the minority. A Congress, on the other hand, cannot accept ready solutions but must debate them. Herein lies the logic of the transition from disorder to organization, from romantic impulses to deliberate actions that coincide with the capabilities of the Program, from the spaciousness of the square to the limited space of the meeting hall. It is said that revolutions are born on the streets and die in the assembly

halls. When the disruptive voice of the street erupted in the dignified calm of previous meetings of the Armenian Supreme Soviet, it sounded dissonant. Now this voice resounded from the hall. But it was no longer dissonant, even though it did not accommodate itself to the comfortable chairs and speaker's stand attended by a polite waiter carefully replacing glasses of water. In this enclosed space, the voice swept the hall, reverberated from the walls, resonated, magnified, and created a sense of chaos. And only the experienced and attentive ear could discern that it was the same voice, speaking of the same things.

A revolution actually dies when it remains in the streets, when its energy is not channeled into organized, creative effort.

Movement or Organization?

The Constituent Congress was delayed for objective reasons. Equally delayed, then, was the open, frank, consolidation-oriented dialogue of dozens of informal social organizations having intersecting political, social, and cultural interests. This is the reason why AOD is now striving to unite 21 organizations on a principled basis (Gtutyun, Mashtots, the Karabakh Committee, and so on), each of which can and does propose its own version of the Program. At the same time, there is a group of organizations which, while they largely pursue aims similar to those of the AOD, do not share its ideological aims, and they flatly refuse to cooperate with the government of Soviet Armenia and organs of Soviet authority in outlying districts.

So the question is, movement or organization? Can a movement have its own Charter? Can a movement without organization represent a real force? These questions were rightly raised at the Congress.

Indeed, "having been conceived with the aim of reuniting NKAO (Nagorny Karabakh Autonomous Oblast) with Soviet Armenia, realizing the lawful rights of the Artsakh Armenians to self-determination, the Artsakh Movement has naturally embraced all the basic issues relating to the fate of the Armenian nation, and in terms both of the number of participants and the variety of problems that have been addressed, it has merged into a truly national movement"—this is what is written in the Preamble to the AOD Program. It states further: "Considering the size of the movement and the readiness of the great variety of segments of society to take real part in the movement, the Committee of the Karabakh Movement of Armenia has deemed it necessary to impart organized form to the overall national movement...." A movement is an idea. It takes organization to make it a reality.

Hence, an organization titled the Armenian National Movement—AOD—has been created, with its own structure, council, and board of directors (37 members of the board were elected at the Congress). But what is to be done with the urgent problem of consolidating the healthy forces of the nation? One proposal that was

heard at the Congress was the idea of creating a National Parliament (or Council/Soviet)—a collegial coordinating organ functioning on the principle of the equal representation of all social forces and organizations. It is a sound notion and qualitatively new (and it received the support of most of the delegates to the Congress), one which can give new impetus to the movement but which needs to be carefully worked through and coordinated with the existing structures of authority, the existing Constitution, and the Armenian Supreme Soviet. For we do not see how the confrontation between presently existing political forces can lead to the formulation and realization of an overall national Program; what is needed is interaction, with consideration of the real contributions and capabilities of each.

Once More About the Use of the Lessons of History, Or, What Is Meant by Sovereignty?

History is a fine teacher. It teaches us invaluable lessons. But it also demands an unpreconceived attitude toward them, for history does not forgive a repetition of mistakes, especially those which have already led to tragic consequences.

A great deal was said at the Congress about mistakes of that kind. Also about the necessity of getting rid of false stereotypes of historical thinking. For example, the notion that the Armenian nation is primordially "doomed" (geopolitically and by reason of religion) to seek a powerful protector, or the notion that our nation's very existence is threatened by Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism, which, according to many speakers, have become the nation's eternal bugbears. Stereotypes which, in addition, sow these seeds of enmity between us and our neighbors and stir up their religious feelings.

Yes, we must keep Armenia's geopolitical position in mind. Yes, our past is stained with the blood of our forefathers, and no Armenian can rest because of it. But enough of tears and self-torture, which sometimes prevent us from soberly evaluating our own strengths and understanding that the nation's strengths are inexhaustible, and that relying on one of our strong neighbors and having unconcealed hostility toward another has inevitably led to new tragedies for us. Haven't we had enough, then, of straining to prove the danger of Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism to Russia, the Soviet government, Europe, and America? Haven't we had enough of fruitless attempts to teach reason to those who are already perfectly aware of political conditions and their political interests? Politics is not a benevolent institution. And appeals to historical justice are worth little unless they are backed up with strength, both spiritual and economic strength in particular. It is this unbending law that must, finally, be taken as the basis.

It is Professor Rafayel Ishkhanyan's firm belief that within the boundaries of the little Armenia that is left from our historical Homeland, the Armenian nation can and must preserve its existence alongside its neighbors,

without counting on anyone's benign protection. A nation which does not strive for **spiritual independence** is doomed.

One certainly must agree that this point of view is new and unfamiliar to many, and not everyone shares it.

From the results of a sociological survey conducted during the Constituent Congress. In response to the question of the possibility of restoring relations with Azerbaijan, the votes were distributed this way: a little more than 10 percent believe that the issue can be resolved in two years. Twenty percent believe it can be resolved in 5 years. Some 40 to 45 percent believe it will take 10 years. The remainder do not think it will be possible to restore any ties and relations with Azerbaijan under any circumstances. But how constructive is this position?

The variety of positions, genuine pluralism, is a characteristic feature not only of the recent Congress but also the present stage of our social consciousness....

Genrikh Ovanisyan, doctor of arts:

"I wish to remind you that the struggle of the Armenians of Western Armenia for their freedom and independence began with the struggle for a Constitution. The advocates of this line were jeered.... And that was the time when the foundations were laid for our defeat and the horrible genocide of 1915. Out of all the troubles visited upon us in the 20th century I have drawn my own conclusion that the most viable of all the trends of national social-political thought has been the national-conservative line of Gabriyel Ayyvazovskiy, who said, 'Oh my Armenian people! Do not get involved in revolution or mixed up in warfare, but have educated teachers and educated priests. Make yourselves perfect. National self-awareness and self-perfection! This does not entail national narrowness. We have been saddled with the antinomy of nationalism versus internationalism, which is, in essence, no antinomy at all. Internationalism is impossible without the national.'"

Indeed, independence is faith in oneself and reliance on one's own forces—for each in particular and for all together. It is thinking that is independent, liberated from the worship of any alien culture and way of life. It is high-quality national schooling, national education, as a standard of education. It is the ability to settle one's own fate and dispose of the resources of one's own land. It is Armenian citizenship for all Armenians living in various parts of the USSR and the world. It is membership in international organizations. It is the restoration of Armenian national troop organizations. It is a renewed Constitution and economic independence. It is the United Nations' recognition of the genocide of the Armenians early in the century and acknowledgment of the illegality of points in the Russian-Turkish treaty of 16 March 1921 relating to Armenia, also the decisions of the Kavbyuro [Caucasian Buro] of 5 July of that same year. It is the entire complex of tasks embodied in the national Program that can and must serve as a program of action and cooperation between the AOD and all

other political and social organizations, in particular such an influential political force as the Armenian Communist Party. After all, almost one third of the delegates to the Constituent Congress are members of the CPSU.

Heard repeatedly from the speaker's stand at the Congress was the name of Aram Manukyan, the first President of the Armenian Republic, who said, "Armenians, we are all alone!", and called for building a policy based solely on our own resources.

"Armenians, You Are Not Alone...."

Marina SALYE, Leningrad People's Front:

"There are very few such examples in history. A nation subjected to a horrible genocide, which has nevertheless preserved its own culture. It hurts me to hear people say, 'Armenians, we are all alone, Armenians, we must rely only on ourselves.' A conference of democratic movements and organizations of the country was held in Leningrad, and it passed a resolution condemning the blockade and drafted a telegram protesting the arrest of Manucharov. The same thing happened in Chelyabinsk, which also sent a telegram in defense of Manucharov. No, you are not all alone.... The national-liberation democratic movements of the republics are spreading by the hour, taking more than just the first few steps. Yet Russia is silent. Russia is bewildered. Its peoples, and especially the Russian people, are placed in a difficult situation which tears at the soul of people with almost unbearable contradictions. Why is this happening? Because, on the one hand, there is complete understanding of the liberation processes taking place in the republics, and a desire to follow their example. On the other hand, there is completely justified alarm over the fate of the Russian-speaking population of the republics, which has been artificially incited against the native populations. In the third place, there are numerous advocates of chauvinistic and imperial ideas and views. And, finally, everyone is concerned for the irreversibility of democratic transformations in the country, which could be suppressed under the pretext of liquidating interethnic conflicts. The reason is simple: at present the national idea in Russia has been turned over to Pamyat and has become distorted, without being properly rebuffed by progressive society. Things cannot go on this way. The bell needs to be in the hands of contemporary Gertsens. It must ring out for a free and democratic Russia. I believe that freedom for Russia means freedom for all the peoples of the USSR. But the truth is that a people cannot be free on the basis of limiting the freedoms of other peoples....

"The nation's historical self-awareness was gradually lost, crowded out by the idea of a great nation on a huge territory. But an even more destructive notion took shape—the idea of the creation of a new community, the Soviet nation, which led to the destruction of the colossal treasure of national cultures of all peoples, including the Russian nation. Today the fate of the country depends on us, people representing a democratic Russia. We must

understand that we can be together with the peoples of other republics only if our thoughts and our consciousness are free.... We do not need the thesis of a strong Center and strong republics. We need a different thesis: from an all-union state to a union of states—those states which wish to form such a union. For our freedom and your freedom."

Viktor SHEYNIS, MOSKOVSKAYA TRIBUNA:

"I convey to you, in the words of Pushkin, the love and friendship of the Moscow intelligentsia, all the conscientious people of Russia, who highly appreciate the courage, steadfastness, and dignity of the Armenian nation. We know about the tragic fate of Armenia. But, as if historical tragedies, the loss of statehood, repeated genocide, and the loss of historical lands were not enough, it is an irony of history that even those events linked to the hopes for national, social liberation have frequently turned into terrible new troubles. Today we are going through a time of perestroika, which many of us link to hopes for the rebirth of all nations of the Soviet Union. And in this regard, we must be fair with respect to perestroika: if it were not for perestroika, if new people had not come to replace stagnant leadership, you and I would not have the opportunity today to discuss the problems that worry us. Even the problem of Nagorny Karabakh, the just position of the people of Artsakh, the just position of the Armenian people, could hardly be spoken of out loud. But the inspirers and organizers of perestroika have failed to act consistently in this case and, essentially, have lost a fine opportunity to resolve this issue quickly in the interests of all the people of Artsakh....

"Our and your position, the position of the Armenian Liberation Movement and the position of the democratic forces which are active in the center of Russia, coincide on all the basic issues. We have come to understand that there are certain values common to all mankind, values which must be given priority and cannot be divided by class or nationality. One of our most vital tasks today is to find the way that will enable us to make the transition to these values without catastrophes."

One People, One Land.

We are attempting to convey the new approaches and strategic orientations that were mapped out at the Congress. But there are realities and facts embedded in the consciousness of the nation which must not be ignored. "The Armenian Question." Although in many crisis situations of recent history the question has been the subject of international speculation and haggling, as long as the Armenian nation exists there will also be an "Armenian Question."

The issue of Nagorny Karabakh, in fact, is a small part of "The Armenian Question." The fact that it has received international attention is just one more piece of evidence. And even if we rely basically on our own

forces, on "the proportionality of our steps," we must not leave international public opinion out of the account.

The question arises, in this connection, of the creation of an "Armenian Question" institute in Yerevan. In fact, not one of our academic scientific-research institutes dealing with the humanities is engaged specifically with this problem, nor has a separate branch of research been devoted to it anywhere. So is it possible—is it worthwhile—to give serious thought to it?

As far as Artsakh is concerned, it is indeed necessary to draw up a state program on the Armenian governmental level, encompassing the entire complex of political and social-cultural questions. It is essential to drag the issue out of the dead-end into which it has been driven. It is essential to discuss all proposed variants, whether it be the Armenian Supreme Soviet's immediate decision to incorporate Artsakh into Armenia or hold a referendum in NKAO on the subject of declaring Artsakh a territory that is independent of Baku and concluding a treaty with it on the basis of federation. I should like to hope that efforts in resolving the Artsakh question will serve as the basis for uniting all the political and social forces of Armenia, including the internal and external diaspora.

That's in theory. In practice, Artsakh needs real help from Armenia to exercise its most vital right—the right to live. It is essential to attach the rayons, cities, and villages of NKAO to specific rayons and enterprises of Armenia, to establish sponsorship contacts and bridges of aid. Indeed, this is already being done by the government. It is essential not to forget the remote border villages, in particular those of Gadruitskiy Rayon, where there are at least 30 villages which are in effect living under a military blockade and siege, under conditions of endless shooting and the threat of attack. It is essential not to forget Shaumyanskiy Rayon and Getashen, their position being all the more tragic because, although they are not subject to the Azerbaijani authorities, neither are they administratively subordinate either to Armenia or even Artsakh. What can we do for them? These are questions without answers. Questions which were addressed to the assemblage and hovered in the thick atmosphere of conflicting opinions. Nevertheless, in my opinion, we should start not with these questions but with... repentance.

Repentance for All

An absurd situation has taken shape. Almost two years of political activity have made all of us "politicians." We discuss politics at home, while commuting, and on the job. Each of us has his own opinion on each of these issues. This is why every word in the meeting hall was greeted by dozens of opinions from the audience. Most curious of all, however, was the fact that everyone tried to express his opinion via the microphone, from the speaker's stand, and all the while about a dozen specialized commissions were waiting for specific proposals.

What is personally important to me under the circumstance is the moral aspect: In order to have the right to be heard, above all, it is necessary to go through... repentance. Let everyone who stands up, holds up his hand, makes demands, and gets agitated first ask himself: "Where was I prior to February 1988? What was I doing?" Let every journalist repent of the fact that he was purveying lies. Let every teacher acknowledge—to himself and his students—that he was teaching lies; let every historian confess that he was writing lies; let every engineer confess that he was designing worthless buildings; let every builder admit that he was building nothing but worthless homes; let every cultural worker confess that he was wasting the nation's treasures (Ayvazovskiy's paintings in the Armenian State Art Gallery are in terrible condition, and the frescoes of Minas are perishing).

Repentance is essential to everyone. In particular, repentance for unprofessionalism. If we could transfer the ardor of our day-to-day, minute-by-minute political disputes to the professional sphere, and if we could repent of our impatience, learn to heed and listen to one another, then and only then could we undertake serious discussion about the nation's spiritual independence.

The Bible says there is a time to cast away stones and a time to gather stones together. We are only at the beginning of the path.

I should like to conclude with the words of the American writer Kurt Vonnegut as quoted by V. Sheynis: "Lord, give me the strength to fight against what I can change, give me the spiritual courage to resign myself to what I cannot change, and give me the wisdom in every case to know the difference."

'Vatan' Society Chief on Contacts With Azeris Abroad

18310042G Baku KOMMUNIST in Azeri 1 Oct 89 p 4

[Interview with Elchin, chairman of the Vatan Society Ispolkom: "We Need Unity"]

[Text] Our prominent writer Elchin, chairman of the Vatan [Society for Relations with Compatriots Abroad] Society, was in the U.S. from 11-22 September as a member of a delegation of the central Rodina Society. Below we give our correspondent's talk with him.

[Correspondent] Elchin, tell us first what the objective of your journey was.

[Elchin] Representatives from the fields of science, culture, and religion, from Moscow, the RSFSR, Belorussia, Uzbekistan, Lithuania, and Armenia were included in the delegation. I represented Azerbaijan. The basic objective in going to the United States was to exchange ideas at various levels on the theoretical problems, composition, and trends in cultural development of the emigration, and on questions of ethnic relations in the USSR. Arrangements were made in the cities of Los

Angeles, Fresno, San Francisco, and Cleveland. I would note that three of these cities—Los Angeles, Fresno and San Francisco—are in California, where the emigration is predominantly Armenian. The state's governor, an American named Deukmejian, is also of Armenian descent.

[Correspondent] I am sure that fabrications connected with the Karabakh question occupied a special place in the talks.

[Elchin] Certainly. But I knew this in advance and, as they say, did not embark on the journey unprepared. Some instigators of the provocations connected with the mountainous part of Karabakh emigrated to the U.S. and are concentrated in this state. Some hardline nationalists like Paruir Ayrikyan, who was driven from our country, are not satisfied only with Europe and wish to spread scandal throughout the whole world. They often speak in California. I have to say that these forces have been able to succeed in awakening false ideas among the American public, even in scientific circles with a progressive world view.

The Armenian extremists there conduct themselves in an extremely pretentious manner and when they were confronted with the truth they made a commotion. A profitable exchange of ideas took place during the meeting with the Jewish emigration in Los Angeles. At this time an extremist Armenian group, headed by Ayrikyan, forced its way into the meeting room. They spewed out inventions connected with Nagorno-Karabakh and the events in Sumgait: that thousands of Armenians were killed in Sumgait; Karabakh was an ancient Armenian land; the Azeris used the Armenians living there as slaves; Stalin had given Nagorno-Karabakh to the Azeris as a gift, etc.

In my speech I showed some official documents and proofs which I brought with me to those in the meeting room in order to convey the truth to the audience. Imagine what it is like to stand face to face with lies and slander in a strange country...

[Correspondent] What can you say about your meetings with Azeris living in America?

[Elchin] According to approximate calculations there are no less than 250,000 Azeris in the United States. However, some of our compatriots said that more than 500,000 Azeris live in the U.S. Some 98-99 percent of them are Azeris who emigrated from Southern Azerbaijan or Turkey. There are various organizations of our compatriots in some cities of America. Some of them are longing for a relationship to Azerbaijan. This is good news!

[Correspondent] Is the exact number of Azeris living in the world known to the Vatan Society?

[Elchin] A difficult question. Although a similar society has been active in Armenia for 30 years, we have only been operating for a year and nine months. Thus, we do

not have precise data on the number of Azeris scattered by fate in various countries of the world or of their geographical distribution in the places where they live. On one hand, this is connected with the youth of the society and, on the other, with the weakness of a stable relationship with the fatherland of our emigration. Along with this, however, we are optimistic about our future monolithic activity with our native people, citizens in the emigration. The majority of the emigration are young. A great part of the youths who are making an effort to do serious, profitable and patriotic work are studying in various faculties of America's great universities despite material difficulties. They are American citizens.

We are sure that 15 or 20 years from now we will be hearing about prominent Azeri scholars, public servants and statesmen from the United States who will be partial to our land and language with their whole existence. America is a democratic country. A political career here depends on the man himself, his creed, ideas and spiritual purity. From now on we must succeed in building our connections on pure and conscientious civic relations and introducing the history, culture and general spiritual world of Azerbaijan as it is in fact.

[Correspondent] What can you say about your meetings and talks with America's political and business circles?

[Elchin] Certainly, their relationship to the Nagorno-Karabakh problem interested me everywhere. Personally, I pursued one goal on my trip: I wanted to learn why and at whose behest the United States Senate was interfering in our internal affairs?!

As the readers know, on 18 July of this year a question was raised in the United States Senate in connection with the events in Nagorno-Karabakh and totally false claims entered the agenda. It could be that one reason for this was connected with the onesidedness of the information, but the pursuit of a hostile goal was still clearly felt. Our initial idea was correct. The actions of the Armenian nationalists, the Dashnak rabble, which live in the USA and possess powerful political traditions had done its perfidious work. It was natural that at meetings and press conferences we had to raise this issue often. We also heard that the Azeri emigration had registered their strong protests with the American Senate. This was a joyful event. We have to understand unity of national action no matter what one's political belief or position in life and the effect of the centralizing capability inherent in national societies no matter where we live.

One question bothers me. The Presidium of the AzSSR Supreme Soviet expressed its strong protests to the U.S. Senate. But why did not the USSR Supreme Soviet express its position on this issue? Is not intervening in the internal affairs of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic also intervening in the internal affairs of the USSR? I hope that at the current session of the USSR Congress of Peoples Deputies' this question will be raised in all its seriousness.

[Correspondent] Did you meet with Azeri youth living in America?

[Elchin] I wish to share one enlightening impression from the meetings with the readers. The university at Berkeley is near San Francisco. According to the docent at the university and sociologist Akbar Bayramly, close to 800 Azeri students are studying here.

During the meeting at Berkeley it was revealed that national clubs of students of various nationalities are active in this educational center, for example Greek, Japanese, Persian, Arab, Armenian, etc. The Azeri students, however, do not have their own club. Since they are active in various other clubs, this shows that in any event they have lost their national awareness.

During the meeting we tried to draw their attention to this aspect of the question especially. We said that the Vatan Society was ready to help in any way possible to organize activities in this direction. It is obvious that every Azeri living in our republic will take part with pleasure in sending to this club literature, periodicals and various displays connected with our national existence. After Akbar Bayramly introduced this matter with great enthusiasm and after the students spoke at the meeting, the hope was created among us that an Azeri students' club will be established soon at Berkeley. We conveyed our wishes to the university leadership and faculty deans. During our conversations with the Azeri professors Hasan Javadi and Firudin Safizade we also discussed this question in detail.

[Correspondent] It seems that similar interesting meetings with Azeris in other cities were also held...

[Elchin] Despite the rigor of our official visit program we had a number of unforgettable gatherings. Near San Francisco there is a nice small city called San Jose. I took part in a meeting organized by Yagub Khoshgabani and his American wife, a professor. Only Azeris got together at the meeting. I would mention that Yagub Khoshgabani and his wife are engaged in collecting and studying Azeri folklore. With this specific goal they traveled to Southern Azerbaijan and taped our folklore according to statements of elders. The 28 hours of tales on cassette in the Tabriz dialect are a very important source for our folklore studies. We will definitely use these kinds of sources according to the Vatan guidelines and we conducted talks about this.

From the point of view of widening the connections of Azeris living in America with the fatherland, their native people, the San Jose meeting was very profitable. Concrete agreements were reached in the direction of working out principles and plans for future forms of propagandizing problems concerning Azerbaijan in America.

[Correspondent] Were you able to meet any American specialists in Azerbaijan?

[Elchin] You know from your newspaper, ODLAR JURDU and other press organs that despite the great quantity of biased information in America on the past and present of the Azeri people connected with the Karabakh events a number of prominent scholars having a strong influence in academic circles are doing serious research. They are evaluating the issues objectively in their works, research, lectures and speeches they give to various audiences, and are telling the basic truth.

One of these scholars is the renowned orientalist Professor Tadeusz Swietochowski, Polish by nationality and American by citizenship. I met with him on the last day in New York. It was good that this meeting was on the last day because it provided a respite from the previous days of anger and tension. The professor felt this himself and wrote as an inscription in one of his books: "To Elchin. For the memory of the pleasant meeting the day before his return to Baku. Tadeusz Swietochowski. 21 September 1989." In a conversation lasting until midnight we concentrated on a number of facts important for new works written about Azerbaijan, especially in connection with the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh. Answers were given to questions that interested him and we exchanged the necessary literature.

It is known to the readers that Professor Tadeusz Swietochowski is the author of the major work "Russian Azerbaijan: 1905-1920." The book was written in English and published in the USA. The scientific community and a broad circle of readers received the work with great interest. The book was quickly sold out because of the newness of its subject, the seriousness of its scientific research, its theoretical level and wealth of facts. At this point I would note that this same work was also published in Persian by the Azerbaijan Society in Strasbourg (France) through the efforts of Mr. Ahmed Mehribani, the society's president. Nuray Met also translated it into Turkish and the monograph was published as a book by the Baglam Yayincilik press in Ankara.

I told the author that a book with the title "Russian Azerbaijan" was scientifically inaccurate and that I could not accept it. He said that he meant Northern Azerbaijan by this phrase and that it expressed tsarism's colonialistic policy.

Our talented literary critic Vilayat Guliyev translated the book from English into Azeri. Soon readers will be able to acquaint themselves with parts of it in the pages of the journal AZARBAYJAN. The Vatan Society is making an effort to publish it as a book. The professor was very pleased when he heard this.

Here I would say that Swietochowski's quiet and intimate study, which created a calm and intimate atmosphere, gave one a taste for creative talks and scientific debate after the skyscrapers and the sound of cars flowing like wind in the streets.

[Correspondent] I am sure that Vatan Society has confronted difficulties connected with the growing complexity in the international arena...

[Elchin] Certainly difficulties exist and they are constantly increasing. The Vatan Society's effort to work for national unity among Azeris living abroad from the point of view of the people's honor, propagandizing our culture and widening our relations does not please certain circles; it disturbs them. At this time rumors are being spread, artificial disagreements are being created, slanders are being bruited about, and open hostile attacks are beginning. In some Persian-language press organs published in America a feeling of fear connected with the activity of our organization has found its expression.

This is not by chance. The land of Azerbaijan, north and south together, is a fertile land. It has a thousand and one material resources and gifts. The people's unity increases its power and belief in its ownership of its own soil. There are many who do not wish this in their hearts. It is not by chance that primarily the Armenian nationalists who are opposed to us are exploiting rumors to shatter this power and belief.

The business trip to America convinced me once again that extremely difficult and honorable tasks stand before us. Up until now we have been unable to introduce ourselves to the world by using mass media and information channels to the necessary extent. We found an hour in New York to go to the Metropolitan Museum with our countryman, talented artist Araz Mirhadi. We walked through the museum's halls devoted to works of art created in the Safavid period. Here Azeri rugs, jewelry, copperwork, miniatures, especially the incomparable pearls of the Tabriz school, were presented as Iranian exhibits. We made an official complaint to the Metropolitan Museum's leadership about this. But we have to say that all this is not something that can be changed by the activity of one individual or one society...

All Azeris, no matter where we live, must work closely and in unanimity. During these days of trial in the history of our people, especially as a result of the provocations by the Armenian nationalists, we all must mobilize for the sake of our common work. We must try to unite all forces working to preserve the people's honor and dignity. All creative organizations, the Azerbaijan Peoples' Front, and the public organizations must go hand in hand for effective and useful work.

Another Ukrainian Region Affected by Chernobyl

90UN0391A Kiev RADYANSKA UKRAYINA in
Ukrainian 16 Nov 89 p 3

[Article by V. Skoropadska, special correspondent of RADYANSKA UKRAYINA, entitled: "At the Radioactive Crossroads"]

[Text] Recently, in the town of Korosten (Zhitomir region), as well as in the villages of the area, there was a regular meeting concerning the measures taken to eliminate the consequences of the catastrophe at the Chernobyl AES. K. I. Masik, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers and chairman of the Permanent Extraordinary

Commission of the UkSSR Council of Ministers; I. G. Lazuta, secretary of the Zhitomir Oblast Party Committee; G. O. Gotovchits, deputy chairman of the Zhitomir Oblispolkom; as well as representatives of a number of republic ministries and departments met with residents of the city of Korosten and the Korosten rayon.

More than 3 years have passed since the tragic event at the Chernobyl AES, but only now is the extent of the disaster being realized. Even today, scientists cannot determine what consequences it will have in the future. Meanwhile, on the map of the Ukraine, there appear more and more new villages, affected by the radioactive disaster, that are referred to by the term "villages under rigid control." It was not long ago, that specialists began to speak aloud about the problems of the town of Narodichi and villages in this rayon. Still a new zone of concern has appeared nearby—Korosten, a rayon center with a population of 75,000, and the villages in the rayon itself.

While listening to the speeches of the Korosten residents, I involuntarily recalled what had been said in their time, by Narodichi residents, at the UkSSR Ministry of Health scientific-practical conference which was held by the All-Union Radiological Center.

The problems were the same. Our newspaper has already raised the question of the fate of Narodichi residents ("Suffering and Anxiety of Narodichi," 22 June). But, unfortunately, little has changed in this notorious rayon known worldwide. Today, its populated areas, contaminated with radionuclides, lack sufficient amounts of uncontaminated food; baby food is a great problem, as are fruit and vegetables, which are so necessary for growing children. It is shameful to mention, but people have nothing to wash their hands with. I still remember one business trip to the Zhitomir region. I approached a crowd of village women near a shop. They showed me their hands, calloused and black because of flax (it was being harvested at the time).

"We wash them with clay, because there is no soap," they explained to me.

There was concern for the fate of his countrymen in the speech of I. M. Chirik, first secretary of the Korosten Gorkom.

"There was silence for 3 years, but half a year ago it came to light that not only in Narodichi, but in our area as well something was wrong. Both in Korosten and in the rayon villages. But will the situation eventually worsen? People from the city and rayon come to us at the rayon and city party committees. We would be happy to help them, but unfortunately we are not all-powerful. We also want to know the truth from the specialists. What future is awaiting our people? How are they to live further? What should we, party workers, tell them in order to have the right to look straight in their eyes tomorrow?"

Often, when on business trips to the areas which have suffered from the Chernobyl disaster and meeting with

their authorities, I have noticed a peculiar attitude the people have to the party and state workers. The misfortune has, in some way, united the people, and they come to party and state workers with their sufferings and troubles. The latter, in turn, protect the interests of victims, as far as possible, not taking into account the possible reaction of their higher authorities and how this may affect them personally. Among such leaders, I would name V. S. Budko, first secretary of Narodichi Raykom Party Committee, and G. O. Gotovchits, deputy chairman of the Zhitomir Oblispolkom.

The leaders, who sincerely sympathize with the people, today worry most about the immediate re-settlement of the population to "clean" localities. That is why, perhaps, the speech given by V. M. Ben, first secretary of Korosten Raykom, at the conference was so emotional.

"We understand how important this meeting is," he said. "Our problems cannot be postponed until tomorrow. It is a matter of the health of people and especially of the fate of our future, i.e., our children. Taking advantage of the presence of K. I. Masik, deputy chairman of the UkSSR Council of Ministers, we want to again name the problem which the republic must help us solve. First of all this is the supply of uncontaminated food and the construction of roads and public baths. I would particularly emphasize that we do not have a hospital in our rayon, and that under the existing conditions it is absolutely necessary. But the most urgent problem, as it has already been indicated, is the health of the children. It is our belief that the children should regularly improve their health, during the academic year in clean localities—by whole schools or pre-school institutions. Everybody working in our zone, which is a zone of increased risk, should have a leave of not less than 60 days. Those villages, where the radiation level is dangerous for the people's health, should be immediately evacuated. Our duty as rayon and city authorities and as communists, is to protect the people."

Sometimes we journalists are blamed for supposedly exaggerating the tragedy of Chernobyl. However, all those of us who happened to be present at meetings in Narodichi, Korosten, Ovruch, and other places, had much to tell even without any exaggeration. I still remember a woman crying out in a crowd: "I am still young and I want to live and want my baby to live. But when I am giving it a bottle of milk, I feel as if I were committing a crime, for I do not know how much of that damned cesium is in that bottle. I myself have already been in the hospital three times and my three children have, too. Before the Chernobyl disaster all of us were healthy!"

How can I forget this? How can this be called radiophobia?

After the meeting in Korosten, I asked K. I. Masik what the plans of the republic government were concerning the six rayons of the Zhitomir region, which are especially contaminated with radionuclides.

"During the several months of my being in the new post, I have already been in the rayons with the high levels of radioactivity 10 times," Konstantin Ivanovich said. "I am familiar with the problems of Narodichi, Luginy, Polisk, and now have been acquainted with the problems of Korosten, as well. They are almost the same everywhere. The time has come to solve them as a whole. People should have a guarantee for safe residence in certain areas not only today but in the future as well. The people are waiting for such a guarantee for 4 years now. They are morally exhausted; significant psychological stress exists. The USSR and the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (VTsRPS) resolution on additional measures for improvement of health and the material condition of the population which resides in the territory which was radioactively contaminated by the Chernobyl catastrophe was adopted.

"In recent years, there has been much discussion of a new concept, radiophobia. I believe that people are offended by being accused of radiophobia. They have the right to know what the threat may be and from where they may expect it, what the consequences of radionuclide contamination may be and what to do in order to prevent the danger, etc. Today, in Korosten, the lack of medical personnel was discussed. Meanwhile, medical assistance is being ensured here by a shift method. If any premises are found for a medical school, we would even be ready to open it tomorrow."

I was told that there is no production of dairy products in the rayon. This is unacceptable and we think that the republic Agroprom should explain why this is so.

Though the discussions about the radioactivity are very emotional, it is obvious that in this situation the oblast itself is not able to "rescue" the six rayons nor to give them appropriate medical and material assistance. The support of the entire republic and possibly of the whole country is necessary. Today, I think we should discuss again the sense of people residing in locations with increased levels of radiation. The right to leave contaminated areas first should be given to the families with children. Those families after moving to the "clean" areas should be given living quarters without having to be put on a waiting list. As for those who stay in the rayon, they must first of all be supplied with uncontaminated food and measures must be taken to normalize their living conditions. Many residents of Korosten wish to move to the former Brusilov rayon of Zhitomir Oblast. Certainly specialists should first of all investigate the living conditions in this area and give the victims such an opportunity. As bitter experience shows, it is not worthwhile to spare expenses for this because this issue concerns the most valuable thing to people, their health, as well as the health of future generations.

Kiev—Zhitomir—Korosten.

Worker Questions Democratic Movement of Uzbekistan Goals

90US0330A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
2 Dec 89 p 1

[Article by Sergey Chinayev, lathe operator at TAPOiCh (not further identified), in the "Front-Page Opinion" column: "What Is the Democratic Movement of Uzbekistan Asking Us To Do?"]

[Text] You do not have to be a master plumber to figure out that when a pipe has broken in your apartment, you immediately shut off the water and get busy with the repair. And if someone recommends that you initiate debates "on the problem of stopping the flow" when the mishap occurs—well, that person is out of his or her mind.

A couple of preelection tracts, signed by a certain "Democratic Movement of Uzbekistan" (the DDU), fell into my hands. I shall read one of them: "In order to achieve solution of their everyday problems, the voters need to have the kinds of deputies in the local soviets that really stand up for their interests...." That is all—like a bolt out of the blue, it is proposed to downgrade an important political campaign, elections to the local soviets, to the level of a broken pipe. Is there really someone who seriously believes that we will achieve true democracy by compelling the soviets' future membership to undertake debates on our everyday altercations, that we will strengthen the state thereby, and that the broken pipes will fix themselves?

The tract calls upon us to form voters' clubs and committees at our place of residence. For this purpose, it is said, we must invite all who are dissatisfied with the work of the housing operation offices [zheki] (?) or local authorities, and recommend that they... "post the same statements all through the other apartment buildings." Well, we are to have a meeting, bad-mouth the housing operation office, and do the posting. What else? Nothing.

What can the reason for such secrecy be? Why, of course: The Democratic Movement of Uzbekistan [DDU], having heightened the "mass anger" aroused by our general, everyday dissension, hopes to quietly make the anger serve DDU purposes. Pretension to the leader's role in the preelection contest (even at one's place of residence) is obvious. But, such being the case, DDU, be so kind as to publicize your program, specify your goals and means, and prove your dedication to the people's interests.

In all probability, the second tract, prepared in the form of a manifesto—"Appeal to the Voters of Uzbekistan"—is devoted to this purpose. I cannot help noticing that it was duplicated on a computer. I have long dreamed of seeing a computer in my workshop, and I would gladly share my work with it. But you understand—there is a shortage. It is unfair that both rationed paper and office equipment, and even computers, are available for putting out political nonsense.

Well, what is the DDU asking Uzbekistan's voters to do? Clear-cut goals are not apparent in the second tract either. However, the manifesto is full of sinister, demagogically stamped allusions to the duplicity of those vested with power and the aggressiveness of the bureaucracy, and to the assertion that "nobody will relinquish power voluntarily." Everything is lumped together—attacks on the USSR People's Deputies from Uzbekistan and agitation for the disruption of okrug preelection conferences.

Wishing to understand the particulars, I called the telephone number indicated in the tract, and I reached...an apartment. The woman who answered me had never heard anything at all about the DDU. What fighters for democracy!

I remember once having heard the bitter comment: "Some people today are trying to turn the party into a cuspidor, so every passerby may spit." The DDU's agitational activity is just such a wad of spit. Moreover, it is treacherous....

Let us return to several days ago, and reread M.S. Gorbachev's article "The Socialist Concept and Revolutionary Perestroika." In it, the difficult situation in the country, the harm we are suffering in the fields of politics, economics, and morals, is analyzed honestly and without bias. A call is sounded for the consolidation of all societal forces, including the unofficial, and a concerted quest for the way out. This position was also maintained in a speech by I.A. Karimov, first secretary of the Uzbekistan Communist Party Central Committee, at a meeting in the Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences on 28 November.

But the anonymous DDU, covering its tracks, is calling for disunity and an internal "cold" war.

I am not a Communist. I think that anyone who is honest with himself and other people will evaluate on its merits the very complex and painstaking work that the CPSU, and particularly our republic party organization, does to improve the people's lives. Much has been done to establish the principles of social justice in land possession and in ownership issues. There has been the fight against cotton monoculture. There have been the additional payments for delivered raw material, without which the Uzbek peasants would have endured yet another joyless harvest autumn. There have been the household farm plots. There has been the care for the health of children and ordinary people. Many examples of specific work may be presented. Although there also are problems—a great many—these are not being concealed now; they are talked about openly and, most importantly, ways to solve them are being sought.

What can the DDU and any other unofficial organization tell us about their useful activity? Let them present even one example. There are no such examples. There are only scandalous slogans, cheap pursuit of glory, and a desire to stand out and to represent themselves as "persons of note."

All of this might be political naivete if the plot did not stick out like a sore thumb: to sneak to the top, very furtively, behind the backs of those fighting, having set the voters against everybody, including the organizers of the okrug preelection conferences and the housing operation offices.

We will not permit it!

I say this in the name of the working class, and in the name of all levelheaded people.

Who are you, DDU leaders, hidden behind other people's telephone numbers? Why do you not come openly to us, the workers? Are you afraid of open talk?

By the way, do people with a party membership card participate in the DDU? I should like to find out from them: How does one comfortably stand on two platforms at once? Is this permissible for a Communist?

We need pluralism of opinion. But one should be called to account for pluralism of the soul.

Uzbek Writers' Union Chief on Uzbek, Azeri People's Movements

18310042F Baku ADABIYYAT VA INJASANAT in Azeri 27 Oct 89 p 3

[Interview with Adil Yagubov: "Traditions: Talk With Adil Yagubov, USSR People's Deputy and First Secretary of the Uzbekistan Writers' Union Ispolkom"]

[Text] [Interviewer] Adil, my friend! You have your own place in the development of Uzbek Soviet literature. You are the author of novels such as "Ulugbek's Treasury," "The Old World," and "White Storks," which have won renown among readers as well as short stories and tales and publicistic works which touch upon serious problems in our lives. For a long time you have been chief editor of Uzbekistan's newspaper ADABIYYAT VA SANAT, and your work in the formation of its militant image is great. But in this talk I want to turn to you as a politician, as a USSR People's Deputy. You were elected a deputy from the USSR Writers' Union. In this context, one could evaluate our talk as a deputy's accounting to an elector...

[Yagubov] If we approach the question in depth, in my opinion the duties of a writer and a deputy overlap in a number of areas. The duty and obligation of a writer who wishes to be taken seriously is to depict the concerns of the people, to reveal the deprivations to which they have been subjected for years, and to look for a remedy for the people's ills. In other words, the writer expresses the voice of the people, and everyone who considers himself a writer is an ambassador of the people, either with or without a mandate. This has been the case for centuries and is a truth which is still in force. This is the way I understand my obligation as deputy and writer, and I shall try to answer your questions as a writer.

[Interviewer] I remember your emotional speech at the first Congress of USSR People's Deputies. The problems you raised, especially the spiritual, physical and social tragedies to which the nation was subjected by the cotton monoculture are also characteristic for Azerbaijan. But since the first congress there is still no ray of hope that there will be any basic changes in the situation, either in Uzbekistan or in Azerbaijan. Poison still rains down on our heads, our children are still being taken from their schools, their studies, and education to work the cotton plantations, and the central press still does not refrain from onesided propaganda.

[Yagubov] The problems connected with the cotton monoculture which have accumulated for decades in the Central Asian republics and Azerbaijan have a common nature. The fate of our people in the Soviet period has led to a situation in which the Turkic peoples have basically been sentenced to cotton growing. There is the concept in historical sources that a people wishing to destroy itself raises cotton. In my opinion, when writing about the role of cotton in the fate of our people, the greatest fault lies with the Stalin dictatorship and its legacy's special relationship to the Turkic peoples.

I remember that once cotton was grown in Armenia. When N. S. Khrushchev came to power it was planned that Armenia would grow a hundred thousand tons of cotton (this is approximately equal to the cotton harvest of two of Uzbekistan's rayons). The Armenians did not want to grow this hundred thousand tons. They came out stubbornly against it, and were able to rid themselves of the terrible burden of cotton exploitation.

When the Uzbek literature dekada was held in Armenia in 1961 all the Armenian intelligentsia were yelling that Armenia had produced a total of thirty thousand tons of cotton. When Gafur Gulam, one of the classical writers of Uzbek literature, was at the reception of the first secretary of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee he was interested in how much cotton was raised in Armenia. The first secretary said with a smile:

"Together with Uzbekistan, three million six hundred thirty thousand tons..."

I have no intention of upbraiding the Armenians for pulling cotton out of their lands by the roots. What embitters me is that a terrible plant like cotton has turned into the "national plant" of the Turkic peoples. For the Turkic peoples today, cotton means a youth growing up weak and diseased, schools closed half the year, massive infant mortality, and a difficult and unbearable way of life.

The cotton plan in Azerbaijan has reached an incredible amount—some one million tons (it is hard to believe that this figure is correct). We must rescue our people from this terrible danger. In my opinion, not only the governments of Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan, but also all-union ruling circles are unable to resolve this problem in all its depth and actuality. It appears that the planning organs demanding five million tons of cotton from

Uzbekistan and six hundred fifty thousand tons from Azerbaijan and those in agreement with this have no regrets about destroying the lands of our ancestors in the name of today's interests. If the fertile lands of Central Asia and the rich land of Azerbaijan are only needed today, then what about the futures of these peoples? There is no one who thinks that this land does not belong to the future generations, that anyone has the right to take this share from them, to point a cannon at the future. They should also think that these lands are also necessary for Russia's future. They are trying to wring it dry today.

The pity of it is that when we talk about our agonies, they accuse us of nationalism, localism and national egoism.

There is also a tragic aspect to the cotton question. What are the earnings of a cottongrowing people who are sacrificing their land? I am not talking about the gold taken out of Uzbekistan, the caracul hides or the cocoons, but about a people growing five million tons of cotton a year who live in deprivation, in horrible conditions. One cannot imagine the relationship the union state has towards us: a miner making 450-500 a month can go on strike, make the government hear his words, and receive satisfaction on a number of questions. But a peasant's voice does not travel as far. Thus, the defense of the villagers' interests, one could even say their representation, falls within our purview—that of the writers and deputies.

State planning and pricing organs do not wish to listen to us and pay no heed to our concern. Comrade Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, only signed a document allocating additional money to the Central Asian republics (one million two hundred thousand rubles to Uzbekistan)...

[Interviewer] But Adil, it strikes me that if the average monthly salary of a cotton grower were to be increased by thirty rubles, the inflation gripping the Soviet economy would make it impossible to change the standard of living or way of life of the working man.

[Yagubov] The pity is that we are only achieving this with great difficulty.

[Interviewer] It is clear that the protest of the people in the area of this kind of social injustice is growing in strength and the people themselves are rising up in order to demand honest wages. In saying this, I am interested in learning your relationship to the popular movement, to the public political organizations...

[Yagubov] I do not know the situation in Azerbaijan in depth. At one time I had thought that in fact there was no people's movement or no informal organizations, that one could not count on Azerbaijan. At one time the people's movement was persecuted in Uzbekistan. The republic leadership, by not defending this movement, came out against it at the 19th All-Union Party Conference. But one thing is clear, whether the truth is recognized or not, it will come out in the end.

As you read in the central press, the "Birlik" social-political organization provides leadership for the people's movement in Uzbekistan. Birlik's program has been discussed at city and oblast party committees and at the Central Committee, and a foundation has been laid for a dialogue between Birlik and official circles. In my opinion, this organization supports both the people and the party in the struggle against bureaucracy and social injustice.

We have to concede that in places some decrees of party and government are disregarded, and they do what they want. For example, there is a decree of the Uzbekistan CP CC on the allocation of 0.20 hectares of land to kolkhoz families. Local leaders who have enriched themselves are not allowing the implementation of this decree. Now, Birlik is standing firm on this question. We are not talking about a conflict between the party and Birlik in this context. In addition, Birlik is also a great force in defusing tense interethnic relations. We have to concede that official circles are unable to control national hostilities...

[Interviewer] It is no secret that national conflicts have pervaded every part of the Soviet Union. They often ascribe they events occurring in Central Asia and Azerbaijan to "Islamic fundamentalism," "Wahhabis," "Khomeini-ists," and "panturkists." What do you think are the roots of the national conflicts in the USSR?

[Yagubov] In concrete terms, I want to talk about the situation in Uzbekistan. To evaluate the Fergana events in the central press as some kind of Muslim movement, "an Uzbek ruse to secede from the USSR and establish an Islamic republic," is an oversimplified fabrication by trivial, irresponsible journalists and ideologists.

I see the basic cause of the tension in interethnic relations in the fact that, one can say, we have paid lip service to or remained silent about existing national problems for seventy years, and now these problems have accumulated to the point of a crisis. We reassured ourselves that everything was in order: that languages would merge into the language of a great people in a short time, that a Soviet people with one language would emerge in the glorious future, etc. There was even a time when there was an effort to give this absurd policy an international scope.

In my opinion, our society or, more correctly, certain strata within our society, were not ready to implement the changes in nationality relations stimulated from above, from the CPSU CC and M. S. Gorbachev, and that the ground for making these changes in society was not prepared. M. S. Gorbachev has been able to see the deformations which reigned in interethnic relations and has given certain peoples the right to look into the historical past and the present with open eyes, and to see the injustices. Every people saw that their language, national existence, and national culture were on the verge of extinction. And people who gained the possibility to raise their voices in protest through glasnost did

not wish to accommodate themselves to this situation and stood up for the revival of their national rights.

[Interviewer] Let us focus on this idea. As you know, the Nagorno-Karabakh machinations arose under the veil of the "revival of national rights." In essence, there is an insidious hope behind this claim: it rested on the goal of breaking land away from Azerbaijan and driving the Azeris in Armenia into exile...

[Yagubov] Certainly, coveting someone's land and trampling on the rights and honor of its owner is to provoke an open war. I would say something else. What is happening in Moldavia and Uzbekistan? In these republics a proposed law on giving the national language state language status is being discussed. But the Russian language population is opposing this by all means because they know they will lose the advantages they have gained in state institutions where the national language is not being used and they do not wish to consider common sense: why should not Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Moldavia, Estonia and others which are considered sovereign states within the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics not officialize their own language as the state language?

As you know, during the Civil War hundreds of thousands of Russians emigrated to foreign countries. But up until now the issue of making Russian the state language in France, Germany or England has not come up.

Now there is a very dangerous tendency to look for "panturkism" and "panislamism" among the Turkic peoples. Once this fabrication was used by Stalin and his henchmen so that they could fill the prisons with masses of Turkic peoples, drive them from their homelands, eliminate them. All peoples were subjected to the scourge of Stalinism, but Stalin's personal relationship to the Turkic peoples, to the Muslim world, was even worse. I remember that before the war six or seven Georgian families were exiled to our village: all of them were Georgian Muslims! And it was not by chance that whole nations—Meskhetian Turks, Balkars, Chechens, Ingush from the Caucasus, Tatars from the Crimea—were exiled. Stalin's hatred for the Turkic-Muslim world in the USSR stood behind this. It is very regrettable that clear symptoms of this tendency are still manifesting themselves.

Let us illuminate the Fergana tragedies. The view of the central press was that the national dignity of an entire people was being trampled on. No one questioned how a Turkic people accused of "panturkism" could spill the blood of another Turkic people, their blood brothers and coreligionists. No one wanted to raise the issue of what kinds of social deformations, social injustices stood behind these events!

By saying this, I am not trying to excuse the Fergana events, this merciless, disgraceful fratricidal bloodbath. But how did these events come about, in what context—it is this question which needs a correct answer.

During the Stalin repressions Uzbekistan was turned into a second GULAG archipelago. Just before the war more than three hundred thousand Koreans were exiled here, and during the war a half million Crimean Tatars, a hundred thousand Turks and tens of thousands of Germans, Chechens and Ingush. People by the hundreds of thousands were transported from Russia to Uzbekistan. In those difficult days all those people found shelter for themselves among the Uzbek people.

Do you know how the present situation came about? The arrivals live better than the Uzbeks. By saying this, I am not reproaching them. It is a natural occurrence, like a law of nature—among people torn away from their own land, their own survival and immunity to concerns about the future are powerful. But the social inequality created among the peoples in Uzbekistan is extremely serious. No matter what the political goal, the lands of Uzbekistan were divided among the peoples unjustly. One can say that only Uzbeks cultivate cotton, which is the cause of the people's tragedy. The majority of Uzbek youth in rural areas are unemployed and landless. According to official information, close to forty million people in the USSR live in poverty, and nine million of these are Uzbeks.

It is also odd that in the Fergana valley the many "money-making" areas—trade, social services, etc.—are in the hands of the Turks.

The outgrowth of the events in the realm of social and economic inequality is what started the clashes among the youths. The party and Soviet organs of Fergana Oblast were unable to meet the commitments of their jobs at the beginning of these events, before they turned into a mass tragedy; certain minor, local clashes quickly gained impetus and turned into an explosion. I state this unequivocally because this is the opinion of the Turkish elders whom I know and with whom I have talked.

The latest data shows that many Uzbeks died in the course of these events but not one soldier was killed.

[Interviewer] Adil, I have talked with Turkish acquaintances in Tashkent, the Birlik leadership, representatives of other nationalities, Fergana Uzbeks and writers in detail about this, and the impression I received from their often contradictory observations is that the Fergana events were the most monstrous, tragic form of social protest brought about by social injustice. In other words, one has to connect the reasons behind these events with the fact that masses of Uzbek women have immolated themselves in recent years.

[Yagubov] I agree. And what was the result of the fact that the situation was incorrectly assessed? After articles in SOBESEDNIK and OGONYOK a terrifying action against Uzbek youth in the army was organized. The OGONYOK correspondent, who claims that Uzbeks who wanted to "establish an Islamic republic" and drive the Russians from Uzbekistan proposed that the Turks unite with them and that they take vengeance on the Turks who did not unite with them, referred to the argument of General Didorenko who was one of the inspirers of the Gdlyan group and who had been sent to Uzbekistan five years ago. Now this general has been relieved of duty and criminal charges have been raised against him for the wrongs he committed against the Uzbek people.

Now I also think that when the central press evaluates the events in Azerbaijan it has forgotten its conscience...

[Interviewer] When were you last in Azerbaijan?

[Yagubov] In 1983. My son Iskandar did his military service in Baku and I visited him then.

I also know why you asked this question. We have to revive our literary-cultural relations between Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan in a totally new context. Azerbaijan's dramaturgy had a great role in the development of the Uzbek national theater in the 1920s and 1930s. Uzbeks readers like Samad Vurghun as much as they like their own poets. We have to bring this tradition back to life.

Legal Representation for 'Irresponsible' Discussed

90UN0569A Moscow SOVETSKAYA YUSTITSIYA in Russian No 23, Dec 89 pp 23-25

[Article by V. Pankratov, graduate student, USSR MVD Academy: "The Legal Representative of the Irresponsible in Criminal Proceedings"]

[Text] Within the framework of the existing legislation, incapacitated accused (suspects), victims, civil defendants and plaintiffs may, in addition to the assistance of the professional lawyers representing their rights, also have the assistance of their own legal representatives during both the preliminary investigation and in court sessions. Individuals with regard to whom compulsory medical measures are applied for the commission of socially dangerous acts in a state during which they were not aware of their actions or could not control them, that is, in a completely helpless condition, do not have this right. It is difficult to find a sensible explanation for this. In addition, in the given case, the criminal process legislation to a certain extent differs from that of civil process, under which guardians and custodians provide such individuals assistance in cases where needed while exercising their right not to be exploited by someone. And if the mentally ill person is a minor, then the non-participation in the case of legal representatives is in contradiction of the norms of family and marital law (articles 53 and 108 of the KoBS [Family and Marital Law Code of the RSFSR], and the corresponding KoBS articles in other union republics).

The problematic nature of the issue is also conditioned by the fact that neither the legal representative, nor the individual for whom the issue of applying compulsory medical measures is being resolved is named among the participants of the proceedings in the Foundations of Criminal Processes and the RSFSR UPK [Criminal Process Code] (or in the UPKs of other union republics). Paragraph 8 of UPK article 34 indicates that parents, adoptive parents, custodians, and guardians are legal representatives of the accused or victim, as well as representatives of institutions and organizations in whose custody that same accused or victim is located. Absent from this roster is the legal representative of individuals recognized as irresponsible.

At the same time, part 1 of UPK article 407 (in the UPK chapter on proceedings for application of compulsory medical measures) stipulates that appointing the case for a hearing, the judge (representative of the court) informs the legal representative of the individual who has committed a socially dangerous act of this. The norm which determines the circle of mandatory participants of the court procedures (the procurator and the defense counsel) does not name a legal representative among them (UPK article 408). The law contains no other mention of the participation of a legal representative in the resolution of a criminal case on the application of compulsory medical measures. That which has been said

allows us to draw the conclusion that the legal representative cannot be called a full and equal participant in the proceedings.

In accordance with the USSR Supreme Court Plenum of 26 April 1984 resolution No. 4 "On Court Practice for the Application, Alteration, or Abolition of compulsory Medical Measures," the court is obligated to provide the legal representative of the irresponsible the opportunity to familiarize himself with the case materials, to participate in the investigation of evidence, to present evidence, to petition, to make objections, and to appeal the determination of the court. These explications have no legal basis. Neither the norms fixed in the articles of UPK chapter 33, nor the text of the indicated resolution contain any means for ensuring the realization of the requirements of the country's highest legal organ in the event that they are not fulfilled. The results of a sample generalization of court-inquiry practices indicate that of the studied criminal cases considered by the people's courts of Moscow and Bryansk, legal representatives of the irresponsible participated in only 31 percent. Consequently, in 69 percent of these cases, the court did not ensure their participation in the legal sessions. However, not one of these cases was returned for new consideration by courts of cassation or supervision.

In both inquiry and court practice, an extremely simplified procedure for investigating and examining cases on application of compulsory medical measures had been confirmed in all locations; with this, the realization of the rights and legal interests of both the irresponsible and his legal representative are not only complicated, but for the most part impossible. Thus, regarding the case of the mentally ill P., who had committed an act dangerous to society as stipulated in part 3, article 144 of the RSFSR Criminal Code: The case was examined in a court session without witnesses or the victim. The court proceedings were reduced to the proclamation of investigator's resolution to those presiding, and the conclusions of the court-ordered psychiatric examination. Then were heard the opinions of the procurator and the defense counsel on the advisability of compulsory medical measures, after which the court, taking the fact of the commission of a socially dangerous act to have been proven, handed down its determination on the application of compulsory medical measures. P. and her legal representatives did not participate in court. A lawyer was involved in the case from the moment he was familiarized with the materials of the proceedings, that is, his participation was nominal.

For the case of S., who had committed a socially dangerous act as stipulated by part 1 of article 96 of the Criminal Code, only an inquiry was conducted. Despite the requirements of UPK article 404, the court not only failed to return the case for preliminary investigation proceedings, but considered it without the participation of the defense counsel or the legal representative, having applied compulsory medical measures. The mentally ill individual did not attend the court proceedings.

The list of such examples could be continued. The following trend is delineated: The phases of the criminal proceedings during which the objective truth of the case is established were either truncated or completely absent (preliminary investigation and court investigation in the court of first instance); the participants (the irresponsible and his legal representatives) in the proceedings, whose rights and legal interests are quite directly concerned, are either absent from one phase of the proceedings (the irresponsible) or do not participate at all (legal representatives). On the one hand, the individual on whose behalf the issue of application of compulsory medical measures is being resolved may be obliged to participate in processing investigative actions (UPK article 404); on the other hand, in practice, his participation is symbolic and is, as a rule, reduced to establishing the fact of his psychological condition to the investigator. After this, the mentally ill individual is faced with the fact of having compulsory medical measures applied to him on the basis of the court's decision. As a rule, he is not present in court. When informed by the court, the legal representative may take part in the court proceedings, but in actuality, the court does not ensure this. The defense counsel participates in the case from the moment the fact of psychiatric illness is established, and then this fact acquires judicial effect if the investigator has the conclusions of the court-ordered psychiatric examination, and in the majority of cases, it moves on directly to completion of the investigation. Consequently, under the existent procedural regulations, in the given category of cases, even he is actually able to defend the rights of the irresponsible only in a court session. Thus the issue remains open: Who then may represent and defend the rights of legal representative, since it is, after all, quite obvious that he may have his own opinions, distinct from the interests of the individual he represents.

A means of extrication from the situation is suggested by the practice itself. Many problems would become solvable if the participation of the legal representative of the mentally ill individual were to be legislatively fixed starting with the phase of the preliminary investigation. Investigative practice already has such experience. Some 31 percent of the criminal cases studied had been investigated by investigators of the internal affairs organs and the procuracy, with the participation of legal representatives of individuals recognized as irresponsible. Particular attention should be directed toward this conformity: The participation of the legal representative in the preliminary investigation practically always (in about 80 percent of the cases) entails his participation in the court proceedings. In all cases, without exception, where the legal representative was not presented with the preliminary investigation by anyone, the court proceedings were conducted without him, in as much as the court, by virtue of the specificity of its activity, could not ensure his establishment, appearance, and participation in the case. The majority of the investigators, judges, and attorneys polled spoke in favor of resolving this issue in the manner proposed.

The positive resolution of this issue also presupposes the definition of the lawful status of the legal representative. It seems that for this, the basis should be in the procedural position of the irresponsible individual himself, who has granted his rights in all their scope to the legal representative, with the exception of his right to give explanations. Under the currently effective criminal procedural legislation, there is no mention of a concrete enumeration of the rights of the mentally ill; merely his right and responsibility to participate in the conduct of investigative action and in court proceedings stemming from his psychological condition are noted (UPK articles 404, 407). In light of this, the situation of the psychiatric patient is in many ways similar to that of the accused (the defendant), and he should thus be accorded the rights of the latter.

The problem of witness immunity is becoming increasingly topical. Granting the legal representative the right not to respond to questions if the answers to them place him or the individual represented by him in jeopardy of being proven guilty will only promote the independence and legal defense of these participants in the procedure.

The issue of granting the irresponsible's legal representative the right to a representative by agreement has also become urgent. This is explained by the fact that in many cases, for many reasons, the irresponsibles' legal representatives do not have the opportunity to participate in the execution of the case. A positive resolution of this issue will respond to the growing demands of the legal provision of citizens' lawful interests.

Nor does there exist a single opinion among lawyers on an issue such as permitting civil action on cases concerning the socially dangerous acts of irresponsible individuals. Some feel that since the case is not being considered a crime, but as the act of an irresponsible individual, this matter should be considered in the procedure of civil court proceedings. The USSR Supreme Court, and the overwhelming majority of practitioners support such a viewpoint. Others, based upon the requirements of UPK articles 410 and 317, feel that the court must permit civil action during the course of the case's examination on the application of compulsory medical measures.

This issue acquires particular urgency in view of the following circumstances. On one hand, the individual who has committed a socially dangerous act in an irresponsible state does not answer for the material damage he causes even if he had not been declared incapacitated before that time. If there is guilt, such responsibility may be borne by the individuals designated as custodians. However, the fact of guilt must be proven, and in a civil court proceeding, the court does not bear such a responsibility. On the other hand, it is immaterial to the victim who will compensate him for the damage caused by the irresponsible party; of far greater importance to him is the guarantee of such compensation. As a rule, there is simply no one who is supposed to compensate the victim for the losses caused

by the irresponsible individual, since the parents quite rarely are the custodians (this was so in only 1 percent of the cases studied). The state may resolve this problem by taking upon itself the responsibility for the complete compensation of victims' material damage. In our view, the state must, in being the guarantor of the social relations established by it, bear certain material expenses in reinstating citizens' violated personal property rights, all the more so because we have in our country an analogy to this resolution. By the USSR Council of Ministers resolutions No. 134 of 6 February 1984, "On the Introduction of Temporary Stipends for Minor Children in Cases Where it is Impossible to Recover the Support of Their Parents" (USSR Court Proceedings, 1984, No. 6, article 32), and the 25 January 1989 resolution No. 67 "On the Measures to Improve the Material Situation of Minor Children whose Parents Decline to Pay Support" (USSR Court Proceedings, 1989, No. 12, article 36), the state took upon itself the responsibility for partial maintenance of minor children whose parents not only decline to pay support, and are held criminally responsible, but who are undergoing cures in treatment facilities without social security stipends. The creation in the country of a special fund from whose resources payments would be made to compensate the material losses of the victims of the crimes and socially dangerous acts of irresponsible individuals would promote a more complete defense of citizens' rights.

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Work of Ukrainian Customs Inspectors Examined
90UN0562A Kiev RADYANSKA UKRAYINA in
Ukrainian 26 Nov 89 p 4

[Article by special correspondent A. Kraslyanskyy, Transcarpathian Oblast: "Customs Office: The Myths and Prose of Life"]

[Text] Getting ready to visit the workers of the Chop State Customs Office, looking for detective stories was furthest from my mind, especially since myths on that subject are a dime a dozen. And in addition, back in Uzhgorod, in the office of O.S. Semerak, the head of the oblast committee's State and Law Department, I got intensely interested when I saw in the hands of V.M. Osavachuk, the chief of the Operations Department of the Uzhgorod Customs Office, an item of wondrous beauty: A rather large, half-a-palm-sized decorative star made of pure gold and studded with big diamonds which glittered, shone and sparkled on all sides. The star, Volodymyr Mykolayovych explained, had been confiscated from one of several tourists heading for Czechoslovakia. When I asked how much the item was worth he answered, "It's for the expert appraisers to say, but it should be roughly thirty thousand—at the official rate, of course."

And in Chop, during a meeting with Yu.O. Onufer, deputy chief of the customs office, no matter what problems of the activities of the service they touched

upon I kept coming across incidents that made me put exclamation points in my notebook. In their kind of work, evidently, it is just half a step from myth to reality.

How much would you think the rather small collective of this customs office—just a few dozen staffers—annually confiscates for the state from tourists and non-tourists attempting to enrich themselves by carrying goods and valuables across the border that are banned for export? Over 6 million rubles!

And where do certain "travelers" conceal the things they hope to smuggle across the border—or, more precisely, where do the inspectors find them? No matter how hard you try, your imagination will fail you, no matter how many of the stories you hear. But anyway, Where do you think? In the heels of shoes, gas containers, thermoses, fire extinguishers, buttons, watches, brushes, ballpoint pens, rolls of film, and Krona batteries. There were some "conspirators" who tried to smuggle platinum wires in the handle of a hammer; there were some who hid 300 cans of caviar in laundry powder. But I was most astonished by a case in which one clever fellow tried to smuggle a 100-ruble banknote in his shoelace.

I asked Yuriy Oleksandrovych, "How do you manage to detect the charade so quickly, a secret operation the culprit has worked days, months, or even years to prepare?"

"Don't believe the myths," Yu.O. Onufer answered, "about how we X-ray people, as when there is a suspicion that someone has swallowed some valuable item. No one has the right to force a person to undergo X-rays, or to employ other devices that might damage his health, any more than to resort to physical force. Our rule is to respect the law and people's rights while exercising high professionalism in detecting contraband."

"But by no means every wrongdoer looks forward to confessing that he's carrying forbidden items across the border."

"The fact is that most people who violate customs regulations readily admit their intentions—not without our assistance, of course. This evening, for example, at the Tysa Customs Station where there's a steady flow of cars crossing the border these days, one traveler was caught carrying gold items worth over a thousand rubles. And he turned them over himself, completely voluntarily."

Detecting my look of disbelief, Yuriy Oleksandrovych made this suggestion:

"Let's go to the station and you can see for yourself how it's done."

I had already heard about the lines of cars at the border, but what I saw exceeded my expectations. There were Zhigulis, Volgas, and Moskviches lined up for three kilometers to the border. For several hours and sometimes days they await their turn to cross the border. And all these people have to be inspected quickly, sometimes

they must be checked in just a few minutes so as not to allow any smuggling of forbidden items.

The customs officials really labored "in the sweat of their brows." But what was surprising was that for the most part they were not oldsters but young people who, in fact, often seemed a little too young. One of the officials was a woman who quickly and accurately worked with the motorists. I suddenly recalled hearing that when crossing the border, travelers are especially apprehensive about passing through the lane where women are working.

When I reminded Yuriy Oleksandrovych of that he laughed:

"Well, in fact, that principle has been noticed. Perhaps it's because women are more finely attuned to the mood of whoever they're talking to, and that's a prime concern of ours. A woman inspector, if she notices one of the drivers trying to switch to another line and be inspected by a man, will immediately change places with her male partner. And in most such cases something will be found, because honest people don't care who inspects them."

We came closer. We were introduced. Senior inspector Zita-Yeva Vashkeba, a nice-looking, courteous woman.

"But why do you stop some people and let others through practically without inspecting them?" I asked.

"You know, everyone has his own professional secrets and habits. Let me just say that our main 'weapon' is the ability to sense the slightest psychological nuances, and to get people to think that they're not going to conceal any contraband from us."

Among the youngest was Yuriy Baran, the chief of the customs station. The day before, Yuriy Oleksandrovych had said that for the collective he was a real find.

Yuriy Yuriyovych, a calm and judicious man, named his staffers Volodymyr Markush, Vasyl Besak, Tamara Kuzmenko, and many others who have earned the respect of their colleagues and returned a good many valuables to the state.

Over a cup of wondrously fragrant coffee of the kind they only know how to make in Transcarpathia, we continued our conversation about certain problems that need to be solved soon, because with the amazing increase in the number of trips abroad, it would be easy to drown in the deluge. Above all, the cadre problem. Although our republic has dozens of customs offices on the borders alone, we have yet to open a single educational institution to train specialists in this field. What we need is a serious, state effort, not the slapdash kind they provide in so many of the customs offices.

Such a school could be opened, certainly, in Chop, which has very experienced specialists and rich traditions. And there are about as many "visual aids" as you could wish—confiscated items and the techniques resorted to by violators. A whole museum of such items has been organized there to help train personnel. Incidentally, such a school has been functioning for some time in Chop thanks to the efforts of specialists like Yu.A. Shlyakhta, the chief of the customs office; Yu.O. Onufer, whom we already know; Yu.Yu. Baran; and others. So why not legalize it as a republic educational institution having the appropriate rights and financing? We have plenty of bitter experience of making do with the brigade method of training specialists where we should be taking the statelike approach.

One other thing bothers me. It has become a commonplace to say that we don't know how to retain our best cadres, that we are unwilling to give proper remuneration to people who have golden hands and good heads. Where to get it? Where are the funds?, we say as we throw up our hands; but it's just our own inertia.

Just look. As has been mentioned, the customs offices of Chop return over 6 million rubles to the state every year. Why not allocate a part of those funds to encourage the best specialists, build housing, kindergartens, and so on?

I know, in such cases people often say, That's all they need: make salaries depend on the amount of goods they confiscate and see what happens! But what will happen? Customs officers will work all the harder. As for legality, experience shows that the higher a person's professionalism the more strictly he complies with the law.

Roundtable Views Postal Service Role in Media Distribution Problems

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Second Edition p 4

[Report by N. Demidov and A. Fedotov on Editors' Roundtable: "The Post Office From the Service Entrance: 'Cinderella' in the Departmental Kitchen; Where Is the Way Out of the Day-Off Problem?; Wages from Expenditures?; The Union of the Press with Soyuzpechat [Main Administration for Distribution of the Press]; Not Ultimatums, But an Understanding"]

[Text] What do we know about the postal service and about the mailman? Not very much. The idyllic image of Marshak's letter carrier will scarcely give us any realistic idea about the mailman's difficulties today. It is not just that his sack continues to be heavy. In addition, with the passage of years, the problems have become much more serious.

This year alone, the printing runs of periodicals increased by almost one-third. Consequently, there was also an increase in the subscribers' interest in them. But what was the mood with which the postman met this newspaper and magazine boom? Did the increase in the printing runs have an effect on the income or the welfare of the postal service itself? Not really: both the appearance of the mailman, bending over more and more under the heavy load of his antediluvian sack, and the constant delays in the delivery of newspapers, magazines, and correspondence give rise to unhappy thoughts.

What is the reason for this? What is the mailman's place in the inseparable bond that goes from publishing house to Ministry of Communications to the subscriber? The following article from today's editors' roundtable is an attempt to comprehend the problem, and to find ways to improve the interaction between the publishing houses and the people at Ministry of Communications. And so it was no accident that the persons invited to take part in the discussion were representatives of both sides, in particular, V. Leontyev, director of the CPSU Central Committee Publishing House; Ye. Manyakin, USSR Deputy Minister of Communications; M. Sumerin, director of the CPSU Kalinin Obkom Publishing House; V. Gavrilov, director of the CPSU Tatar Obkom Publishing House; Z. Malakhova, brigade leader, Vilnius Post Office; V. Volunkova, postal worker, Groznyy Postal Delivery Office; V. Filatova, postal worker, Communications Department No. 316, Moscow; R. Kulakova, chairman of the Ulyanovsk Obkom of the Communications Workers Trade Union, and USSR People's Deputy; L. Vyalov, deputy chief, Chelyabinsk Technical-Production Communications Administration, chairman of a committee to assist the economic reform of communications; S. Noikov, chief of the Cherkassy Post Office; T. Dzokayeva, assistant professor, Moscow Communications Institute; and others.

The roundtable was conducted by PRAVDA editor in chief I. Frolov.

[I. Frolov] For a long time the operation of the postal service has been a "hot," widespread topic for us in the press. And, unfortunately, for the most part it has been a topic that is remote from praise. It would seem that there just isn't anything that can be praised: the newspapers are delivered late to the subscriber, it is a very complicated thing to send a package, it takes a letter two whole days to go from one street to another in Moscow,...

Who is to blame? Are we really supposed to think that it is exclusively the postal worker? It seems to me that it would be a simplification to look at the situation in this way. The problem of the postal service is more diverse, deeper, and more complicated. I say this on the basis of the statement that Roza Gafurovna Kulakova, who is present here, made at USSR Supreme Soviet during the discussion of the draft of the law on the press. Therefore it would be reasonable to begin the discussion of the interrelationships between the publishing houses and Ministry of Communications with the link that binds us—the operation of the postal service.

[Z. Malakhova] In late November we had a conference of Lithuanian postal workers. What problems were mentioned then? Our scourge is the late delivery of newspapers and the serious shortage of transportation. The expenses for delivery and haulage in the republic constitute 13 million rubles a year. And that figure includes a large share of expenditures that arise as a result of the chronic delay in the fresh press.

And yet the mailman's wages are miserly: 110-130 rubles. And even though his sack keeps getting heavier and heavier, his wages do not increase by a single kopeck, regardless of what you say about runaway prices. As a result, there are absolutely nothing in the world that can entice people to work with us in the postal service. The only people working are fanatics. And the situation has not changed for many years.

So, since there is no one who is especially interested in defending us, we decided to save ourselves: we intend to demand from the publishing houses that they make up the losses linked with the delay in publishing the newspapers. We feel that there is no need to print on Tuesdays or Wednesdays, or on holidays, the rayon, city, and republic newspapers; or, on Sundays, the central newspapers. We women (and we constitute the majority in the postal service) want to have a guaranteed day of rest, which would be the same for all communications workers. The conference decision already contains a statement about the postal workers' right to strike...

Editorial note: And so, literally from the very beginning, the roundtable encountered its first snag: the requirement to ban the publication of newspapers on days off, the possibility of strikes... It is certainly not so complicated to understand the postal workers' desire to speak out loud and clear about their rights. But is it correct, while defending the rights of some, simultaneously to lay claim

to the rights of others? What, one asks, are the subscribers supposed to do in this instance—sit at home on their days off without any mail or correspondence?

However, that rejoinder, reasonably thrown "out of the hall," was scored by the offended voice of the next postman.

[V. Filatova] In Moscow we have all the same problems that exist in Lithuania. And the first problem is the late receipt of newspapers. During one month, for example, MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA was late 17 times in our post office, and TRUD was late approximately the same number of times. And the newspapers come to us unfolded. Therefore, whether you want to or not, you have to come to work an hour or an hour and a half ahead of time in order to fold the entire press run. And if we had the money for this purpose, we would hire a folder.

And now about magazines. This is the procedure that we have current: some of them arrive at the city section, then they go to the sorting station, and only then to the communications department. Why do we need this roundabout path? Wouldn't it be better to bypass the intermediate links? The delivery time would be considerably shortened, and also, more importantly, the magazines would be received in much better condition.

Although I will admit that with the subscriber system that we have in Moscow, it would not be too easy to guarantee that they would remain intact. The post boxes are a crying shame. They are broken and all scratched up. One key opens up 15 boxes at a time. And, as everyone knows, we have not yet made our way to communism, and therefore there are still dishonest elements who steal other people's publications.

[R. Kulakova] Well, it goes without saying that concern for the mailman has been pushed somewhere into the background. Because there does exist a decree concerning the allocation of official space to postal workers. But it is being fulfilled haphazardly. In Ulyanovsk Oblast, for example, since the beginning of the current five-year plan, 60 apartments have been allocated for these purposes. Sixty apartments for an oblast this size!

[V. Volunkova] It would seem that we are supposed to wear a uniform. But just look a bit more attentively at it: it's heavy and unattractive, and gets soaked from the lightest rain. In addition, we walk around looking like stokers, from all the newspaper ink. And it is impossible to save up any washing soap, especially now.

[L. Vyalov] We have got the firm impression that all the problems that are "painful" for us are listened to at various levels, where people nod their head in agreement, groan sympathetically, but resolve absolutely nothing. It was for that reason that we created the public committee of communications workers, that would defend perestroika in the branch. Currently we already have 200 members from all the republics.

But what are we fighting for? For our rights that have been violated. We are fighting, say, for what has already been mentioned here by my coworkers: why is it that, when a newspaper is late, the money is paid by the postal enterprise, while the publishing house washes its hands?

I've heard that in Finland a newspaper has been late once in 3 years. What is their secret, you might ask. The answer is that the advertisers submit a bill for every hour of delay, and the bill is such that no one wants it to happen again.

I know that we have a regulation according to which as much as 2 percent of the cost of a delayed printing run is paid by the publishing house as a penalty sanction. Let us now think about whether or not this is a sizeable amount: for a thousand copies, a penalty of 80 kopecks. Who likes that arrangement, one might ask. Probably only the publishing house.

[I. Frolov] Nevertheless I appeal to you to look at the forced delays without prejudice, with understanding. It is one matter if a publication is late because of sloppiness or sluggishness on the part of those who should be working on it (incidentally, at PRAVDA we carry out the strictest, most uncompromising struggle against this). But it is another matter when the delay is dictated by a newsworthy event that absolutely has to appear in the morning issue. A newspaper lives and breathes on news. Especially if the news contains important political emphases. I do not think that this should be discounted.

Customer's position: "The operation of the postal service does not withstand criticism. On the one hand, the deadlines for the movement of correspondence are frequently missed. On the other hand, the operating hours of the postal service have been reduced. One does not have to be especially observant to notice, even in Moscow, the standard phenomenon: a communications department with its windows battened down. In order to send printed matter, or, even worse, a package, you have to drive around to several rayons, and then stand in line for a minimum of one and a half hours. The rates have been rising, but the service keeps getting worse and worse. A single rate has been introduced for air mail and for ordinary mail, but we have not been getting our letters any faster..." A. Stepanov, retiree, Moscow.

Our statement: The postal service employs more than 700,000 persons, 75 percent of whom are women. Without stretching the point, their work can be included among hazardous occupations, especially the work performed by those women who accept packages and deal with the "heavy" mail. In the winter they have to work on concrete, in an open area that is completely open to the winds and the cold. We do not have the proper work clothing.

[T. Dzokayeva] It may seem to some people that what I, a worker in the communications system, am going to say is not very patriotic. But the crux of the matter is evaluating the patriotism. I am against departmental patriotism that stands above state patriotism. And it is for that reason that I cannot fail to mention something

that is causing a rather large amount of surprise. Because most of the questions that were raised here in the presence of the deputy minister of communications, who is responsible for the mail, lie within the competency of the ministry services.

But here is a question that, I feel, requires discussion at the PRAVDA level, namely the question of the alleged nonpayment for such a service as the delivery of periodicals, and the resultant debts owed by the publishing houses to Ministry of Communications in the amount of 600 million rubles a year. The main argument revolves around costs of delivering the press, and in particular the transportation expenses.

I think that the discussions on this topic require an economic explanation. First of all, the delivery of the press is not a charitable service, because the cost of each published item includes a part that is intended for the expenses involved in selling it. That part is a trade rebate of from 6 to 16 percent of the cost of the publication.

Is that amount sufficient to compensate for the expenses linked with delivery? At Ministry of Communications today you will not be told that, inasmuch as the economic gauges do not make it possible to find an answer. On the contrary, they have been called upon to conceal completely the picture of what is happening in the department's "kitchen."

The economic mechanism has been constructed here in such a way that the main factor in it is the expenditures, the "volume of operations." The branch has no self-interest in reducing them—that's the bottom line!

Here is another substantial factor. The very same sly economy at Ministry of Communications has been programmed in such a way that even the trade rebate that we are mentioning here is not included in the postal service's income. Otherwise the horrendous difficulties of the postal workers, beginning with their heavy sacks and ending with their wages, could be easily resolved within the postal service.

Where, then, do the proceeds from the trade rebate go? They go to another department—Soyuzpechat [Main Administration for Distribution of the Press]. Isn't that a strange division of labor, when one department receives the money that another department (the postal service) earns? But the main thing is that the postal service's expenses and Soyuzpechat's income do not intersect at all in the branch's economic mechanism. So that, even if starting as of this minute, the publishing houses were to pay Ministry of Communications not 600 million rubles, but, say, 3 billion rubles, not a single kopeck would be used to the advantage of the long-suffering postman.

Hence today's unhappy situation: the postman has a tremendous amount of work, but that does not reflect in any way on his earnings.

[S. Novikov] It has been said here that the postal service does not get any money for delivery. But this is the third

year that we have been united with Soyuzpechat and we can see that it is advantageous to work as a pair. It is just that certain Soyuzpechat workers, realizing that they are losing the prestigious positions that they have occupied for so many years, have suddenly raised an unhealthy hullabaloo. It has been necessary to create an association of post-office chiefs.

I feel that the ministry in this question should occupy a businesslike, well-principled position. It should have a sober, well thought-out economic concept. We would like to be able, independently, bypassing Soyuzpechat, to conclude direct contracts with the publishing houses. Give us this opportunity as applicable to PRAVDA and you can be assured that we will worry about how to deliver and distribute it.

[M. Sumerin] Every year we conclude contracts with Soyuzpechat, and, accordingly, send the payment there. But recently the following situation occurred. We made the youth publication a weekly. We had to pay three times as much to forward it. The post-office chief told me: the postmen absolutely refuse to carry the magazine. I explained that we are paying three times as much. She said, "How do we know that?" It turns out that, actually, the money is being paid to Soyuzpechat, while the postmen are just barely making ends meet.

Editorial note: The idea of agreements with publishing houses would seem to be completely natural and justified. One would only wish to emphasize the following thought: the agreement, by virtue of its mandatory nature, must be equivalent to a contract, and must become the basis of the work performed by the entire Ministry of Communications. That means that each of its rates is an agreement between the customer and Ministry of Communications, beginning with the payment for an envelope (by this act, the department obliges itself to deliver the letter strictly within the normal time limits) and ending with the delivery of newspapers to the subscriber.

Until the present time, practically speaking, the people at Ministry of Communications have not borne any responsibility to the customer for their violations. Take, for example, the letter from Odessa resident O. Kavaleva, who is indignant at the fact that postal workers have submitted to her a bill for searching for printed matter sent to Angola that was lost at the fault of subdivisions of Ministry of Communications. "In addition, I am supposed to pay for the department's sloppiness," the newspaper reader says at the end of her letter.

[V. Gavrilov] As long as we have been talking about magazines, I must state that they are being delivered in an extremely poor manner. They lie around at the printing offices for 10-15 or even 20 days. The working conditions at the shipment enterprises are much worse. I have worked for 18 years in Kazan, and during almost that entire period the mail-shipment department has been huddled into housing accommodations that have not been properly adapted for postal work. We have been attempting to bring the manufacture and printing of the

central press closer to us in Kazan. There are printing capacities that are available. But the communications administration flatly refuses, stating that the mail-shipment department cannot carry a load like that.

Response: Magazines printed in Kazan used to be shipped to Moscow so that they could be forwarded from the capital.

[V. Leontyev] Currently we and Ministry of Communications are hindering one another's work. For example, the communications workers used to tell us constantly about the blessing of decentralization. Well, during the past 15 years we opened up 22 locations for the printing of newspapers in the outlying areas. Currently these locations are operating appallingly, because it is impossible to deliver the output properly from them.

We are ready right now to turn over 24 locations to magazines. But the communications workers, as has already been correctly stated, refuse to forward them. No one can understand their reasons for refusing.

Nor can I remain silent about the mailmen. With complete justification we compare their work with the work performed by the women plowmen after the war. Why is this occurring? The impression is that the postal service is a stepdaughter for Ministry of Communications. No, Ministry of Communications does not like the postal service that has been devoted to it, because it is much more profitable and more prestigious to engage in work in space, work with communications satellites... It seems to me that it is not only the economy of the Ministry of Communications that is sick (and that economy actually is sick), but something else that is "ailing" is the basic attitude taken toward people, toward the rank-and-file workers.

And now a few words relative to the late issuance of newspapers. Of course, the publishing house is guilty of this, and we are not attempting to take the blame off of ourselves. Take, for example, the MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA publishing house, because Shop No. 28 there is a subdivision of Ministry of Communications. We haul PRAVDA from 0000 hours to approximately 0430 hours. Then what? It still is not delivered promptly to the subscriber.

And what about the post offices at the nine Moscow terminals? The conditions are simply inconceivable. What kind of quality can one expect... We sent freight cars loaded with output there. And they come back to us in the same condition: they do not accept them. There are been many instances when magazines have taken seven days to get to Vladivostok, and then were returned to Moscow.

And now the question of the day off. This is a difficult question that affects the interests of approximately 100,000 persons who will be forced to work on Sundays. It seems to me that it is necessary to seek other ways that are acceptable for everyone. For example, we could give work on Sunday to students, retirees, and anyone else

who wants to make additional earnings. In the final analysis, we must increase the payments given to workers in the postal service. Putting it succinctly, we must search, rather than mark time.

[Ye. Manyakin] I agree; it has turned out that the postal service has become the Cinderella in our ministry's system. And the profits that the branch has obtained have been going basically into the development of electrical communications. Apparently there was a need for this.

Today we need a different approach. The efficiency and the quality of the work performed by the postal service cannot be improved by berating people or shouting at them. It is necessary to invest a large amount of money into it. And in this regard we are not marking time: at the present time, as much as 100 million rubles a year is being invested into developing the material-technical base of the postal subbranch. A comprehensive program for the next five-year plan has already been prepared. That program is based on a total sum of no less than 1.5 billion rubles. If this program is approved and begins to operate, the postal service will begin rapidly to get out of its current crisis.

I feel that we have complete justification right now to be gratified at certain results, including those that were achieved, so to speak, "on an equal footing" with the publishing house, with PRAVDA's support. Speaking about this, I am not attempting to play up to our partner, but, instead, I have in mind 64 specific press-delivery points that are in operation throughout the country. If they did not exist, we would not deliver 90 percent of PRAVDA's printing run to the readers on the date of issue.

The economic mechanism also plays, and must play, a serious role. But that mechanism has not yet been completely adjusted. And until a pricing reform is carried out, we shall continue to live in a kingdom of curved mirrors and will be unable to change over to actual, real cost accountability.

People tell us that, in the final analysis, we will be politically mature people, having in mind the fact that we must apply reduced wage rates to the distribution of the party press. But this will not happen! At what expense can we distribute it "with a rebate"? Only by means of increasing the rates for other services.

You will say that we have five billion rubles of profit. This is nothing new: superprofits hypnotize everyone, including Goskomsen [State Committee on Prices]. But it is necessary to know from where this "exorbitant" profit flows to us: the military pay for leased channels. But telephone communication and the postal service, obviously, are different things. Who will pay, out of good will, the postal enterprise for its poverty? Pardon me for saying this, but there aren't any such fools. And it is completely obvious the profits are located in one pocket, while the losses go into another one.

We say: reduce for us the rates for the leasing of channels, reduce by one-half the rates for the delivery of pensions, and we will reject the indicator "volume of output." Yes, it is necessary to change over to income for the postal enterprise that is based on rates. But for a beginning it is necessary to think carefully about many things, and first of all to put a solid base under the changeover to an improved economic mechanism.

[T. Dzokayeva] Whatever pricing policy exists at Ministry of Communications (and that pricing policy is simply tasty for the department), it is understandable that the branch-level economic mechanism that is in effect today must be changed if we really want to achieve progress in the branch. For the time being, it is being maintained by the fact that the rank-and-file workers are uninformed and are being deliberately disoriented.

Just take a look: with the aid of the present economic mechanism, Ministry of Communications simply picks up the mail, without even resorting to tax dodges. By way of its pivotal indicator, "volume of output," without even bending over, at its own discretion, it pumps out the lion's share of the rate income. That is why our postal system is poor.

Of course, I understand that this is not the place to consider from all angles such a large and serious question as the action of the economic mechanism in the branch. However, I feel that it is absolutely necessary to attract the careful attention of the country's highest economic agencies to it.

[R. Kulakova] I think that there cannot be two opinions about the fact that the questions raised here—whether they pertain to the single day off, the postmen's working conditions, the branch's economic mechanism, or the interrelationships between the publishing houses and the Ministry of Communications—have already, so to speak, "overripened." But, taking advantage of my powers as people's deputy, I am doing, and shall continue to attempt to do, everything that is expected of me to assure that these problems prove to be, as they used to be, shoved in the back of a long, unnecessary "drawer" in the desk of those whose job obliges them to resolve them.

[I. Frolov] Well, on my part I must express satisfaction that this important dialogue within the walls of the editorial office, a dialogue that has been postponed for so many years, has finally taken place. It has been one that involved different opinions and has been largely debatable, but, most importantly, it has been a frank and mutually self-interested one. It has been a dialogue among people who are not standing on different sides of the "barricades," but, rather, people who are in principle doing the same job.

Of course, the problems that have been illuminated here are truly very important. But having said "a," it is necessary to say "b": not only to mention the problems, but to take immediate steps to resolve them. Therefore, I think that it would be correct if, on our part, on the basis of which has been jointly discussed here, we

prepare for sending to the party's Central Committee a memorandum that raises in a clear-cut manner the questions that were brought up at this roundtable. I hope that the simple fact of publishing its materials in PRAVDA will serve as an impetus for easing the situation that has developed around the postal service.

It is natural that the resolution of the questions mentioned here is linked directly with the economic methods of management, with cost accountability; there are also problems that depend upon impressive capital expenditures and that require a long period of time. But it is nevertheless important not to mark time, but to move ahead toward resolving them. At such time one should by no means rely in each instance upon the center, because much can and must be done, so to speak, in the outlying areas by the soviet and trade-union agencies. Let us all work together to delve deeply into the economic system, untying its tight knots and publicizing its concealed defects.

I am convinced that thoughtful, painstaking joint work is the reliable path to the resolution of all problems. And the responses of the readers and subscribers must become the tuning fork for testing the correctness of our actions. Because it is for the sake of the readers and the subscribers, in the final analysis, that we all work.

PRAVDA VOSTOKA Editor on Perestroyka in Regional Media

90US0332A Tashkent OBSHCHESTVENNYE
NAUKI V UZBEKISTANE in Russian No 9, Sep 89 pp
17-24

[Article by R.A. Safarov, doctor of historical sciences, PRAVDA VOSTOKA editor: "On Perestroyka in the Local Media"]

[Text] Ongoing perestroyka poses major challenges to our media. Life has shown convincingly that its structure as it emerged in the past comes into conflict with the political and economic development of society at the current stage. This is stated directly in the CPSU Central Committee resolution "On Several Issues of Perestroyka in the Central Party Press", which was passed recently.

The CPSU Central Committee asked the central committees of the CPs of union republics, kraykoms and obkoms to review the structure of their publications, reforming them by 1990 according to new requirements and, if need be, converting to other uses industry publications funded by the party budget, to improve their content and to reduce financial losses. In this area, much needs to be done in our republic, since a number of publications have not justified their existence and some newspapers and magazines must redefine their functions and orientation.

It is important to note that the CPSU Central Committee resolution permits republics to decide independently whether to start, close or rename rayon, city,

oblast, republic and some other newspapers and journals, within the quota of paper allocated to them for this purpose and given that new publications are economically viable.

Our proposals, which we delineate in this article, comply to the spirit and direct recommendations of the CPSU Central Committee. Of course we do not pretend to be the bearers of absolute truth. There may be other proposals, too. One thing is important: the press must work for perestroika and play an active part in the creative labor of the Soviet people.

The director of an oblast department of publications, printing and book trade recounted the following incident. At a fair, rural cooperators were seen wrapping their goods in freshly printed copies of the rayon newspaper.

In and of itself, this was not surprising. Let us be realistic, people sometimes use newspapers for purposes other than reading. What was surprising was that the vendors could get hold of so many copies of that day's issue.

It turned out that last fall the rayon had been falling short of its subscription targets for the local paper. Organizations were given strict quotas, backed by the threat of harsh sanctions for laggards. A large number of subscriptions was imposed on the rayon consumer union. The union solved the problem simply: they took up a collection and fulfilled the plan.

Let us not name the rayon where this happened. This is not because we have sympathy for local cooperators or want to cover up the sins of rayon journalists whose product finds no better use.

Of course this is not a pandemic phenomenon. In the country as a whole and in Uzbekistan in particular there are many excellent, combative rayon papers, ones that have earned the respect of their readers, busily implement party policies in their rayons, take an active part in perestroika and initiate many useful projects. There are many others, however, ones about which few good words have been heard in their rayons. They are compulsory companions for subscribers to the popular magazine *ZA RULEM*, for example, while retailers sell them in tandem with *SOBESEDNİK*. There is plenty of such newspapers, too.

It is not our purpose to analyze why this happens. Let us admit that in addition to subjective reasons there are general ones as well. In any case, the rayon media as a whole has failed to fulfill its duties. The following is a far-from-complete list of responsibilities the party has asked rayon publications to assume: to cover the activities of labor collectives in reaching key economic, sociopolitical and educational goals, to report on organizational as well as ideological and educational work of primary party organizations, to assist in bolstering discipline and order and developing worker initiative, to cover the work of sovkhoses, kolkhoses and agricultural

industry enterprises in carrying out the Food Program, to promote and assert the Soviet way of life and to strengthen contact with readers. Under perestroika, when each new day is marked by another important event in sociopolitical, economic or sociocultural areas, rayon newspapers are simply unable to respond to new goals and achieve them in full.

Let us look at the problem differently, i.e., from the economic point of view. Some may think that this approach is crude and utilitarian. However, life with increasing persistence tells us otherwise.

How much does it cost the state to publish rayon newspapers? It is no secret that most of them are losing money. Of the 143 rayon papers published under the aegis of the UzSSR State Committee on Publishing, there are few that do not get state subsidies. In 1986 alone, such subsidies totaled some R5 million. Coupled with the cost of maintaining oblast publications, which are also mainly loss-making, subsidies total R7 million. In the Union overall, some 3,780 rayon, city, regional and district newspapers are published. Only 17 percent of them are viable. To keep the rest afloat, R70 million was spent in 1986. There are no self-sufficient newspapers in Turkmenia, Tajikistan and Kirghizia and only a handful of them in Moldavia and Kazakhstan.

Are such expenses warranted? This is not an easy question, of course. It would not have arisen if the papers had been doing effective ideological and organizational work. But if their reputation is such that they must resort to forced subscriptions while a portion of subsidies is spent on extraneous things, the question not only becomes pertinent but acquires special urgency.

But let us not dwell on the obvious. The need to restructure the local media was stated in the 1984 resolutions of the CPSU Central Committee "On Further Improvements at Oblast and Rayon Newspapers" and of the USSR Council of Ministers "On Measures to Strengthen the Material and Technical Base of Regional, District and City Newspapers". In particular, they listed measures to improve the financial and economic activity of publishers, to cut production expenditures and to introduce editorial collectives to self-sufficient, profitable work methods.

The goal is clear. To reduce losses and to become profitable means creating conditions for improving the quality of the newspaper, enriching its content and increasing the influence of the press.

There are two main ways to raise revenues. The first is to raise circulation. As is well-known, circulation depends on the content of the newspaper. An impressive experience in improving the content of rayon newspapers and raising their circulation has been gathered in the Baltic republics. Most rayon papers there are profitable, and this has been achieved in the past 10-15 years. But while studying the experience of the Baltic, we must keep in mind that it can not be fully duplicated everywhere.

The content of rayon newspapers in Central Asia is inferior to that of their counterpart in the Baltic. There is plenty of work left in this area. But even if they reached a level of professional skill comparable to that of their Estonian and Lithuanian colleagues, local journalists in Central Asia might be unable to attain such high circulation figures. A number of social and demographic factors comes into play. Calculations show that losses can be stemmed if the newspaper sells at least 10,000 copies. But what can be the maximum circulation of the newspaper in a rayon which has a population of 10,000-30,000? In steppe and mountainous rayons of Uzbekistan there are at least 14 such rayons. Here, a circulation of 2,000-3,000 copies is the limit. Profitability is out of the question.

Moreover, the best papers in the Baltic sell one issue per 4 or 5 rayon residents. Consequently, in a rayon with 50,000-70,000 residents the newspaper has a circulation of 12,000 to 15,000 copies. Let us note, however, that the average family size in the Baltic is 3 to 4 people. In Uzbekistan, on the other hand, it is 6 to 8 people, or twice as much. This means that in a rayon with a similar population, at the same level readership penetration—i.e., based on the principle of one issue per household—rayon journalists in the UzSSR will achieve a circulation only half as large, or 6,000 to 7,000 copies. Once again, profitability is impossible. Yet, a good half of Uzbekistan rayons have a population of 50,000-70,000.

The second way to achieve profitability is to raise advertising revenues. If the advertising department at a newspaper is properly organized, its income grows sharply. Yet, setting up this department entails extra work and it is not always successful. Rayon newspaper staffs lack the position of advertising specialist. The task of editing and placing advertisements is assigned to a journalist on a volunteer basis, since no compensation is paid for advertisements while the bonus awarded to the employee responsible for fulfilling the newspaper's advertising revenue plan is much lower than the honorariums he would have received if he had worked on his own articles, the ones he was unable to write because he spent all his time chasing after ads.

Moreover, the outmoded view still pervades many newspapers. "What is advertising?" they ask. "It is something that belongs to the practice of the bourgeois press. Why do we need advertising? We are an ideological outfit, not merchants."

Moreover, many journalists lack business acumen. Let us be honest, they never studied it. Journalism curricula lack well-grounded courses in economics of newspaper publishing.

But economics, ability to calculate and business sense are skills that can be learned, if there is desire. Editors whose newspapers are nearing the break-even point tend to have a good understanding of economic and business issues. A few more efforts and they will kiss state subsidies good-bye. After it becomes profitable, the

newspaper gains a 10 percent increase in its compensation fund, which means that it will be able to hire employees and raise wages to existing ones.

But if the circulation is low for objective reasons, keeping the newspaper from achieving profitability, revenues from advertising, however large, will remain nothing but revenues and will not become part of profits. It does not matter whether or not one makes an effort, especially since everyday editorial concerns take up all free time, leaving none for business issues.

But the fact remains: some 60 rayon papers in the republic have the average circulation of less than 5,000 copies, of whom 10 sell only 2,000 copies. For above-mentioned reasons, their results can not be improved in the near future.

Meanwhile, costly, highly efficient equipment, such as offset printing presses, is being purchased to improve the quality of those newspapers. Along with the positive effect, this creates a serious problem, raising production costs and reducing return on investment. In the 1980-86 period, return on investment in the UzSSR Committee on Publishing system fell from 57.8 kopeks to 48.2 kopeks of gross output per ruble of industrial investment. A number of reasons came into play, including higher costs of newspaper production. During that period, the capital base of oblast, city, inter-rayon and rayon printing enterprises in the republic, whose job is mainly to print rayon newspapers, rose 33-to-36 percent, on average, while annual output per worker only 20-to-25 percent.

Why did it happen? Equipment utilization rates are low. But how can it be raised if the "Dominant-726" offset press can finish a 5,000-copy run of the rayon newspaper in an hour or an hour and a half? The newspaper is published three times a week, meaning that the "Dominant" is occupied for 4 or 5 hours. What happens to the remaining 36 hours of the regular workweek—which is a minimum, given a one-shift schedule? The rayon, and its neighboring areas, do not have enough work to keep the press busy. This means that imported equipment mostly stands idle, while those who work on it do odd jobs cutting paper or sweeping the floor, which is neither work nor leisure.

There is another way out, following the lead of one inter-rayon printer in Syr-Darya Oblast who fills its order books by taking orders from organizations as far away as Novosibirsk Oblast. But as they are traveling far and wide, can those printers pay adequate attention to the quality of their own newspaper? What about intensification?

Now, the republic is working on consolidating the printing of rayon newspapers in inter-rayon and oblast printshops and reducing the number of underutilized rayon printers. But if circulation figures remain low, it can only be a half-measure.

The question therefore arises whether it is the essence of perestroika to tackle new issues by old methods. In our opinion, the structure of the local media must be changed.

It makes no sense today to keep such a large number of rayon newspapers. It makes no economic sense and, more importantly, no political sense, either. This is because due to their low creative, artistic and aesthetic potential stemming from their weak financial base many rayon papers have become useless—a tasteless extravagance in local ideological work. To be honest, in some rayons most readers are smarter, politically more literate and spiritually richer than their local paper.

Another proposal has also been heard: to slash the number of rayon papers and stress instead regional papers, one of which could cover several rayons. Economically, the advantage is clear: if the number of newspapers is cut while the overall circulation remains constant, the surviving papers could improve their situation and attain profitability sooner.

But organizationally, the issue is not as obvious. Which newspapers should be closed and which stay open? Under whose roof should joint editorial offices be set up? The regional newspaper will be based in one of the rayon centers, giving rise to concerns that that rayon will get better coverage. Or worse, its leaders may get only praise while the rest nothing but criticism.

A simple idea comes to mind. What if the question were solved without giving preference? What if all rayon newspapers were shut down?

At first, the idea may seem heretical. After all, the task of the rayon press is to provide communist education to workers, shaping their ideological views and exhorting them to action. True, not all newspapers successfully fulfill this important responsibility. But is this reason enough to remove it from the agenda?

Let us look closer at this issue. First, let us look at history. Why was a wide network of regional party papers created in the first place? The following is a quote from the Central Committee memorandum to regional and local party committees "On the Local Newspaper Program", dated April 4, 1921: the main goal of the newspaper "is to involve the masses of workers and peasants in the general task of building political and economic life. The newspaper can fulfill this assignment by explaining and highlighting local interests of the masses which can be deduced from the general state interests by setting concrete local goals for the local population." The Central Committee resolution "On Rayon Newspapers" dated July 13, 1940, stressed: "The main goal of the rayon press should be ideological and political education of workers based on daily propaganda of current policy and measures taken by the party and the government, this propaganda being based on concrete, close and comprehensible facts of local life and from the life of the rayon, kolkhozes and enterprises."

Clearly, these are timeless aims. But no strategic document of the party on the media states that the rayon newspaper is the only form of attaining these aims and that other forms can not be used in principle.

When they came into existence, in the 1920s and 1930s, rayon papers were indeed the only available form. Even oblast newspapers, not to mention central ones, could not devote enough attention to every rayon. They were not delivered regularly. Central newspapers used to reach some rayons several days, if not weeks, late. Few places had radios and there was no television. In that situation, the rayon was helpless without its newspaper, affordable and accessible as it was for every worker. We must not forget that rayon papers used to inform their readers about union-wide activities and major events in the world.

Today, the situation is completely different. All newspapers, oblast as well as central, reach rayon readers at the same time as the local one does, if not ahead of it. Modern printing technology allows oblast papers to run special pages on rayons. Once a part of the run containing a special section for one rayon is finished, the section for another rayon can be inserted into the same newspaper. Thus, the rayon reader, at certain intervals, can get an issue of the oblast newspaper with his rayon paper inserted in it, including local news items ranging from a report on the raykom buro meeting to sports results. The neighboring rayon gets its own section in the same issue.

Much can be achieved by this, in our opinion. First, the local press will be raised to the level of the oblast press—ideologically, creatively and technologically. Every article published in it will have an impact in the rayon. We hope that it will be convincing, readable and, most importantly, effective. We are aware that some rayon leaders ignore the press, dismissing proposals and criticism and even finding ways to persuade the raykom to curb its organ. It would be more difficult to do so with the oblast paper.

Secondly, costs will be cut considerably. There will be no need to maintain the staff of the rayon newspaper, usually comprised of 12-to-14 employees, or spend on paper, local printing and distribution. Rayon news can be collected by a local bureau consisting of several reporters and a driver. It would be easy for the party raykom to decide how to supervise the bureau's activities.

Will the reader be hurt under this arrangement? We do not think so. What does the rayon paper print now? Usually it is the television schedule, TASS and UzTAG news summaries and APN dispatches. Sometimes it reprints official articles ahead of major anniversaries and announcements by oblast entities. All that required material is printed in homage to the old tradition, dating back to the time when even PRAVDA got there late. Now, most rayon newspapers are slower on the uptake than central or oblast ones, if only because the latter

come out daily and the former every other day. Consequently, rayon residents find out about major events next door to them from higher level papers first, and from local ones later.

The same situation is seen in the ratio of original materials to reprints, even when it is reasonable. What do local reporters do? Why do they drown their pages in boundless officialdom? It would be nice to have someone to whom this question could be posed. But many offices, especially in virgin soil and mountainous regions, are understaffed and full of people without formal education learning the basics of their profession on the spot. Forget good articles, they do not have enough poor ones to fill the pages. Instead, they find official articles and add skilfully disguised void. They simply make text columns narrower than standard width, widen spaces between lines and add very wide borders and huge dividers. The issue comes out half-empty; the hope is that the reader will miss it.

The problem of staffing at rayon papers is an old one. Poor housing, low social and cultural level, lack of conveniences, bad salaries—all this keeps newspapermen from working in rayons. The opinion is that it is better to be last on the oblast newspaper staff than the top dog at the rayon newspaper. People worry that their wings will be clipped and that they will get used to doing shoddy work. A talented graduate of the journalism department would do everything possible to avoid being placed at the rayon paper. Who is left to do it, then?

Special rayon sections would help wring all water and air out of local-interest pieces and avoid useless repetition of official news, giving the local reader only the most important, most efficient and most interesting articles.

Setting up oblast bureaus to replace rayon offices will help solve the staffing problem, too.

We understand that this proposal to reorganize the regional press will not meet with universal approval. Rayon authorities in particular will certainly have objections. The social issue is equally important: what to do with an army of unemployed rural journalists and printers? What to do with those rayon papers which have achieved good results and make a profit? What to do

with rayons which have a huge territory? Life may put forward other, equally important objections.

This is why we think that such reorganization should be carried out in stages. First, on an experimental basis, it should be introduced at one or two republics. These should include Uzbekistan, which has compact rayons and closely situated rayon centers, ensuring that there will be no problem with getting articles from bureaus to the newspaper.

In Uzbekistan, this reform will quickly help mend the account books of the local press. Introducing oblast newspapers with special sections will reduce the size of subsidies.

Next, some 3 to 5 years later, as their circulation rises and advertising revenues grow thanks to rayon organizations and private individuals, oblast newspapers could become self-sufficient.

This will help solve problems at oblast newspapers, as well. It will create additional opportunities to improve the staffing structure of the newspapers and provide modern equipment and information processing tools for them. Once ties between main offices and bureaus are perfected, journalists will finally feel that they too live in the age of technological progress. It is time to teach them to work with news tickers, image transmitting devices and computers.

After losses at oblast newspapers are stemmed, they could be transferred to the party budget, as in most other union republics. Currently, Uzbekistan oblast papers are supervised by two organizations: on one hand, they are organs of party obkoms and oblast soviets of people's deputies, while on the other they are units of the State Committee on Publishing system. In some areas of material and technical supply, they do not have any superiors.

Should we continue publishing separate oblast and rayon newspapers? In our opinion, we need to make radical steps in intensive and decisive restructuring of local newspapers. It is not only staffing and new printing technology that are at issue. The essence of perestroika is to raise the ideological content and the quality and effectiveness of articles and to set up an optimal structure for managing the regional press.

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Col Gen Kleymenov on 1939 'Introduction' of Troops into Baltics

90UM0135A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
26 Nov 89 First Edition p 3

[Interview with Col Gen A. Kleymenov, deputy chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces: "The Baltics, 1939: Why Were Soviet Troops Introduced?"]

[Text] Col Gen A. Kleymenov, deputy chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, is interviewed by a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent.

[Correspondent] Events of the fall of 1939 are one of the subjects most debated in the Baltics. This is borne out, among other things, by numerous letters to the editors. The readers ask on what basis certain public movements classify the introduction of Red Army units into Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia in the fall of 1939 as an occupation. What can you tell us about this, Anatoliy Nikolayevich?

[Kleymenov] What is an occupation? It is the seizure of enemy territory by armed forces and the assumption of control of that territory. Soviet troops did not seize the territories of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia and did not assume control over them. They were introduced under an agreement with the governments in the face of fascist Germany's aggressive aspirations.

The parties to the agreement committed themselves to provide one another with every kind of assistance, including military. It was specified that military bases would be built on the territories of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia and that a small number of Soviet military units would be located there.

These and other agreements did not encroach upon the sovereign rights of Lithuanian, Latvia and Estonia and did not affect their public and state structures. They secured the national independence of those nations and were designed to prevent their territories from being turned into staging areas for an attack on the USSR.

[Correspondent] What documents are there which specifically refute the accusations of forced "Sovietization" of the Baltic states?

[Kleymenov] Political, diplomatic and military documents at our disposal provide the basis for stating that the actions taken by the Soviet side adhered precisely to the agreements.

I would cite just a telegram sent by V. Molotov to N. Pozdnyakov, plenipotentiary in Lithuania, on 21 October 1939: "I absolutely forbid you and all the workers with our delegation, including the military attache, to interfere in intraparty affairs in Lithuania, to support any kind of opposition movements, and so forth. The slightest attempt by any of you to interfere in the internal affairs of Lithuania will bring the most severe punishment for the guilty party. Bear in mind that our party is going to fulfill the agreement with Lithuania

honorably and precisely." Similar instructions were issued also to diplomats representing the USSR in Latvia and Estonia.

The same is indicated in war department documents....

[Correspondent] Would it be possible to acquaint our readers with at least a few of them?

[Kleymenov] Why not? Many of them have now been declassified. Orders issued by the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR on 25 October 1939 are extremely typical of relations between the "occupiers" and the "occupied."

Among other things, Order No. 0162 stated: "In order to ensure that the mutual assistance pact between the USSR and the Estonian Republic is precisely followed, I order:

1. Division Commander Comrade Tyurin, commander of the 35th Special Rifle Corps, and Brigade Commissar Comrade Zhmakin, commissar of that corps, to take all necessary steps to see that all the personnel of our units located in Estonia, from the Red Army private to the highest commanders, observe each point in the mutual assistance pact precisely and conscientiously and not interfere in the internal affairs of the Estonian Republic under any circumstances;

2. that the Soviet Government's friendly policy toward Estonia be explained to all the personnel of our units. The mutual assistance pact with Estonia is intended to secure peace in the Baltics and ensure the security of Estonia and the Soviet Union. All of the personnel of our units must clearly understand that under the mutual assistance pact our units are billeted and will live on the territory of a sovereign state in the political affairs and the social system of which they do not have a right to interfere.

Orders No. 0163 and No. 0164 absolutely forbade personnel of the 2nd Special Rifle Corps and the 16th Special Rifle Corps to interfere in the internal affairs of the Latvian and Lithuanian republics.

[Correspondent] Would it not be a good thing for those who talk about an occupation of the Baltic nations by Red Army units to learn how questions pertaining to the stationing of Soviet troops there were decided? We know the indications of real occupiers in such cases: plunder, murder lawlessness....

[Kleymenov] There was no such thing in this case, of course. The sites and the procedure for stationing Soviet military units, the status of our armed forces and the kind of relations maintained with local authorities were decided through talks. I have before me a directive issued by the People's Commissar of Defense to the military council of the 7th Army: "A commission chaired by Corps Commander Comrade Boldin, 7th Army commander, has been set up to implement that part of the agreement concluded between the USSR and

the Latvian Republic pertaining to the introduction of Red Army units onto the territory of the Latvian Republic.

"The commission's missions are to coordinate with representatives of the Latvian Republic the basic sites and the distribution of Red Army units to be stationed on the territory of the Latvian Republic...."

[Correspondent] Anatoliy Nikolayevich, it would be of interest to learn the procedure by which Soviet units were introduced.

[Kleymentov] I can cite excerpts from a report from Army Commander 2nd Rank Meretskoy, commander of the Leningrad Military District, to the People's Commissar of Defense: "The last columns of our units moving into Estonia crossed the state border at 10:50 on 19 October 1939...."

"This is how the crossing of the border took place. Representatives of the Red Army command element gathered at the troop crossing sites on the Soviet-Estonian border by 08:00 on 18 October 1939: Brigade Commander Lyubovtsev, commander of the 16th Rifle Division, on the Narva Highway; Division Commander Khabarov, commander of the 8th Army, and Brigade Commander Dershinin, chief of Armored and Motor Vehicle Troops, on the Riga Highway, and on the Estonian side: Maj Gen Pulk, commander of the 1st Infantry Division, with an escort of officers, on the Narva Highway; Maj Gen Kruus, commander of the 2nd Infantry Division, and Col Strig, commander of the Pechora Military District, with an escort of officers, on the Riga Highway. Following reciprocal greetings, bands played the International on our side and the Estonian national anthem on the Estonian side, with a simultaneous 21-gun salute on both sides. The troops, positioned in a state of readiness at the border, were then given the order to advance."

[Correspondent] But there were also opponents to the introduction of Red Army units....

[Kleymentov] There were, including members of the government of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. They did everything possible to sabotage the fulfillment of the treaties, on the one hand, and organized acts of provocation and united the reactionary forces against the Soviet Union, on the other.

Acts of provocation against our representatives and Red Army fightingmen had been stepped up by the summer of 1940, obviously influenced by those victories which fascist Germany had won in the West.

In view of this, the Soviet Government proposed in June 1940 that the governments of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia strictly observe the treaty. In order to prevent new acts of provocation and to ensure the security of our few garrisons in the Baltics, the government considered it essential to move additional military contingents to the bases previously made available.

It should be stated that the demand was in fact made in the form of an ultimatum. This can hardly be recognized as acceptable in relations between sovereign states.

[Correspondent] Anatoliy Nikolayevich, how did relations develop between Red Army units and the people's armies of the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian SSRs after those republics joined the USSR?

[Kleymentov] The Baltic Special Military District was formed on their territories after the Baltic Soviet republics became a part of the USSR.

Since the regular armies of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia consisted of representatives of the workers, they were not disbanded but were reorganized. Each army was transformed into a territorial rifle corps.

The corps were given the following names: the Estonian corps, the 22nd Rifle Corps; the Latvian corps, the 24th Rifle Corps; the Lithuanian corps, the 29th Rifle Corps. The new corps became a part of the Red Army and were subordinate to the commander of the Baltic Military District.

It is my profound conviction that if agreement had not been reached on the introduction of Red Army units into the Baltic nations in the fall of 1939, the fascist boot would have crushed that territory long before 22 June 1941.

Soviet Intelligence Agent Skoblin Rehabilitated

90US0324A Moscow NEDELYA in Russian No 48,
27 Nov-3 Dec 89 pp 10-11; No 49, 4-10 Dec 89 pp
14-16; No 50, 11-17 Dec 89 pp 11-12

[Series of three articles by Leonid Mikhaylov under the rubric "Unknown Pages from the History of Soviet Intelligence": "1. The General Gives His Agreement"; "2. Farmer Reports from Paris"; "3. The ROVS Suffers A Defeat"]

[Text] 1. The General Gives His Agreement [27 Nov-3 Dec 89]

The urgent telegram from the Soviet Intelligence resident in Vienna was addressed to the deputy chief of the OGPU Foreign Department. The text was brief and work with the code held by the Vienna rezidentura didn't take much time. The code clerk passed a sheet from his notebook to the typist. Having laid in three carbons, the latter swiftly typed the telegram. A tall young man placed the sheets in a cardboard folder with paper ties and set out along the long corridors of Lubyanka.

On the second floor, he knocked on the required door and, without waiting for a response, entered. This was a small reception room between two offices. A girl was sitting at the desk banging away at her typewriter with four fingers. She raised her eyes and silently nodded. The young man opened the left door and asked loudly:

"May I?"

After a minute he came out and, just as silently, disappeared. Thereupon, the door of the right hand door opened and its owner crossed the reception room in two steps.

"Show Slutskiy and Artyzov," said the deputy chief of the Foreign Department, handing the coded message to the new arrival. The latter ran his eyes over it. "We are going ahead with the operation."

A note in red pencil had appeared on the fourth copy of the coded telegram from Vienna: "For YeZh/10 personal file."

Telegram No 1415 from Vienna stated:

"YeZh/10 has returned to Vienna from Paris. The general's wife has agreed to work for us... The general has agreed to everything and has even written a request for personal amnesty to the TsIK. In my opinion, he will work well. The general's signature is written in "purgen" (invisible ink) and will appear with ammonia (volatile alkali)... A visiting card will serve as a parole. The general will talk with any person sent from us who presents such a visiting card. I urgently request instructions. The monthly salary which the general wants is about 200 American dollars.—Vatsek."

The general about whom the Soviet Intelligence resident in Vienna was reporting was Nikolay Vladimirovich Skoblin, a former officer in the tsarist army. He had left Russia in 1920, along with Wrangel's broken army. He was a member of the leadership of the Association of Gallipoli Veterans (former soldiers and officers of the Volunteer Army). A director of the Kornilov Society, that is, of former officers of the Kornilov Regiment living abroad. An influential figure in the Russian Armed Forces' Union (Rossiyskiy obshchevoinskiy soyuz—ROVS)—the largest and most dangerous White emigre organization of the 1920's and 1930's, which had its staff in Paris.

YeZh/10—this is a code number used by the Center and the European rezidenturas to designate a Soviet intelligence agent who bore the pseudonym "Silvestrov."¹ The true name and a photograph of "Silvestrov" were kept only in his personal dossier, into which a copy of the coded telegram from Vienna was sewn this same evening. The short message from the resident in Vienna had meant that the first step in an operation had ended successfully.

And it had begun four months before.

"To the Chief of the OGPU Foreign Department from the Chief of the Ukrainian GPU Foreign Department.

You have turned to us with a request to locate a worker who would be able to carry out work in Yugoslavia. We have decided to recommend to you for these purposes

our secret collaborator SILVESTROV. The latter is a tested person, extremely intelligent, decisive, and persistent.

We urgently ask you to let us know your decision because if you do not find it possible to utilize SILVESTROV for Yugoslavia, we will dispatch him for other work."

bold"To the Chief of the Ukrainian GPU Foreign Department from the Deputy Chief of the OGPU Foreign Department.

SILVESTROV is known to us from his work behind the lines [kordon] and, in principle, his dispatch abroad is desirable. But, at the same time, it is necessary to take into consideration that this assignment is in pursuit of a very specific goal—recruitment. In this connection, we need to clarify the extent to which he is both objectively and subjectively suited to this task.

The information available to us about SILVESTROV and the autobiography which you have sent do not provide sufficient information to determine his potential behind the lines. While in contact with us in Warsaw, he did not work against the Whites. His autobiography, besides OGPU personnel, does not give the names of persons in circles closest to him in the past. Meanwhile, such indications would assist us, in a preliminary way at least and in general outline, to understand SILVESTROV's potential situation and contacts after he goes abroad. We ask, therefore, that you question S. in more detail about his former acquaintances.

Besides this, he has worked both with us and, as we can conclude, also with you, as an agent. Was he tested by you in the capacity of a recruiter?

We ask that you send this information about SILVESTROV in addition.

"To the Deputy Chief of the OGPU Foreign Department from the Chief of the Ukrainian GPU Foreign Department.

In accordance with your request, we are forwarding herewith a list of SILVESTROV's acquaintances.

While working with us, SILVESTROV did not recruit anyone behind the lines, as he did not have such assignments from us. On the Soviet side, he was quite successful in carrying out several recruitments.

We consider that, with the positive qualities that he has, he will fully cope with recruitment assignments.

Attachment: As stated.

The sealed package from Kharkov (at that time, the capital of the Ukraine) to the OGPU Foreign Department contained two exhaustive handwritten lists. "Silvestrov" named the prominent figures within the White movement with whom he was well acquainted. The list

was retyped so that all the directors of the department might familiarize themselves with it. There were 18 family names in the list.

The deputy chief of the Foreign Department, Sergey Shpigelglas, called in a worker from its information section.

"I would like you, together with your comrades from the Fifth Section, to take a look to determine which of these people may be of interest to us."

The work lasted five days. On the sixth, S. Shpigelglas received a report from the information section, together with the recommendations of the section that was concerned with the White emigration.

"Silvestrov" had briefly characterized each of the 18 and the nature of his relationships with them.

"General Kutypov—I became acquainted with him in the Red Cross dormitory in Novocherkask in 1917, where the first nucleus of the Volunteer Army had gathered. We met frequently. During the defense of Rostov, Kutypov was in disfavor with Kornilov (Kornilov did not like former guardists) and was a junior officer in the officers' company, from command of which he had been removed for the abandonment of Taganrog. We met, I repeat, frequently, but were rather distant.

"General Skoblin—we became acquainted in 1917 during formation of the 8th Army's shock troop detachment. Skoblin was staff captain. We were great friends. For almost a year, we served in the same regiment—the shock troops unit, the Kornilov shock troops regiment. After he was wounded, I visited him one time in Debal'tsevo and another time, in 1919, we went out carousing in Kharkov, at the Astrakhanka".

"General Skalon—I became acquainted with him in Kremenchug, when he was named chief of the region's defense. We were great friends, frequently got drunk with one another, and retreated together to Poland, where we sat together in the Shelkovsk camp. We lived in the same barracks and we also often drank together there. The last time we saw one another was in 1920."

And the list went on to name another dozen-and-a-half generals and senior officers whom fate had scattered to various lands. At that time, the main concentrations of the Russian "military" emigration were centered in Turkey, Yugoslavia, Poland, Germany, France, and Manchuria.

The report that was compiled on the basis of materials in the Foreign Department's card files picked eight names. The section that was working against the White emigration selected three of them for more careful study.

General Skalon... According to information from sources in Prague, is in correspondence with the center of the "Brotherhood of Russian Truth" terrorist organization

in Paris. Participates in the distribution of flyers and recruitment of cadres. A Gallipoli veteran. A suitable individual, but lives in Prague, and what we need is a person who lives permanently in Paris, where the ROVS headquarters is located.

General Shatilov. Unfortunately, "Silvestrov" was not closely acquainted with him. Doesn't know anyone from his present circle. Consequently, direct recruitment is excluded. A shame.

General Skoblin. He is listed in the files as a member of the leadership council of the Association of Gallipoli Veterans. Was on good terms with former colonel Vasilii Georgiyevich Voskresenskiy, who took part in preparations for the attack on the Soviet political representation in Rome. Close to General Miller, who plays a large role in the ROVS leadership. Skoblin?

"To the Chief of the Ukrainian GPU Foreign Department from the Deputy Chief of the OGPU Foreign Department.

Prepare SILVESTROV for a trip behind the lines. Send him to Moscow. On his arrival in Moscow he should make contact via telephone number 5-18-00 and agree on a meeting place. Advise the date of SILVESTROV's arrival."

"Vienna. To Vatsek.

We are now engaged in working out the problem of sending people to you with the goal of activating your recruitment and agent work. We have already identified one of your future workers. This is a former officer who took part in the civil war on the side of the Whites and has been working with us since 1922. He has acquaintances from his old service, mainly in Yugoslavia, and two brothers, whose whereabouts is unknown to him.

We will send him to you in the capacity of a recruiter. Possibly, you will be able to make some sort of operational use of him.

The preliminary plan boils down to the following: He will be coming to Vienna in the capacity of a refugee from the USSR in connection with repressions—using someone else's passport, which he succeeded in obtaining. In Vienna, he will report to the authorities, declare himself, and register as a political refugee. From there, he will travel a couple of times to Yugoslavia for the purpose of searching for his brothers and, having familiarized himself with the Yugoslav situation, will ascertain possibilities either for resettling in Yugoslavia or for frequent visits under light cover. He will have been successful in bringing certain valuables out of the USSR, which will make it possible for him to live for about two months without specific occupation.

Please advise your thoughts regarding kinds of cover. He will work against the Whites.—**Andrey.**"

"To Andrey.

I think that your idea of sending a fleeing officer here is predestined to failure. Vienna is not a place to which White Guardists flee from the USSR. This will immediately look suspicious. But even if he did succeed in convincing people here that all this is natural, he would not be given permission to travel to Yugoslavia, because the Serbs categorically refuse to issue visas to Russians, even extremely deserving Whites.

This path, therefore, is both expensive and complicated, and is 99-percent hopeless.—**Vatsek. Vienna.**

"Vienna. To Vatsek.

We will take your thoughts concerning the impossibility of our man's travel to Yugoslavia as a White emigrant into consideration. However, in connection with the fact that we attach great importance to this travel, we ask you to develop and advise the most convenient, vis-a-vis the conditions in Yugoslavia, means and form for such travel. We assume that he will come to Vienna using a Persian passport purchased by him. As we do not propose to limit ourselves to one-time travel, please take into account possibilities for the future and advise us of the nature of entry conditions into Yugoslavia in general, as well as of the most expedient forms of cover.—**Andrey."**

"To Andrey.

It is possible to send a person using a Persian passport; all that is necessary is that, upon arrival, he be able to explain in great detail how he obtained this passport. It is also necessary that he be able to refer to contact with some kind of counter-revolutionary organization within the USSR. Best of all, he should go directly to Yugoslavia via Constantinople. He can register in Yugoslavia and then come from there for a meeting with us. It is very difficult to discuss such trips in principle. It is necessary to try one once. Much will depend on the source himself, on his capabilities, his adroitness. It is necessary to count on the extreme suspiciousness of Yugoslav authorities with regard to the Whites and, in particular, regarding the kind of people leaving the USSR such as your officer. Warn him that it is extremely possible that they will arrest him at once; for the first 3-4 months it will be necessary for him just to look around, without doing anything.—**Vatsek. Vienna.**

"To Vatsek.

Our man has departed for Vienna via Berlin on a Persian passport in the name of Bulatyan Petros. In Vienna, he is supposed to stay at the Graben Hotel. We will advise the time of his arrival by telegraph. We are sending his photograph with which you, knowing his name, will be able to locate him.

Parole for contact: Have you received the letter?"

Response: I received it on 12 May.—**Andrey."**

"To Vatsek.

Herewith, we are sending a letter to General Skoblin from his brother, who is in the USSR, along with his photograph. Request you clarify through YeZh/5 the location of General Skoblin (We are issuing similar instructions in other channels.) According to certain information, Skoblin is living in Nice at the present time. It is desirable to summon him to Vienna for recruitment under the pretext of delivering the letter from his brother. The conversation with him is to be assigned to Bulatyan Petros.—**Andrey.**

LETTER HOME

"Vienna. 26 May 1930.

Dear Raya!

I still have nothing to write myself, but I will put down a few words about my impressions of the trip.

In Leningrad, I caught the German steamer Sachsen.' The first thing that struck my eye was the German stiffness and politeness, but, most important, the abundance of food. I thought of Vitusya—how good it would be to feed her like this.

On the 20th, I was already in Stettin—a small, stiff city: cleanliness, neatness, an abundance of stores, goods, products, and no people in the stores. While, with us, it would be possible to post one salesperson in every store to repeat only: There isn't anything,' then, in Germany and Austria, they need to station the same salesperson to say: There isn't anybody.'

About it being inexpensive abroad—all this is a lie; what is cheap is trash, and if you want to get a decent thing, you must also pay decent money.

The only difference is that, while we have money available, there is nothing to buy. Here, if you have money, you can get everything, and it is also possible to buy everyone, I think, right up to the top... I have substantial information that permits me to speak this way.

On the 22nd, I arrived in Vienna. What is Vienna? A large cafe-restaurant. A population of 1.3 million, of whom 200,000 are unemployed and the same number are policemen. I could never imagine so many restaurants; true, most of them are empty or have a person sitting there, looking like a prominent burgher and drinking "soda water." He drinks this water from three o'clock in the afternoon until two in the morning on weekdays and, on holidays, until four. A rather pleasant occupation.

But I still want to talk about one class of the population. If I am not making a mistake on the side of exaggeration, then 15 percent of the women in Vienna are for sale.

There is much that is very seductive but, comparing the capitalist world and our own new world—of socialist restructuring, having analyzed deeply these two

opposing systems, I am convinced anew that socialist restructuring of life—this is not an experiment, as many among us have come to think, but is rather the only way out of that capitalist dead end, in which the entire world has ended up.

But, I must tell you, it is very difficult for a person who is wavering, even a little, in his own political beliefs, to hold out here. After the difficulties of material life in the USSR, once you get a taste of all the external blessings of life in Europe, it is entirely natural not to want to go back...

It will be very difficult for us to catch up with and surpass Germany, but our will and, most important, improvement in our cultural level, must place us in the front ranks ahead of Germany. However, for this, it is necessary to study, to study, and to study.

I ask you, pass on these behests to Lyala, and also impress on Vitochka that, for us, stuck up to our knees in mud, salvation lies in study.

Try, if you have a chance, to find for Vita and Lyala some old woman or someone from the now-destroyed "former classes," who speaks the German language and would agree, for a little pay, a table, and a room, to live with us, to give lessons to Lyala, and also to take care of Vita. I, for myself, am experiencing how difficult it is without a perfect knowledge of the language.—Your P.

"P.S. Take care of Vita. I would hope that she will be my successor and honestly make up for my mistakes."

Late in the evening on the second of September 1930, a young man in an excellent suit arrived in Paris aboard a Hungarian train. The large station clock showed a quarter to twelve. Having snagged a porter, the young man exited onto the station square and stopped a taxi.

"Hotel Montcenis."

His room had been reserved. The night porter handed him a registration form and the key.

The new lodger spent a relatively restless night. An unfamiliar city where they spoke a language which he didn't know... And the main thing: How would his old friend receive him after almost a ten-year interval? The return letter which he had received in Vienna had been kind in all respects. But who knew what might hide behind this? And what his reaction might be if the matter reached the point of a frank conversation? Would he demand to leave? Would he call the police? Or simply let his own counterintelligence people know? The latter would not hesitate...

In the morning, he arose late and spent a long time in front of the mirror, critically examining himself. His suit had to be beyond reproach, his face calm and satisfied. Exactly at eleven, he went out into the street and set out for the Russian concert bureau, which was headed by

Prince Tsereteli. Here, they greeted him with a charming smile and a French "bon jour," but thereupon, to his satisfaction, switched to Russian.

"I am looking for Nadezhda Vasilyevna Plevitskaya and her husband, Nikolay Vladimirovich Skoblin," said the young man. "We served together in the Kornilov Regiment."

"We don't have the precise address," said the young lady who greeted visitors. Nadezhda Vasilyevna usually drops in on us herself. Not long ago, they moved from near to Nice and have settled not far from Paris. In a little place called Ozoir-la-Ferriere."

The young man politely thanked her and headed for the railroad station. He was at the station in Ozoir-la-Ferriere at five in the evening. From the station to the village it was three kilometers. Not knowing French, the young man did not attempt to ask anybody, but set straight out along the road. However, after about 40 minutes, he realized that he had made a mistake and turned back.

The empty road went through a forest turning yellow. The first people he met turned out to be speaking Russian to each other. They were not at all surprised to hear his question in their native language: Almost a million Russian emigres had gathered in France. They politely accompanied him to the mayor's residence, where they wrote down the address of the home of the Russian general on a piece of paper for him and even showed him the shortest way.

The owner turned out not to be at home, but it was not necessary to wait long. After about 15 minutes, an automobile with an open top drove up and a man in a light gray suit stepped out. He gave his hand to a woman, and then spotted the guest.

"Nadyusha!," he exclaimed joyfully. "This is the Petya that I have told you so much about!"

The young man took a step forward and, in the military manner, inclined his head:

"Staff Captain Petr Georgiyevich Kovalskiy."

"My wife, Nadezhda Vasilyevna Plevitskaya."

"Kolya," Kovalskiy stopped him reproachfully. "What Russian does not know the singer Nadezhda Plevitskaya! I have been fortunate enough to hear your singing only once, but the impression is unforgettable."² Kovalskiy kissed her hand, turned to Skoblin, and looked him over critically.

"I see a general in excellent form. At once, if you will, into the saddle and review the regiment."

Skoblin laughed:

"There's one small matter. There is no regiment, and none is foreseen."

"You have come just in time," said Nadezhda Vasilyevna. "We are having guests today. You will see interesting people."

The presence of outside people by no means pleased Kovalskiy. He had been thinking the whole time about his forthcoming conversation with the general, and any kind of delay was irritating to him.

"How did you get away from the Soviets?" the general was asking in the meantime. "And how have you settled in Vienna?"

"In Leningrad, I bought a Persian passport, and now I am living under it. I brought something with me, so that for the time-being I am not in need. And how are things with you?"

Skoblin moved his head indefinitely, and Plevitskaya's mood was suddenly spoiled.

"Four years ago, we rented a piece of land in the south, with vineyards. We thought this was a sure thing. But two years of bad harvests in a row and we went bankrupt and they didn't renew our lease this year. Now we have bought a home here—ten thousand francs."

"We borrowed the money at a high interest rate, but with a repayment period of 10 years," explained Skoblin.

"And you know, how much concert clothes cost!," Plevitskaya threw out testily.

At this point two more cars drove up. The guests had arrived. They ceremoniously introduced Kovalskiy to them: "Petya, our friend, one of the pioneers of the Volunteer Army, a comrade-in-arms of General Kornilov."

This was the essential truth. The son of a railroad worker, Petr Kovalskiy in 1914 left the gymnasium in order to enter the Odessa Military Academy. On the first of May 1915, he was graduated as an ensign and in June found himself at the front. He had every reason to consider himself a minion of fate: already in October of the next year he was promoted to staff captain, that is, in less than a year and a half, he had received three promotions. His bravery was recognized by 8 military decorations. Three times wounded, but each time returned to the lines.

The events of February 1917 made a stunning impression on the 20-year old staff captain. He attempted to hold himself apart from the political struggle. When they began to set up the shock troop units, Kovalskiy, as one of the best officers, was sent to a battalion which was absorbed into the Detached shock troop detachment of the 8th Army; General Kornilov commanded the detachment. Service in the Kornilov Regiment to a large extent determined the fate of Kovalskiy.

After the October revolution, the officers of the regiment began to be transferred to the Don, where they comprised the nucleus of the Volunteer Army. The logic of the civil war also led Petr Kovalskiy into the Volunteer Army; by family tradition he served in the directorate of military communications. All this was excellently known to his former comrade Skoblin. But the general did not guess another side of Kovalskiy's life.

In his autobiography Kovalskiy wrote: "Circulating in the highest spheres of the Volunteer Army, I saw the total collapse and the unprincipled character of the entire White movement, but for me there was no turning back or choice. I was a senior Kornilov Regiment officer—for all this, the Cheka would not pat me on the head..." Along with the retreating White Army, Kovalskiy found himself on Polish territory and was interned. Later, he settled in Lodz and found work, first as a night guard and then as a technician in a construction office.

In the end of 1921, Petr Kovalskiy came to the Soviet political representation in Warsaw and said that he wanted to earn the right to return to Russia. For two years, he worked on assignments of Soviet Intelligence and, in April 1924, he returned home.

Concluding his autobiography, he wrote:

"An evolution took place within me during the period from 1914 to 1920, a period when, from an unthinking monarchist under the influence of the historical course of events and having become utterly enmeshed in all the dirt of all shades of the White movement, I made a transition to the platform of Soviet authority and put myself utterly at the disposal of its leading vanguard—the organs of the GPU."

Kovalskiy stayed with the Skoblins until nighttime, missed the last train to Paris, and was kept on to spend the night. The general conversation centered around old war stories, recalling comrades in the Volunteer Army and naming familiar names. Kovalskiy listened attentively, trying not only to learn something about the fate of former comrades in the Kornilov Regiment, but, mainly, to understand how his friend Nikolay Vladimirovich Skoblin was living now.

In the morning, Kovalskiy left for Paris, having arranged that Skoblin and Plevitskaya would come to visit him on the morrow. They appeared the following day. They set out together to make some purchases, inasmuch as the couple again expected guests. At one o'clock in the afternoon, Plevitskaya announced that she was hungry and Kovalskiy suggested some place or another to dine. Plevitskaya cautiously noted:

"You know, Petr Georgiyevich, everybody knows me here; there's no place I can decently show myself."

"Of course, agreed Kovalskiy. "I invite you to the Hermitage."

Plevitskaya was satisfied with this choice and after dinner sent Skoblin off with Kovalskiy to a barbershop for a shave. While there, Kovalskiy, looking Skoblin in the eye, handed him a white envelope:

"This is a letter from your brother."

Skoblin's jaw turned to stone; he became silent.

"And I want to talk with you. Privately."

"I'm listening to you," answered Skoblin.

"A barbershop is not the place for conversations."

Kovalskiy seated himself in a chair and closed his eyes. Skoblin took the neighboring chair.

"And now we will go to our place, and we'll talk there," proposed Skoblin.

In the car, both were silent, but Plevitskaya, who was talking excitedly about her upcoming tours, did not notice anything.

"We will take a short walk, Nadyusha," the general said softly, "and then we'll drink tea."

They went out into the completely deserted street, where Kovalskiy decisively began to speak:

"Kolya, I came to Paris with one goal—to ask you whether you do not intend to give up all this adventure, to stop playing soldiers, and to return, finally, to the ranks of your country's army?"

Skoblin had not expected such a question.

"What do your words mean?"

"We have decided once more to propose to everyone whom we consider useful for Russia that they cease this White adventure and return to the ranks of the new Russian army."

"Who is this we?"

"The General Staff of the Red Army."

If I return, in Moscow, they will arrange a show trial, or will simply shoot me."

Kovalskiy fixed Skoblin in the eye:

"Kolya, indeed, you're not a child and must yourself understand everything. You are not a political figure, but simply a military specialist, and a show trial against you is of no interest to anybody. To shoot you would only mean creating an international sensation. So that, if you use your common sense, you are talking nonsense. Remember, Kolya, that I know very well about your patriotism and your love for Russia. I will say something more to you. When we were discussing the question about you on the staff, somebody said that Skoblin can simply be bought. I objected: Skoblin is not for sale, and if he comes to us then this will be only in the name of service to our motherland and her army."

Kovalskiy fell silent for a moment and added:

"Now I'm waiting for a direct answer from you: Are you with or against us?"

Skoblin answered with a quiver in his voice. Tears appeared in his eyes.

"Petya, I have always considered you my best friend and I do not have the right to censure the reasons why you joined the Red Army. Each person regards such things in his own way... I have my own convictions. I am bound by an oath and close friendship to my subordinates, who have been scattered throughout the entire world. These people trust me blindly and are ready to go with me into fire and water... And besides, there is Nadyusha, to whom my life belongs..."

Kovalskiy shook his head.

"I am surprised at your ideas about your oath. You gave it not to the Tsar, but to the people. I am also calling on you to serve the people. By doing so, not only will you not be breaking your oath but, to the contrary, you will be keeping it, by breaking with the enemies of the people. As regards your subordinates... We never even thought to demand from you that you break with them. I am deeply convinced that all honest people, at your instruction, will begin to serve together with you in the new Russian army."

The conversation was broken off. They had returned home and Skoblin immediately was sent by Nadezhda Vasilyevna to the country for milk.

"And so, Peter Georgiyevich," she asked, "is it possible to live in Russia now?"

All Russians have remained in the motherland, Nadezhda Vasilyevna. Those who have fled are basically ones who, like Nikolay Vladimirovich and us, ones who wore military shoulder boards."

"I often think how things are in fact there, said Plevitskaya. "Based on the newspapers, one doesn't understand very well what is going on in Russia."

"It is necessary to look with your own eyes," Kovalskiy remarked. "They would welcome you very well back there, I think."

"Well, now!" laughed Plevitskaya.

"I am serious," continued Kovalskiy. "It is always difficult for a Russian person in a foreign land, and this is doubly so for you, a Russian singer. Who is there here who is in a position to understand your songs, their beauty? Your audience has remained in Russia."

Plevitskaya shook her head mistrustfully.

"You are an outstanding singer. At the same time, they both know and understand you in Russia. So that you in fact can think about a return home. You are the daughter of a peasant, and the power is now yours. They will have

a completely different attitude toward you than toward members of the gentry. But here... I've seen enough our emigre society in Vienna... Here you can only sing songs of grief in the taverns."

Plevitskaya unexpectedly agreed with him:

"Yes, I think they could not quickly forget me in Russia. But it is not a matter of me. Even if I am now ready to return to the motherland. But I am afraid for what is most dear in my life—for Kolehka. Indeed, they would shoot him there, without fail."

In the evening, Kovalskiy left for Paris, but Plevitskaya got his word that he would return and stay with them for two days.

This time, there were no guests. Kovalskiy understood at once that the Skoblins had discussed his proposal and, possibly, had come to some kind of decision. When Plevitskaya left the room, he directly declared to Skoblin:

"Kolya, our time is limited. I must return to Vienna and therefore I want to know your answer: Yes or No?"

"Petya, think. What can I myself now do in Russia? I don't want to serve on the staff, and I will not take other work because, other than military affairs, I don't know anything."

"This is of little importance," Kovalskiy stopped him. "What is important to me is your agreement in principle to work with us. Everything else can be decided later. Yes, and it is premature to talk about leaving. Your return needs to be formalized, and not less than half a year is required for this. During this time we will size you up and you will have an opportunity to demonstrate your loyalty. And, in general I, for example, think that now you will be of greater use here than at home."

"And where will I be listed in the service?"

"In the General Staff."

"In what department?"

"Don't be a child, Kolya. Of course, in the Intelligence Directorate."

"What is that? Not the GPU?"

"Something half way between the General Staff and the GPU. But all this is not important. I want to hear your direct answer: Are you with us or not?"

Skoblin was silent. The pause continued about two minutes. Finally, the general raised his head and said distinctly:

"I have spoken with Nadyusha and... I agree." And he added: "If it had not been you that approached me, Petya, but somebody else, I would have thrown him out of the house."

A day later, Skoblin came to Kovalskiy at his hotel. Kovalskiy proposed they formalize his agreement to work for Soviet intelligence and for greater security asked him to sign his agreement in secret ink. The General composed yet another other document:

"USSR Central Executive Committee (Ts.I.K.)

From Nikolay Vladimirovich SKOBLIN

Declaration

Twelve years of active combat with Soviet power have showed me the sad error of my convictions.

Having recognized this great mistake and repenting my breaches against the workers of the USSR, I request personal amnesty and ask that I be given the rights of USSR citizenship.

Simultaneously with this, I give my promise not to act either actively or passively against Soviet power and its organs. To contribute exclusively to the construction of the Soviet Union and to communicate to appropriate government organs regard all actions aimed at destroying the might of the Soviet Union.—N. Skoblin."

10 September 1930

Resolution of the Chief of the OGPU Foreign Department:

"Set up an agent personal and working file for Skoblin under the pseudonym Farmer"—YeZh/13

"Vienna. To Vatsek.

We consider recruitment of the general to be a valuable achievement in our work. In the future we will call him Farmer' and his wife Farmer's Wife.' We concur in payment of 200 American dollars to the general monthly; an appropriate telegram has already been sent to you.

First of all, obtain from him a complete overview of his contacts and work possibilities. Please provide detailed information about people whom he believes it is possible to recruit and draw up detailed guidelines for them.

Obtain from him an overview of the present situation within ROVS and assign him the task of penetrating to the ROVS top levels. In discussions with YeZh/10 (Silvestrov'), Farmer' mentioned that General Miller at one time suggested that he work in intelligence. Does he have an opportunity now to return to this conversation?

Through YeZh/10, ask whether Farmer' can travel to some other country for a meeting with our people. Advise the means by which you will maintain communications with him.—Andrey"

2. "Farmer" Reports From Paris [4-10 Dec 89]

On 25 January 1930, a Russian emigre living in the Rue Rousselet in Paris received a short note proposing a meeting. The note was read and immediately destroyed. The man receiving it nodded his agreement and the one who had delivered it left the house at No. 26, down Rue Rousselet, without having avoided met any member of the household.

No special skill was required for this. The owner of the house did not initiate even those closest to him into own affairs. The rules of conspiracy were paramount for him. His wife was supposed to know only what her husband considered necessary to tell her. They had lived here six years. The day after they had moved to Rue Rousselet a son had been born. A batman lived with them.

Incidentally, the owner was not, of course, supposed to have any batman, because the army in which he had once worked his way up to a general's epaulets no longer existed. He, however, continued to consider himself to be in military service and even tried to wage a personal war with those whom he believed to be his own most evil enemies and the destroyers of his motherland.

Be that as it may, the batman, Fedorov, remained with him and performed the duties of a charwoman, a cook, and a nursemaid; in a word, he was a servant for all things. It was only from the role of doorman that he was excused. The master himself opened the door. He did not want anyone to see his private visitor. And when someone came to see him, even his wife was forbidden to enter the study and the dining room.

The master had no fear of thieves, robbers, or enemies. He knew that the house had reliable protection. But not by the Paris police—by his comrades-in-arms. They had also ensured the safety of General Kutypov in 1928, after the death of Wrangel, when he headed the Russian Armed Forces Union. Russian officers who were working as taxi drivers in Paris took turns driving him, not permitting him to use public transportation.

The note which he had received the evening before did not change Kutypov's usual daily routine. As always, he planned to go to the Gallipoli Church on Rue Mademoiselle—this was a 15-20 minute walk. Kutypov told his wife that after his return they would all go together to the countryside.

A pedantic and scrupulously precise man, who was never late, Kutypov left the house at ten-thirty. The short visit to which he had agreed the evening before was set for a streetcar stop on Rue Sevres. Kutypov arrived there precisely on time, but the person who had set the meeting had not appeared. Unusually, Kutypov decided to wait a little. Evidently it was very important to him to talk with the author of the note.

But he did not turn up. Kutypov could not allow himself to wait more than 15 minutes. He began to walk along Rue Oudinot in the direction of Boulevard des

Invalides. Buried in thought, he was not paying attention to anything. Not to two strangely stopped automobiles, not to the policeman who earlier had never stood there, although Kutypov had walked along this way to the church for several years already and could not have but noticed him. Incidentally, during the previous week, the policeman had appeared several times at this crossing, and the local residents, who at once become accustomed to his presence, also did not pay attention to him.

When Kutypov came abreast of one of the automobiles, two men got out and stopped him.

"Monsieur Kutypov? We are from the police. You will have to come with us to the Prefecture. The question is an important one and cannot be put off."

Kutypov, who spoke French poorly, could not judge the faultlessness of pronunciation of what had been said. He also could not understand what had happened, why the Paris Prefecture of Police, with which the ROVS tried to maintain the very best relations, was summoning him in such a strange manner.

For a second he hesitated. But the figure of the policeman in uniform removed all doubts. Kutypov nodded. The door had been opened in preparation, Kutypov got in, and the car roared away. He did not look around and did not see that the policeman suddenly abandoned his post and got into the second car, which rushed after the first.

Kutypov sat silently, not trying to ask his travelling companions anything. He looked with relative calm out of the window. The automobile was driving along streets well known to him, changing from one to the other. He did not understand why the driver was choosing such a strange route. But when the car had left the center of Paris and the southern suburbs began, Kutypov frowned.

"Where are we going?" he asked in French, carefully choosing the words.

The young man sitting next to him glanced briefly at him.

"You can speak Russian," he said. We are workers of the USSR OGPU..

One of Kutypov's ROVS assistants, dutifully awaiting the general at the Gallipoli Church, phoned him at home. But the general had not returned home. Suspecting an accident, the chief of counterintelligence of the ROVS headquarters in Paris, Zaytsev, turned to the police. Together with a policeman, he spent the entire day driving around to Paris hospitals and morgues. While they were looking for Kutypov in Paris, the automobile that was carrying him reached Marseilles. Here, a Soviet vessel stood in the port, waiting to depart. The operational group that had kidnapped Kutypov handed him over to their colleagues, who had been

included on this voyage as members of the crew. Kutypov was taken on board the ship under the guise of a senior mechanic in the engineering department who had been taking a walk on shore. This was the version for the French police. In case they became interested in the elderly man, who stood out against the background of a young crew.

Aboard the steamer, Kutypov fell into a deep depression, refusing to eat or answer questions. Having left Marseilles, the ship set a course for Novorossiysk. Kutypov spent the entire trip in a state of strange detachment. And only when the vessels was approaching the Dardenelles and the Gallipoli peninsula, where the beaten First Wrangel Army, which he had commanded, had been quartered in camps after its evacuation from the Crimea in 1920, did Kutypov come to himself.

What awaited him? A trial and execution? The 48-year old general knew how they regarded him in Soviet Russia. He was guilty of cruel repressions against the population, particularly during his time as Black Sea Governor-General after the White Guardists had taken Novorossiysk in August 1918. He had headed the Russian Armed Forces Union, which had set itself the goal of overturning Soviet power...

But General Kutypov was not brought before a people's court. It turned out that his voyage through time and distance was more of an ordeal than he could bear. He died of a heart attack on board the ship itself. A hundred miles remained to Novorossiysk...

Why had Soviet intelligence decided to kidnap General Kutypov?

Moscow considered the Russian Armed Forces Union to be a source of constant danger. Agent information witnessed to this: The strategic goal of the ROVS leadership was an armed attack against Soviet power. Of course, in 1930, the remnants of the Volunteer Army scattered throughout Europe could be viewed as a direct threat to the country only by a great stretch of the imagination.

But in Moscow, as formerly, they assumed that in the case of war in Europe the enemy (or enemies) of the Soviet Union would inevitably also call the regiments of the former Volunteer Army to arms under their banners. All the more so, because it had retained its structure even in the emigration. The officers considered themselves as being in military service, underwent training, studied the military capabilities of the Red Army...

At the end of the 1920's, the ROVS leadership began extensive organization of terrorist acts within the Soviet Union. Innocent people died. Weapons, explosives, and other arms were being smuggled in across the border, most often the Soviet-Finnish one, or by sea. ROVS divisions in Paris, Bucharest, Sofia, and Belgrade were engaged in training terrorist groups. These groups were given help by the 2nd Department of the French Army

General Staff, the Polish Defenziva, the Rumanian Sigurancia, and Finnish counterintelligence, which received information on the situation within the USSR as payment from ROVS.

Within ROVS, the principle advocates of terrorist activities were generals Kutypov and Gerua (the director of the ROVS division in Bucharest). Gerua proposed to kill the new German ambassador in Moscow, who had spoken out for an improvement of relations with the Soviet Union. A letter written by the General in September 1928 has been preserved:

"Count Brochdorf-Ranzau should be removed just as his predecessor, Count Mirbach, was removed. You have orders and instructions for such a situation; think about this and advise me of your ideas. For purposes of further reference to this in our correspondence, we will conditionally designate Brochdorf-Ranzau with the letters Bra.' If this Bra' is removed, there will be nobody in Germany who will support the Soviets, and without this support they must fall."

Gerua also developed a plan to sabotage the oil fields in Baku. But these plans were known in advance to the Soviet agent network. This is why the main efforts of the Soviet Intelligence rezidenturas in Europe were concentrated on the struggle against ROVS and other emigre military organizations.

It was not without foundation that the OGPU Foreign Department considered Kutypov to be the brains of ROVS, the chief generator of ideas, and the undisputed leader of the emigre officer corps. To a large extent, ROVS was maintained by his energy, initiative, and personal authority. This is why the general's disappearance without a trace deeply shook the entire right sector of the emigration. The whole French police were called into action, but did not succeed in uncovering anything.

The successor to Kutypov in the post of ROVS director was Lieutenant General Yevgeniy Miller, who had belonged to the group of old cadre generals. His good acquaintance was General Nikolay Skoblin, who had given his agreement to work for Soviet intelligence soon after the kidnapping of Kutypov. (His wife, the well known singer Plevitskaya, had made the same decision. In the Center's documents, the married pair were called the "Farmers.") Kutypov's kidnapping made it possible for an agent of Soviet Intelligence to assert himself within the ROVS staff.

"Vienna. To Silvestrov."

I have decided to ask your opinion about a letter which has been passed to you by me. The fact is that it is necessary for me to know right away how to handle it.

It seems to me that it is necessary to respond affirmatively and to enter at once into close contact with these people.

It would be good for me to come see them and to familiarize myself with the situation. How do you look on this?

The season' is beginning here with us—courses have been organized for 100 persons, including such ones as I. The opening is in several days. I will write in detail after the first lecture.

Nadezhda Vasilevna sends you greetings.

Paris—Your Nikolay Skoblin."

"Center. To Andrey.

I am sending three letters from Farmer.' Farmer' is leaving at the beginning of December on a concert tour with Farmer's Wife' for Latvia and will transit Berlin, where your man can also come for a meeting with him. If you will not be able to send your man, request you send instructions. Then, I will accompany Silvestrov' to see him.—Vatsek. Vienna."

"Vienna. To Silvestrov."

Dear Petya!

I have taken your instructions into consideration. I have not broken out the new method of encipherment [shifrovka] because it is not written firmly and nothing comes out when developing it. For the time-being, I will write using the old method. Write more distinctly, which is necessary for the new encipherment system.

For the upcoming, necessary meeting I propose the following: At the end of November-beginning of December, Nadezhda Vasilevna is going on a tour to Latvia by train via Berlin. I could see you and clear up certain important questions. This is the best alternative. I will not be able to obtain a visa for Serbia right away. Additionally, 16 November is the anniversary here of the formation of Volunteer Army, the tenth anniversary of our existence abroad. We will meet for a celebration this day, and it is necessary for me to be present here.

About Anton Ivanovich Denikin, they know very little right now, because he does not enjoy authority at the present time and is not involved in affairs. It would be good to recruit General Turkul. I presume that this will cost money. He lives in Sofia. It is possible to approach him through his wife.

All the attention of the Center is now focused on the Far East.

The Dietrichs are helping with money.

Senior retraining courses have been instituted in Paris, to which the best officers—100 persons—have been named. Many Kornilov officers—25. The purpose is training for infiltration into the USSR. Lectures two times a week. Familiarization with the situation, acquaintance with the Red Army, with its units. Preparation for dispatch to the Far East.

Paris—Your Nikolay Skoblin."

"Vienna. To Vatsek.

Our comrade is coming out for a meeting with Farmer and Farmer's Wife. He will contact you through Vest. Prepare YeZh/10 (Silvestrov) for a trip to Berlin at any minute.

The question of when the meeting will take place—before Farmer's trip to Latvia or after his return to Berlin—will be decided later. Via YeZh/10, ask Farmer urgently when he will be in Berlin en route to and returning from Latvia.—Andrey."

"To Silvestrov.

On 20 November, General Miller left for Bulgaria. The trip is a serious one. Besides a meeting with the ROVS department, an audience with the Bulgarian tsar. The purpose of all these trips is to revive the plans of Kutypov.

You are right to scold me, but I simply am unable to get my bearings immediately to this work and moreover it is necessary to display great caution. I especially look forward to the upcoming meeting because several of the questions touched upon by you are so broad that it is difficult for me as a beginner to answer them in writing, must less in secret writing. In general, periodic meetings are necessary.

And now permit me to scold you. You and I agreed that if a letter is enciphered then messages to me or to you will be written in block letters. You did not do this and I broke out this letter only by chance.

The principle role in ROVS is played by General Shatilov who, using his influence over General Miller, holds everything and everybody in his own hands.

For practical purposes, he is ROVS. Miller is only its representative. Shatilov is not liked within emigre organizations. He relies on us (Kornilov Division officers). A personal meeting would give me the opportunity to make a detailed report about all the groupings and to propose a number of ideas which need to be implemented. It is very difficult and too cumbersome to set all this down in a letter.

It is difficult for me to get into the operational intelligence organ of ROVS right away, but I will try. I have my own ideas in this regard, which I will present at our meeting. And I will tell in detail about the department. Completely different work than under Kutypov.

Paris—Your Nikolay Skoblin

"Leipzig. To Vsevolod.

It has been decided to hold a meeting with Farmer and Farmer's Wife at your place. The need for this has been very clearly demonstrated by a dispatch from Bil. We suggest that Farmer first undertake a series of steps to consolidate his position within the ROVS top level and that he should only then, depending upon the situation, make active proposals.

Farmer, as you know, is an extremely important asset for future operations, particularly thanks to his position as chairman of an entire association (of Kornilov Regiment officers).

Detailed analysis of his acquaintances and contacts in a number of countries, of his mutual relationships with various associations and organizations—all this, with an appropriate approach and the construction of a definite operational plan, can produce an exceptionally valuable result. This is why I have insisted on the necessity of your meeting with Farmer.

We have sent a telegram to Vienna (to Bil) suggesting they contact Berlin (you) and organize a trip to Berlin by Farmer and Silvestrov. Telegraph us whether Bil has established contact with you and the time of Farmer's arrival in Berlin.

In his latest materials, Farmer advises that before his departure from Paris, at a banquet of the Markov Regiment, he met with a Markov officer who recently returned from the USSR. In a letter, Silvestrov writes that Farmer will try to learn more detailed information about this Markov officer. Please find this out at your meeting.—**Andrey.**"

On 20 January 1931, Nikolay Skoblin and Nadezhda Plevitskaya arrived in Berlin. She was headed for Yugoslavia on a tour; he, as always, accompanied her and used this trip for meetings with ROVS divisions and emigre leaders.

Berlin, it had been decided in the OGPU Foreign Department, was the most convenient and secure place for a meeting between the "Farmers" and the directors of Soviet Intelligence in Europe. Skoblin and Plevitskaya were to be introduced to the latter by former Staff Captain Peter Kovalskiy, who the year before had recruited Skoblin, his friend and comrade-in-arms in the Volunteer Army (This is YeZh/10 and "Silvestrov.").

Skoblin and Plevitskaya were able to remain in Berlin for a total of two days. The meeting was set for 21 January. "Silvestrov" was supposed to arrive from Vienna on the morning of the same day. He did not arrive.

"Report of YeZh/10.

In accordance with the orders I had received, at 1800 hours on 20 January I was at the station with the aim of leaving for Berlin. Walking along the platform, I heard Russian speech behind me and automatically turned around. Behind me two men were standing and talking

with one another: One was tall and heavy-set; the other was short, of average complexion, and later turned to be an agent of the police.

Just as soon as the train left the station in Linz, the police agent came into my compartment and asked me to show him my documents. I got out my passport. He looked it over attentively.

I am going to hold on to your passport for the time-being, the agent said to me and went out, leaving the compartment open.

In my pocket there were lists that I had received from Farmer and I needed to get rid of them. But first I needed to check whether or not I was being watched. I went out into the corridor and headed for the toilet. Immediately, from the neighboring compartment, the police agent appeared, came up to me, and asked me to return to my place. Coming into the compartment with me, he closed the door behind himself and asked in German:

In which language do you prefer to speak?

In Polish, or Ukrainian.

That's not true. Indeed, you are a Russian and you are a Communist, the agent interrupted me, switching over to Russian.

I have been fighting communism for 16 years.

Not true. You are a Communist. You not long ago had another passport. Where is it?

I didn't have any other passport and don't know at all what you are talking about.

Stop pretending and tell me where you bought this passport. We won't do anything to you.

I didn't buy the passport, but got it from the police in Brno.

The policemen got a notebook and began to leaf through it. Having found what he needed, he began to read aloud my personal particulars, listed in the passport, checking them against the notes in the book.

No, you are a Communist, you live under another passport, and recently you travelled to Holland. Were you in Vienna in November?

No I wasn't

Speak the truth, indeed communism is not forbidden in Austria, and nothing will happen to you. Stand up!

I stood up. He looked at something in the book.

Sit down. Show me what you have in your pockets.

I took out my wallet, money, a pen knife, keys. The agent took my suitcase, superficially looked through my things, and, having cast them aside, began to tap on the bottom. Thereupon I took my knife and suggested:

If the matter is so serious, do you want me to cut the lining?

Not necessary.

Then he came up to me, reached in my pockets, and found the lists and the receipts for the letters to Farmer.

And what is this? Lists of your party and receipts for letters to your comrades?

Yes, these are lists of my party.

So, you see, and you didn't want to admit that you are a Communist,' the policeman said with satisfaction. Now, tell me when you came to Austria and where your old passport is.

If a staff captain in the Kornilov Regiment is carried on the lists of the Red Army then I, evidently, am a Communist. My old Nansen passport is in Czechoslovakia. And I came to Austria on 14 October 1930.

So, you are an officer of the Kornilov regiment? the policeman asked, perplexed.

Yes.

I knew Kornilov very well. I saw him in Yekaterinodar.

I doubt that you could have seen Kornilov in Yekaterinodar. He never was in the city itself. He was killed at the entrance to the city.

And on what day, in your opinion, of the storm of Yekaterinodar was Kornilov killed?

Kornilov was killed on the third day of the storming. Colonel Nezhintsev died in front of him. This was at the end of March.

From where, incidentally, did the Volunteer Army approach Yekaterinodar? From which side of the river?

From beyond Kuban.

And who commanded the Red Army during the first campaign of the Volunteers against the Kuban?

Yegorov and Zhloba, I think.

Well, fine. Let's leave history. How did you, a Russian officer, get a Czech passport?

If this interests you, I am prepared to tell you the truth.

It's about time. The policeman sat down next to the window.

I am not certain that this is known to you... At one time the Kornilov Regiment stood within the headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. After the departure of Kornilov, it was renamed the Slavic Regiment and joined a Czechoslovak division.

Which stood in the region of Berdichev.

And there, at the headquarters, I made the acquaintance of the commissar of this division, the present president of the Republic of Czechoslovakia, Massaryk. When Wrangel's army was destroyed, we all began to seek any pretext in order to obtain a foreign passport. I, having referred to the fact that I was born in Precarpathian Russia, in Uzhgorod, appealed to Massaryk, and he wrote on my application the resolution: "Issue a passport. I know him personally." And this is how I got the passport.

By this time the train had come to the station in Passau. The agent asked me to get dressed and to follow him.

The questioning continued in the administration of the Austrian border police in Passau.

Now, explain why you have lists of the regiment and where your General Kutypov is?

Where General Kutypov is, you know better. And I obtained the lists from the commander of the regiment for screening. Following Kutypov's kidnapping the time has come for a thorough purge of the entire overseas officer corps: There are many provocateurs.

Who is this Skoblin, with whom you are carrying on a correspondence?

General Skoblin—commander of the Kornilov Regiment.

Does this mean that it is he who gave you the lists for checking?

Yes, he directed me to do this, as an old member of the Kornilov Regiment.

Where do you live in Vienna?

I gave the address.

And have you been there long?

Since the first of December.

And is this the truth?

I think that you can check this freely. Moreover, if you phone right now, here is my landlady, her telephone number is 13-6-79.

The policeman was now sitting opposite me and was rapidly asking questions, as if he had memorized them earlier.

Why are all your clothes new?

Well, if you take my overcoat for new, or my suit, which is already shiny with age, as new, then I am indebted for the compliment.

What kind of medicine do you have?

I had with me a vial with chemical ink for secret writing.

I have the flu and something minor with my stomach.

Wait, I will be right back.

A second agent entered, and mine disappeared.

I asked him to take me to the toilet so that I could throw away my pen for the chemical ink. But the agent left the door open and I wasn't able to do this.

I requested a glass of water and asked whether I could take my medicine. The agent gave his permission, and I drank the whole vial.

I was then taken before the chief of the border police administration himself, whom the police called doctor. He spoke only German. My lists and passport were lying on his desk.

Don't be alarmed, the doctor said very politely. I am sure that you will be able to continue your trip to Berlin on the next train. I find nothing suspicious in your passport, but nevertheless have asked Vienna about you. If you have told the truth, then you have nothing to worry about. Then he asked:

Are you going with a report to your chief, General Lampe in Berlin? Indeed, in your organization, Austria is subordinated to Berlin, isn't that so? Is your organization strong in Austria?

No, not many emigres have made it into Austria, but in both Austria and Germany the communist organizations are strong.

What do you think, is communism possible in Austria?

I don't think so. Austria is so cultured that it will not permit experiments to be conducted on itself.

Do our police greatly hinder your work?

The police don't bother us at all since we work openly.

Here there was a ring. The doctor went to the phone:

Now we will know about you.

He listened for a long time, repeating the entire while: "I understand, I understand."

Then he hung up the phone and returned to the table.

"All your information checks. Please excuse the misunderstanding. You will receive your passport, money and lists. Look to see that they didn't steal them from you. The Bolsheviks would give a lot of money for them. Well, now we will be friends." He smiled broadly. "Indeed, you probably will be coming back soon?"

"Yes, of course."

I departed Passau on the night of 21 January and arrived in Berlin the morning of the next day.—**Silvestrov.**

Center. To Andrey.

YeZh/10 did not arrive at the appointed time.

It was necessary to operate on our own. The meeting took place in Sergey's apartment (he was absent) in the evening of the 21st (a hotel or another place, of course, were not suitable for such a meeting): the Farmer couple, Bil, and I.

Both of them made a good impression on me; their desire to work with us, evidently, is without any second thoughts and is totally sincere. For the time being I gave him basic instructions: Without coming to the notice of surrounding chiefs of the White movement, to begin to become more active, to strengthen his ties with all figures in ROVS and other organizations with whom he is acquainted. His position is of the most advantageous kind—a White general, preserving the legacy of General Kornilov, the last commander of the Kornilov Regiment... His officers are located in various places in Europe, he has close ties with a majority, and has influence over them.

Instructions for Farmer's Wife: Though her appearances at ROVS charitable events, to create a name for herself and her husband, to make the press talk about her, and at the same time about him.

Both are marvelously well-informed about everything that is being done in White circles and know the cherished secrets of many persons of interest to us. The meeting lasted from eight in the evening until one in the morning over a well-laid table. Both drink almost nothing.

The USSR TsIK resolution concerning personal amnesty for him created a good impression. He swore his allegiance to us in the fulfillment of any kind of assignments and instructions we wish. My impression is that they will not lie.

We parted friends, having made arrangements for all further work (meetings, letters, etc.).

Bil will describe in detail other events that occurred, as a result of which I decided to send YeZh/10 home. We took measures so that the Farmers' were not told of these events.

My chief impression is that Farmer, with good direction and if there are no stupid actions on our part, will become a valuable source, one such as we have never yet had within the ranks of ROVS or any other organization.

Leipzig—Vsevolod.

Berlin. To Ivan.

On the 27th, our source YeZh/10, codename Silvestrov, is to contact you and you should provide him with assistance for his return to the Union. We are sending you a photograph of YeZh/10. We ask you to advise us by telegraph of his contact with you and also to give us

the number of the authorization for return that is issued to him and the route he will take to the USSR. Also advise the dates of his departure and estimated arrival in Moscow.—Andrey.

Leipzig. To Vsevolod.

In the event you have contact with Farmer before his trip to Sofia, indicate to him the necessity of paying maximum attention to identification of persons who are conducting active intelligence work against the USSR and to determine routes for the infiltration of agents and means of communication with them.

In his last materials he reported that, at a banquet of the Markov Regiment, he saw a Markov officer who had recently been illegally in the USSR. We attach exceptionally serious significance to this information in view of the fact that, based on information at our disposal, a former commander of the 1st or 2nd Markov Regiment, Dmitriy Anatolyevich SLONOVSKIY actually was in the USSR. Under separate cover we are sending you a photograph of Slonovskiy and ask that you without fail clarify with Farmer whether this is not the officer he saw at the Markov Regiment banquet, and also continue and deepen this investigation.—Andrey.

Center. To Andrey.

On the 12th, I had a meeting with Farmer and, on the 13th, together with his wife. I am attaching his report to this in a separate envelope (Attachment No. 1).

This morning, the couple departed for Prague to give a concert—to see necessary people and, on the way back to Paris, to stop for the day here on the 20th. We will see one another and get an exhaustive report about Prague. He will know in detail what is being done in the school of General Fok, as he has sent thirty of this officers there.

Of the questions which interest us: The photograph that you sent—this is in fact Slonovskiy (well known to him). He does not know the name of the officer who returned from the USSR and was present at the Markov Regiment banquet. My meeting with him gave me a great deal of preliminary information concerning the mutual relationships within the group of generals.

Berlin—Bil.

Center. To Andrey.

Several words about Farmer. The tours went successfully (from the viewpoint of possible surprises following the flap with YeZh/10).

A concert took place only in Sofia. In Belgrade, both spent about a week in no way related to concerts (there was no concert). If the trip of the Farmer couple to the

Balkans is looked upon as their first test trip, then it has to be said that Farmer is a conscientious and, if you will, a talented agent. His reports, verified completely by three sources based on data from YeZh/10, are sufficient evidence of this.

He made exhaustive use of his short stay in the Balkans, and not only in the informational field, but also, so to say, in the strategic one. We came to the idea of his writing from Sofia to General Turkul (commander of the Drozdov Regiment officers) in Paris, whom Farmer will use unwittingly.

And Farmer plus Turkul—this is the kind of fist, to use the words of Farmer, of YeZh/13, himself, can smash the entire ROVS.

In Paris, Farmer is to approach the ROVS apparatus in earnest, choosing his tacks between Miller, Dragomilov, and Shatilov in order to retain his own independence.

Berlin—Bil.

Letter from General Turkul to General Skoblin

Dear Nikolay Vladimirovich!

I have not received the letter from General Fok. In general, I know nothing about the new organization of active work. Nobody tells us in Bulgaria anything about it.

Your suggestion that Fok be designated seems right to me, since he has good relations with Shatilov, who wants to be au courant of active work. I have considered and do consider that active work must be the basis of the existence of our Union here abroad. If it were to cease active work, the Union would be like a living corpse, since neither schools nor courses could revive it.

You write that active work should be transferred to us. In principle, I agree, but I consider that, if they do not want us, then we should not raise a fuss because of this. What is important to us is that there be such work, and that this work is extensive and visible; what is important is that the chiefs of the organization be bold and decisive. There is sufficient experience in this field. A lack of success by the new organization would be a great scandal. If it will be necessary to work, then I am certain that we will not shame our arms and will do everything possible for the quickest overthrow of the power of the comrades in the USSR.

In any case, be sure that I support you in all ways. I have found a buyer for my own business. I await the return of General Abramov, and then will start with the songs to Paris. You study good reasons right away.

Meanwhile, all the best.

I kiss the hand of Nadezhda Vasilevna.

Your A. Turkul.

Aleksandra Fedorovna kisses Nadezhda Vasilevna and sends you greetings.

Center. To Andrey.

Farmer has reported in detail how he obtained three reports from Shatilov. After a three-hour conversation with Shatilov, the latter suggested that he acquaint himself with the reports on the state of military mobilization preparedness within ROVS. Farmer took the reports and asked (I got very nervous when doing so, he says): When do you order me to return them, Your Excellency? Shatilov thought and replied: By tomorrow morning, not later. I went home and the whole night, together with my wife, copied the reports. They are rewritten in pencil on what is, for practical purposes, cardboard—40 pages. I photographed all these pages (he has them at home), the weather was overcast, I didn't know the exposures (Advise, incidentally, what exposure is necessary next to a window without electric light, in sunny weather and when it is overcast). I worked about four hours and developed them (all this without any kind of equipment) and didn't get anything. It was necessary for me to rewrite the reports in secret writing. The reports are exceptionally interesting.—Oleg. Paris.

Paris. To Oleg.

The materials we have received from you with regard to the activity of the new terrorist group are fully substantiated by information through a second channel... The fact that we now, through Farmer have stumbled upon a terrorist organization and can thoroughly investigate it is, of course, good. But it is necessary not to forget that the basic instructions for the source are cultivation of the ROVS center and that all these matters here... must not under any circumstances compromise Farmer' in the eyes of Miller and Shatilov...

Andrey.

To the Chief of the Foreign Department of the USSR OGPU.

Memorandum

Recruited a year and a half ago, Farmer and his wife have become a primary source of information. A man of independent means who at one time distanced himself from the basic nucleus of ROVS, since his recruitment, he has not entered and cannot enter the ROVS leadership apparatus, but, as the commander of one of its regiments, he occupies a prominent position among its general officers and, enjoying respect and a fair amount of authority, has begun to actively influence both the overall policies of ROVS and the conduct of its military work.

The principle results of Farmer's work boil down to the facts that he:

First of all, liquidated the military detachments [druzhiny] created by Shatilov and General Fok;

Second, nullified the idea originated by Turkul and Shatilov of organizing a special terrorist nucleus;

Third, took in hand Zavadskiy, a special agent of French counterintelligence and, besides passing informational materials, uncovered a provocation agent who had been planted on us by the French and had worked for us for 11 months;

Fourth, reported on an organization which was preparing the murder of Litvinov. Uncovered ROVS operations from Romania into the USSR (the Zholntkovskiy case).

This exceptional agent reporting helped us also in a whole series of other smaller cases which were smaller but have serious operational significance. Recently, however, we have on three occasions revealed our own, surprising knowledge (twice via the press) and, by so doing, we have each time placed the agent in an extremely dangerous position, threatening his downfall.

In the future, our decisions to make public information received from Farmer' must each time be coordinated with that officer of the Foreign Department who is in immediate contact with the agent and who immediately oversees and directs his work (in this case, with me).

Moscow.—Chief of Section...

3. The ROVS Suffers A Defeat [11-17 Dec 89]

Center. To Andrey.

YeZh/13 reports: The writer Ivan Lukash proposes to submit a plan concerning the activities of the emigration in connection with the present political situation in Germany. His proposal is that one of the young generals or public figures familiar with the German situation by sent to Hitler in order to talk Hitler into the formation within Germany of an international volunteer corps exclusively for the purpose of combatting communism. If a communist movement is detected in any country, then this corps would be moved there. It is proposed that the Corps be made up of several contingents, whereas the Russian formation would be its core and would be under the command of the young generals who came through the civil war.

Lukash considers the creation of such a corps possible specifically now. Everything will depend upon how such a proposal is presented to Hitler,' he says.—Oleg. Paris.

YeZh/13—this is the agent number of General Skoblin, who became one of the most prominent figures in the Russian Armed Forces Union (ROVS) and one of the best agents of Soviet intelligence in Paris.

His work became increasingly important for Moscow. Skoblin was successful in disorganizing the creation of troop detachments which it was planned to infiltrate into the USSR. With his participation, Kutyepov's military squads were abolished. He convinced the new chief of ROVS, General Miller, to reject the idea of generals Shatilov and Turkul to create a special terrorist nucleus within the union.

Over a four-year period, on the basis of information supplied mainly by Skoblin, 17 agents and terrorists infiltrated into the Soviet Union were arrested; eleven safe apartments used for meetings were successfully identified in Moscow, Leningrad, and in the Transcaucasus.

But an agent's professional life is seldom a long one. And the more actively he works, the greater the danger to which he is subjected. Skoblin's activities were successful to a large extent because he was able to skillfully use the contradictions, which had reached the point of open enmity, between the various groupings within ROVS: A constant struggle was going on for power, for influence, for proximity to General Miller, for the right to make decisions and dispose of the funds which—not very lavishly—the French general staff passed to ROVS. Navigating in this flood of intrigue, Skoblin strived to maintain his own independence, and therefore each group attempted to attract him to its own side, generously sharing information and ideas.

And nevertheless, General Skoblin, who enjoyed the favor of General Miller, was acquiring for himself many who wished him ill. Besides this, after failure involving actions conceived by ROVS, counterintelligence automatically compiled a list of those who had known about the operation. Over a period of time, Nikolay Skoblin figured in each of these lists.

The time came when the suspicions of White Guard counterintelligence, the intrigues of ill-wishers, and the real mistakes of the Soviet Intelligence rezidentura in Berlin had placed Skoblin in a difficult position.

Center. To Andrey.

In the 27 January 1935 edition of the newspaper VOZROZHDENIYE, an article has appeared concerning the revelations of a Colonel Fedoseyenko, who accuses YeZh/13 of cooperating with the Bolsheviks.

I consider it necessary to direct your attention to the fact that no attention has yet been paid to my many and insistent requests that a formal investigation be made of information that YeZh/13 has been compromised to the enemy by our organization. I consider it necessary to establish firmly the circumstances under which a state secret has been divulged and I insist that the guilty person be brought to account. I ask that you advise of your decision by the next mail.—Oleg. Paris.

The man who had exposed such prominent Okhrana agents as the Social Revolutionary Azef and the Bolshevik Malinovskiy, the well-known journalist Vladimir Lvovich Burtsev, who had resettled in Paris long before the revolution, was now tirelessly seeking out the agents of the Kremlin.

On 17 February 1935, General Dyakonov came to the Paris apartment of Vladimir Burtsev, as he put it, "for a top secret conversation."

"What do you have against Skoblin, Vladimir Lvovich?" asked Dyakonov.

Burtsev was ready for the question.

"I, like everyone else, read the paragraph in VOZROZHDENIYE about a provocateur in the ROVS leadership," he answered. "Frankly speaking, the fact itself that a Bolshevik agent exists within the ROVS does not surprise me. It is natural that they will try to get their own man there. The editors of the journal 7 DNEY came to me with a request for an article on this subject. I wrote it, based on data of a general nature that was available. This story interested me greatly and I decided to investigate it thoroughly. You see, I consider the guilty ones first of all to be Miller and Shatilov, who have been provoking their subordinates to play a double game with the Bolsheviks, assuming that they will win in such a game. I have a different opinion on this score."

In this case, Burtsev continued, the people who have been recruited by the Soviets did not interest him. He wanted to demonstrate that a game with agents of the GPU is impermissible and criminal, because people who enter into relationships with the Bolsheviks cannot avoid passing them extremely important information. And what do they get in return? Nothing, other than money.

"What do you intend to do?," asked Dyakonov.

"First of all, I turned to Colonel Gurskiy and asked him to find the Colonel Fedoseyenko, to whom the journalist from VOZROZHDENIYE made reference. Gurskiy fulfilled my request and brought me Fedoseyenko. In my opinion, he was being sincere, although there are inaccuracies and exaggerations in his story. But the latter are not so important for me. I have no doubt that Fedoseyenko went too far in his game with the Bolsheviks and became frightened himself. Now he has thrown himself into uncovering Skoblin, who also obviously has been carrying on such a game. And, I am sure—with the consent of Miller." Fedoseyenko, clearly, was not particularly happy about Burtsev's invitation and initially behaved very strangely. But then, following Burtsev's assurances that he was pursuing only one goal here—to cast light on all sides of this matter—and that he moreover considered the main culprits in this disgrace to be not Fedoseyenko and Skoblin, but the leaders of ROVS, generals Miller and Shatilov, he began to open up and told Burtsev everything, asking that he be protected from attacks.

Fedoseyenko reported that he had entered into contact with the Bolsheviks at the suggestion and with the aid of Colonel Magdenko, who assured him that, in the struggle with the Bolsheviks, all methods were good ones. And therefore it was necessary to use existing possibilities to establish contacts with them in order, first, to obtain money from them and, second, to attempt to obtain information which might turn out to be useful for the struggle against the Soviets.

For the establishment of contact with representatives of the Bolsheviks, the colonel was summoned to Berlin, money for travel expenses having been sent to him in advance. There, he met his future chief, received an assignment from him, and returned to Paris.

But relations with the Reds did not continue very long. At some point, the frightened Fedoseyenko decided to tell General Miller about everything and reported to him. However, having heard him out, Miller did not give him any kind of practical directions, but only advised him to break off all affairs with the Bolsheviks, at the same time giving Fedoseyenko his firm promise not to talk to anyone about his conversation with him.

To Fedoseyenko's great surprise, he was summoned several days later to General Skoblin, who was his chief as head of the Kornilov group. Skoblin stated right away that he knew absolutely everything from Miller: However, not only did not advise him to terminate his work with the Bolsheviks but, to the contrary, very strongly recommended that he continue it, in order to attempt to obtain from them information of valuable to the Whites. At the same time, Skoblin allegedly announced that he himself was in contact with the Bolsheviks for these same purposes.

Fedoseyenko decided to follow Skoblin's advice, but after several days received in the mail a decision by the Kornilov Regiment, ordering his expulsion from membership in this regiment. Almost simultaneously, the Bolsheviks also broke off correspondence with him. Fedoseyenko's explanation for this was that Skoblin, specifically, had warned the Bolsheviks regarding the colonel's double game.

As a result of all this, Fedoseyenko gave General Erdeli, the chief of the ROVS First Department, a written report with a detailed account of the entire story and with a request that he initiate an investigation with regard to both him, himself, and General Skoblin.

Paris. To Oleg.

We confirm receipt of your last letters.

With regard to your main question—the matter of Fedoseyenko and Magdenko—you of course are entirely correct... We are now carefully checking this whole affair. It is necessary to indicate to you that...we were not

au courant of all the important details... The absence of timely, precise reporting also led us into the situation that has been created...

At the same time, considering that Fedoseyenko is not greatly trusted within the ROVS staff (YeZh/13 information) and that his correspondence is doubtlessly being examined by the French, we have proposed that Berlin cautiously work out the problem of his gradual compromise by means of giving hints in the future of a series of assignments supposedly given in the past which Fedoseyenko will not be able to explain to his masters...

As regards certain other measures suggested by you, we are opposed to a prolonged breaking of contact with YeZh/13 (putting him on ice), but propose to receive materials only locally, not to write letters there and, for the immediate future, to meet with him as infrequently as possible.

At the same time, instruct YeZh/13 that he must reduce his activities in the near future and must under no circumstances stand out.

For your information, I can also report that Lampe has already begun to check out Magdenko and, as a provocation, gave him an assignment of getting close to Soviet workers in Berlin. When Magdenko noted that he did not have such possibilities, Lampe dropped this question.—**Andrey.**

Paris. To Oleg.

With regard to Fedoseyenko, who is known to you, Berlin has again committed a mistake, about which Comrade Aleksey will brief you in detail. Therefore, for the protection of YeZh/13, whom the French police will evidently now investigate, we recommend that you break contact with YeZh/13 for about two months. Provide him with money for this period and communicate with him very cautiously in order to receive materials and calm him... If you should have any other thoughts, although in fact this is a proposal you have advanced from the very start, please advise.—**Andrey.**

Center. To Andrey.

I call you attention to the fact that Miller and Shatilov continue to regard YeZh/13 with total trust. When they reported to Miller about the report by Zavadskiy that Fedoseyenko asserts that the provocateur is no one other than Skoblin, Miller went into convulsions and proposed that Fedoseyenko be immediately excluded from the rolls of the Regiment. Shatilov told YeZh/13: You shouldn't be bothered by this. The reptile Zavadskiy is also spreading rumors about me, that I am not simply an agent of the Bolsheviks, but that the Bolsheviks are paying me a salary of two thousand francs.

Only yesterday Shatilov told YeZh/13 in great secrecy what had been decided at a secret military meeting concerning a report by General Arkhangelskiy (from Belgrade) about the 6th Division in Czechoslovakia: Khodorovich has been removed, the division has been abolished, the Czech leadership is transferring to Shatilov.

Miller's order about this will come in a week, and the participants in the meeting were asked to give their word not to say anything. YeZh/13 has spoken with Vitkovskiy (commander of the First Corps). Vitkovskiy didn't say a word, but Shatilov told all.—Oleg. Paris.

To Oleg. Paris.

Shatilov is aware that Miller has been given a report from Zavadskiy that Shatilov, Turkul, and Skoblin have prepared a revolt against Miller and that Skoblin and Turkul with this purpose visited the leadership of the French police in an attempt to enlist them on their side. Secret meetings have taken place in the apartments of Shatilov and Skoblin. Shatilov added that the denunciation is definitely designed to set Miller against him, Skoblin, and Turkul. Shatilov suggests that it is necessary to take decisive measures against the provocateur Zavadskiy, especially as there is the presumption that a French patron is preparing him.—YeZh/13.

Center. To Andrey.

Greater misfortune could hardly have struck YeZh/13. During recent months he has been treated for anaemia; they have been shooting him with some kind of serum and, following the eighteenth injection, he became seriously ill. About seven days ago, he almost gave up the spirit. They operated on him. The doctors declared that if they waited even an hour the patient would have a general infection of the blood. I learned of his condition by accident. We had arranged not to meet for a month and if I had not phoned him I would not have learned what had happened to him.

I saw him yesterday. His condition is now better. He is improving. He is in bed, being there, has typed for us a copy of report by Shatilov entitled *The Situation in the Far East Against the Background of the Local Situation*.

This report cannot be used for the press. In no case. This not only, as we say, would threaten a flap, but would result in his final downfall.

In concert with him, I wrote down from his words a number of reports—answers to questions posed in your recent letters.

YeZh/13 is held in excellent regard. Shatilov, Fok, Turkul, Vitkovskiy, and delegates from the Kornilov Regiment have visited him. Shatilov phones every day to ask about the patient's condition.—Oleg. Paris.

Paris. To Oleg.

Recently we have received a number of reports which to a considerable degree clarify unclear points concerning Zavadskiy. We have clarified that Zavadskiy does not have any serious and significant connections; the whole matter is limited to the fact that he is an agent of the Prefecture, the chief of which is trying, through him, to do in his enemy and competitor, the chief of the Surete General, Alek.³ All the running around and all the noise he has raised around the names of General Dyakonov and Vladimir Burtsev stem from this.

When Zavadskiy talked about his important ties with the Poles and with foreign powers in general, thereby adding to his worth for carrying out the assignment of the Prefecture with regard to penetrating ROVS, then what he was talking about, as we have now determined, was a certain colonel' Babetskiy. In view of the fact that this story is extremely instructive, we are passing it on to you in brief form.

In 1930 a certain Lev Babetskiy appeared in Paris, identifying himself as a colonel on the Polish General Staff sent to France on a special assignment. With him he had official documents certifying this. Babetskiy formed a close relationship with Zavadskiy, whom he assured that he had the possibility of approaching the Bolsheviks.

After a certain time, Babetskiy, carrying out an assignment from Zavadskiy, reported that he had been successful not only in identifying a contact by Dyakonov with the Soviets, but also in personally establishing contact with him under the guise of being a Bolshevik agent. Then he repeatedly told Zavadskiy about his meetings with Dyakonov and about the fact that he was even giving him money from the Bolsheviks (you yourself will understand how unlikely all this is).

However, the affair came to a completely unexpected conclusion. The Paris Prefecture received information that Babetskiy was a suspicious individual. The 2nd Department of the French General Staff intervened, asking Warsaw unofficially about him. In response they received the information that no colonel' Babetskiy existed within the Polish General Staff and, consequently, the story about a secret duty assignment France was a lie. In view of the fact that Babetskiy was living in France on a false Polish passport, the Polish authorities demanded his arrest and extradition to Poland. Babetskiy was arrested and sent to the Poles.

The appropriate authorities reprimanded the leadership of the Prefecture, and most of all zeroed in on Zavadskiy, who has now been ordered to carefully check out his entire agent network.

You should easily understand that this entire history is the result of a struggle between the leaders of two investigative authorities: the Surete and the Prefecture.

And once chiefs squabble, as they say, the matter also reaches down to their subordinates. Dyakonov, the Surete's man, and Zavadskiy—the Prefecture's. The picture is clear. Follow all the machinations of this subject, that is of Zavadskiy, in the most attentive way, but in no case forget that he is not a political figure, but rather only a low-level agent, capable, it is true, of doing us a good deal of harm.—Andrey.

How did the information about the Skoblin case end up in the emigre newspaper VOZROZHDENIYE? Colonel Fedoseyenko was a close acquaintance of his co-worker Zavadskiy and even showed him a carbon of his letter to the chief of the ROVS 1st Department, General Erdeli. Zavadskiy, learning this story, met at once with a worker in the VOZROZHDENIYE editorial offices, Alekseyevich. Judging from everything, Fedoseyenko did not count at all on popularity of such a kind, which caused him personally more harm than good.

Two weeks after the article appeared in VOZROZHDENIYE a meeting of Markov Regiment officers took place. At it, they read an appeal from General Miller calling on them not to believe the dark forces that were trying to sow dissent among the leaders of ROVS and to brand as a provocateur the slandered General Skoblin.

The majority of those gathered were in agreement with Miller. Someone said that this was the handiwork of Denikin who was hoping by such ignoble means to seize leadership in ROVS.

After the meeting, one of the officers even wanted to go together a group of Markov officers in order to go beat up Fedoseyenko at his taxi stand (Fedoseyenko worked as a night taxi-driver and his cab usually was parked at Place Pigalle, a favorite spot for prostitutes).

To Oleg, Paris.

On 13 February the Markov Regiment officers are convening a second special meeting, where Larionov will give a report on the Fedoseyenko case and about relations toward the leadership of ROVS. The chief of the First Department, General Erdeli, is expected at the meeting. The Markov officers are impatiently awaiting Skoblin's arrival from Belgrade on 16 February.

The Fedoseyenko affair has enlivened both Markov circles and also those of the White Idea; all efforts are being made to utilize this story in order to raise the spirits and the level of military activity. In parallel with almost unanimous indignation vis-a-vis Fedoseyenko, lack of confidence in the present leadership of ROVS is intensifying.—Source Yuriy. Paris.

Meanwhile Burtsev decided to turn directly to General Erdeli in order to talk over the Skoblin matter before it

came out in the press. Two days later, they called him from the ROVS staff. An employee of the 1st Department, Cornet Kirill Polovtsev stated that Erdeli had directed him to see Burtsev and provide answers to all his questions.

The meeting took place the next day. Polovtsev was extremely cautious. He said:

"Erdeli, having received Fedoseyenko's report, reported it to General Miller and stated that he did not consider it possible to let this matter go without a follow-up—he considered it necessary to order an investigation. Initially, Miller refused categorically, but then again summoned Erdeli and advised that he considered it possible to assign the investigation to the former military procurator Grigoryev, as a specialist in affairs of such a kind. Erdeli did not agree and answered that a secret inquiry wouldn't satisfy anybody, that a broad investigation was necessary and moreover that it should be conducted by those who enjoy the trust of military circles. Miller disagreed, and, at this, everything stopped for the time being."

"And what does Erdeli intend to do?" asked Burtsev.

"General Erdeli is waiting for the return of General Skoblin from a trip in order to explain his position. Further steps will depend upon their conversation. I should tell you, Vladimir Lvovich, that General Erdeli considers you his ally," added Polovtsev, "and is counting on your support in his demands with regard to a full investigation of the Skoblin matter."

On 17 February Burtsev learned that Skoblin had returned to Paris with Plevitskaya. He called Polovtsev and advised that he intended to send Skoblin a letter with the proposal that they meet and talk.

Polovtsev seized on this idea.

"Excellent idea! Do it without wasting time. And, if possible, advise us of the results of the meeting."

Judging from Polovtsev's tone, it was possible to assume that Erdeli was undecided and did not know how he should act. It is possible that he was even glad that Burtsev had taken the matter up.

Immediately after this conversation, Burtsev composed a letter to Skoblin—in a very calm and even well-wishing tone—with a request for a meeting.

To Oleg, Paris.

From Dyakonov's conversation with Burtsev it has been clarified that Burtsev himself takes a much broader view of the matter. He considers that the main actor in this whole story is not General Skoblin himself, but his wife Plevitskaya.

Burtsev has the following information:

In 1918, Plevitskaya found herself in the territory of the Reds and, as a people's artist, travelled along the front with concerts in order to buck up the Red Army personnel for the battle with the Whites. During one such trip she, together with a detachment of Reds, was captured by the Whites and immediately changed colors and became an anti-Bolshevik. Here also she became acquainted with Skoblin, became intimate with him, and later also married him.

Rumors circulated within the Paris emigration about Plevitskaya's ties with the Bolsheviks. In particular, during her trip to America, the persons who had organized this trip became convinced that, in fact, Bolsheviks were participating, and therefore broke with Plevitskaya. At the time, these persons warned Burtsev about suspicions with regard to Plevitskaya, but Burtsev for want of sufficient information, did not consider it possible to come out against her.

Burtsev assumes that, if the accusations against Skoblin are correct, then Plevitskaya played the main role in establishing his contact with the Bolsheviks. It may even be, perhaps, that Skoblin is not a part of it, but Plevitskaya, as a consequence of her closeness to her husband knew about all his affairs and could herself transmit everything to the Bolsheviks. Of enormous significance is the fact that, according to precise information in Burtsev's possession, until the kidnapping of Kutypov, Skoblin and his wife were very poor, but then they suddenly obtained large amounts of money from places unknown and began to lead a high style of life.

Everything depends now on Burtsev's conversation with Skoblin; in any case he will demand an explanation from him and will offer to indicate the source from which the General and his wife obtained large sums. Otherwise suspicion will also fall on them, particularly of participation in the Kutypov case.

If, however, Skoblin refuses to meet with Burtsev or does not wish to give him any kind of explanations, then Burtsev will consider that his hands are tied and, in such a case, will immediately come out in the press with an accusation of Skoblin. Evidently Burtsev even wants this.—Source Alligator. Paris.

Paris. To Oleg.

For your information, Magdenko cannot know YeZh/13. Available information says that he is holding up well in interrogations and so far has given out nothing.—Andrey.

Paris. To Oleg.

I call your attention to the new talk that has started about the material situation of YeZh/13, about the source of his income. It is necessary to prepare YeZh/13 for the possibility that they will demand explanations from him,

and to propose that he keep within his usual budget, seeing to it that part of it which is received from us does not show for outsiders.—Andrey.

Paris. To Oleg.

The campaign which Erdeli has now launched against YeZh/13 does not contain anything new. Once before, General Zakrzhevskiy wanted to make YeZh/13 the scapegoat for all the failures of ROVS, but the officers' court of honor rejected all accusations as being without substance. We understand that for YeZh/13 the situation now is much more complicated, because Erdeli has taken up the matter, but at the same time, the situation of YeZh/13 with regard to Miller is much more solid now than at the moment that the earlier incident arose. We consider that YeZh/13 must stick resolutely to the earlier version, which led him at that time to be rehabilitated. Nevertheless, I suggest you take extraordinary security measures when meeting with YeZh/13 as we assume that surveillance of him has been established.—Andrey.

The newspaper POSLEDNIYE NOVOSTI (1 March 1936)

Accident with N.V. Plevitskaya and Gen. Skoblin

The well-known singer N.V. Plevitskaya and her husband, Gen. Skoblin, were victims of a serious automobile accident three days ago.

On Wednesday, at about 10 o'clock in the evening, N.V. Plevitskaya and her husband were returning to Paris from Ozoir-la-Ferriere in their automobile. ... A truck which unexpectedly entered the road from the left ran into their car. The blow was so strong that the automobile was flattened.

N.V. Plevitskaya and Gen. Skoblin were extracted from the automobile in an unconscious state and taken to the hospital where they were given first aid. Yesterday morning, Gen Skoblin was transferred to the Mirabeau clinic. His condition is not a cause for concern. N.V. Plevitskaya is also at the Mirabeau, having received a number of bruises and having been generally shaken up. The popular artist hopes that, despite the injuries she has received, she will be able to appear on 7 March at a concert to benefit a church being built in Ozoir-la-Ferriere.

Center. To Andrey.

February was an extremely difficult month for us. The danger threatening YeZh/13 forced exceptional restraint upon us, but the various kinds of apparent counterintelligence measures were subjected to repeated analysis and in the end either dropped off or turned out to be without substance.

YeZh/13's situation is gradually becoming less acute but remains, as formerly, serious. The battle between him and Erdeli is not for life, but for death. Erdeli's activities, percolating to the surface and becoming perceptible to the heads of ROVS, are being transformed into their own contradiction and are creating a threat for the general himself. There is some chance that, as soon as Miller finally recognizes that Erdeli's activities are also dangerous for himself, he will suggest that he leave his post as chief of the 1st Department.

But the possibility of Miller's appointment of YeZh/13 as director of all of ROVS active work, which had already seemed entirely realistic, has temporarily faded because of the difficulties that have struck YeZh/13.

In the automobile accident, they both survived only because the doors of the car opened due to the blow and they fell out onto the pavement. The car was crushed so that nothing remained of the seats. She, having fallen out first, ended up with contusions; he had a broken hand and fractures of the shoulder, shoulder blade and collar bone. They say that his condition is not a cause of concern. He has been put out of action for about three weeks. She has bruises and nothing more.

There are continuous pilgrimages to see him. Miller runs to him almost every day for advice; he is unusually attached to YeZh/13. He told him that he is prepared to mobilize all means on the northern direction in order, by May, to infiltrate a group of terrorists into us through Finland.

The financial side of YeZh/13's affairs do not worry me. He has calculated everything and there are detailed accounts almost since 1922. He should have money, stocks, or securities in his safe. So as to show Miller the kind of money with which his wife returns from tours, I bought an additional 100,000 lei to add to the lei which YeZh/13 brought back himself (this is 8000 francs). A solid packet; he showed it to Miller. I consider it necessary to purchase for 25,000 francs securities (let's say, French government securities) and put them in YeZh/13's safe (He has a safety deposit box in the bank).—*Oleg. Paris.*

The people who were close to Kutypov, who considered the primary task of ROVS to be massive terror inside the Soviet Union, were not very satisfied with his successor, General Miller. They considered him to be indecisive and without initiative, inclined to office work and not capable of leading such a large organization. Incidentally, this was not entirely just with regard to Yevgeniy Karlovich Miller: Appointed commander of the troops in the Northern area by Kolchak in 1919, he demonstrated cruel decisiveness in the struggle with the Red Army and in merciless suppression of popular actions.

Having replaced Kutypov, Miller certainly did not reject terror. Secret ROVS documents that became known to Soviet Intelligence underlined the necessity of

training cadres for terrorist groups and for carrying on partisan war at the rear of the Red Army in the event of a war with the USSR. Miller established noncommissioned officer courses in Belgrade for emigre young people.

In France, the organization "White Idea" (*Belaya ideya*) was involved in the training of saboteurs. (Miller formed it in 1934). It worked on the "northern direction", that is the ROVS fighting groups crossed via the Finnish border and dissolved in Leningrad.

Captain Larionov was engaged in the selection of cadres for the "White Idea". This man impressed the emigre young. In 1927 he had participated in preparations for a bombing of the Leningrad Business Club, which resulted in human victims. The reputation of a dispassionate hero helped him to bring 20 young men capable of military work into the "White Idea."

Larionov taught them shooting, bomb-throwing, the preparation and placement of explosives, orientation skills, how to conceal themselves. They were trained to case sabotage targets and to get away following an explosion. Larionov was concerned with their language; they were supposed to rid themselves of "old-regime" words and to enrich their word supply with a new, post-revolutionary vocabulary.

Prilutskiy and Nosanov were the first ones to go through the full course. Larionov presented them to Miller, who in turn passed them to Skoblin, who led the "northern direction."

With Yugoslav passports, Prilutskiy and Nosanov dispatched via Belgium, Germany, Latvia, and Estonia to Helsingfors, where they made contact with a representative of ROVS, General Dobrovolskiy. They went through additional training in one of the Finnish intelligence schools and then crossed illegally over into Soviet territory. Fifteen kilometers from Leningrad, they were detected and a firing skirmish broke out, but they managed to get away.

Upon his return to Paris, Nosanov replaced Larionov who soon moved to Germany and entered the service of the Nazis with the blessing of Miller.

On one September day in 1937, Skoblin dropped into Miller's office.

"I wanted to tell you, Yevgeniy Karlovich, that I several times have had meetings with representatives of German intelligence."

Miller laid his papers aside.

"Where did you meet with them?" he asked at once. "You understand why I am concerned: The French may become angry..."

"Of course, Yevgeniy Karlovich, all the meetings took place outside Paris. We have guests almost every day in Ozoir-la-Ferriere and therefore one new face doesn't surprise anybody."

"And how does the man from Berlin seem to you?"

"He has appeared to me to be a serious partner," Skoblin replied cautiously. "He is from the Abwehr and says that he is prepared to propose to us mutually acceptable conditions for collaboration. But..."

"What do you mean, but?," Miller grew interested.

"As stands to reason, he wanted to deal with you. I am too small a figure for him."

"Well, what's wrong with you, Nikolay Vladimirovich? You are, after all, a director of ROVS like the others."

"I assure you, Yevgeniy Karlovich, in Berlin they only know you and it is only with you that they want to come to an agreement about everything."

Miller did not object.

"I, of course, am ready to do my duty. But how can this be done more conveniently, considering my official position and the probable jealousy of the French?"

"Come to us," Skoblin had a prepared answer. "Nadezhda Vasilevna will be glad to see you."

They set the meeting for 22 September. At half past twelve in the afternoon Miller left for the Skoblins without telling anyone where he was going. Miller did not return to Paris.

A group of Soviet intelligence workers was waiting for him in Skoblin's house. The same day, they drove him in his car to Le Havre and put him on a Soviet vessel returning to Leningrad. A success?

Miller, recalling the history of Kutypov, had the habit, when going to a meeting, of leaving at home or in his office a packet which was to be opened in the event of a long absence. In the packet Miller would place a memorandum with a precise indication of where and with whom he was going. He did the same thing when he set out for the Skoblins.

When it became clear in the ROVS staff that Miller had also disappeared without a trace, they opened the packet which had been left in his office. Miller's adjutant phoned Skoblin. The latter categorically denied that he had seen Miller on the 22nd. They did not believe him and turned to the police. But Skoblin had disappeared in the night.

An incredible uproar was raised in the French and world press. The emigration was shaken. The police questioned hundreds of witnesses. And the ROVS leaders were infuriated that the French had permitted the unhindered departure of a Soviet commercial vessel, on board which they correctly supposed Miller was located... They

demanded without success that fast military ships of the French navy be sent in chase.

On 29 September, our ship arrived in Leningrad and the next day Miller was in Moscow.

Aboard the vessel, he was charged with crimes against the people: He was recognized as being responsible for mass murders, barbarity, robberies by White Guard troops in the North of Russia, and as being guilty of organizing sabotage and terrorist acts against the USSR during the 1920's and 1930's. Miller was shot.

And what happened to Skoblin?

Soviet intelligence personnel hid him in the safest apartment in Paris; in the home of a former minister of the Provisional Government and former minister in the government of Kolchak, the prominent industrialist Sergey Nikolayevich Tretyakov... He also was a Soviet Intelligence officer. And died tragically at the end of 1943. But about him, a separate conversation, and not at this time.

Alas, not only the fate of S.N. Tretyakov ended tragically. Practically everyone who is mentioned in this history, now more than 50 years old, departed life other than by his own will. And it is not even possible now to establish the circumstances of the deaths of all of them.

Nikolay Vladimirovich Skoblin, also known as YeZh/13, also known as "Farmer" was secretly sent out to Spain under different documentation for further work. Unfortunately, in 1938, Skoblin perished under circumstances which are unclear to this day.

Nadezhda Vasilevna Plevitskaya, his wife, "Farmer's Wife," was arrested by French counterintelligence, charged with taking part in the kidnapping of General Miller and of espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union. She was sentenced to 20 years and in the spring of 1940 died in a French prison for especially dangerous crimes. Before her death she confessed to an orthodox priest. She told him almost her entire life, saying that, together with her husband, she had for a long time helped Soviet Intelligence; however, her cell was, as the professionals say, "wired for sound." Secret microphones made it possible to transcribe her confession. It was precisely for this reason that Sergey Tretyakov was arrested.

Petr Georgiyevich Kovalskiy, also known as YeZh/10, also known as "Silvestrov," the friend of Skoblin who recruited him, worked in Odessa after his return to the Soviet Union, and then in Chelyabinsk as a bookkeeper in a bread-making trust. In 1939, the USSR NKVD Chief Directorate for State Security began to look for Kovalskiy, evidently thinking of utilizing him again along its own lines. The search continued a rather long time. The NKVD directorate for Chelyabinsk and Odessa oblasts reported: Kovalskiy is nowhere. YeZh/10 had vanished...

Later, the chief directorate received a copy of the conclusion of an operations officer of the UNKVD directorate of state security for Donetsk Oblast, typed on cigarette paper, which stated:

"It is evident from the Kovalskiy case file that, during his utilization by the Foreign Department, there are a number of facts leading to the suspicion that Kovalskiy was carrying on intelligence work on behalf of Poland.

"Kovalskiy did not acknowledge that he was guilty of belonging to the Polish Intelligence agent network.

"In accordance with order No. 00495 of the USSR people's commissar of internal affairs—General Commissar of State Security, Comrade Yezhov, Kovalskiy, Petr Georgiyevich has been condemned. 22 November 1937."

In 1937-1938, the basic cadres of our foreign residencies and the central apparatus of Soviet Intelligence were destroyed. They all were accused of espionage...⁴ On the eve of the war the country was in fact left without a strategic intelligence service. The same fate also overtook the people mentioned in this history whom we called by their conspiratorial names.

"Vatsek," "Oleg," "Andrey," "Bil"—We still have to reveal the secrets of these pseudonyms, the truth about each of these intelligence officers. About their brave, honest, and highly professional performance of their duty to their motherland, and about their mistakes and delusions.

And there are still two other destinies that have a relationship to the events described.

In December 1947, a worker of Soviet Intelligence reported from Belgrade:

"In the city of Belaya Tserkov (Banat) lives the White emigre Kutypova (nee Kyut), Lidiya Davydovna, born 1898, wife of the former White Guards general and director of ROVS Kutypov, Aleksandr Pavlovich.

"Following the disappearance of Kutypov in 1930 his wife moved with their son Pavel to her sister's in Riga, and from there in 1935—to Yugoslavia.

"In 1941, Pavel Kutypov, having finished six classes of military school, entered the Russian defense corps established by the Germans; he served there as an adjutant to the general commanding the corps, Steyfon (who had been chief of staff to General A. P. Kutypov in the civil war.)

"According to the statements of L.D. Kutypova, her son went over to the side of the Red Army during the period of the liberation of Yugoslavia and worked as a translator. Kutypova's Soviet citizenship has been reinstated."

Lidiya Kutypova died in 1959 in Paris. Pavel Kutypov, who was five years old when his father was kidnapped in Paris, was given without trial a "term" of 25 years in 1944. In 1954, he was rehabilitated. For many years he has worked in the translation bureau of the Moscow Patriarch's foreign

relations department. He has two sons. One of them is Aleksandr Pavlovich Kutypov.

Footnotes

1. Here and henceforth, an "agent" is a secret collaborator of Soviet Intelligence.

2. Kovalskiy was not acting against his conscience. He recalled well how in the second decade of the 1900's the name of Nadezhda Plevitskaya was one of the very brightest stars of the Russian stage, just as well known as that of Varya Panina and Anastasiya Vyal'tseva. Not only word of mouth, but also millions of phonograph records, newspapers and magazines, inexpensive editions of songs, and motion picture films had spread the fame of the "Kursk nightingale," the "Russian lark," throughout the land.

The daughter of a poor peasant from the Kursk guberniya, she began her path to art with a monastery choir. She had sung in a professional chorus, in cafe vocal groups, in restaurants, performing Russian folk songs. And in 1909, following a successful appearance at the Nizhegorod fair together with L. Sobinov, shifted on his advice to the concert stage.

Her name ranked with that of Fedor Shalyapin who—like Leonid Sobinov, Konstantin Stanislavskiy, Sergey Eyzenshteyn, Sergey Rakhmaninov, and Sergey Konenkov—thought highly of Plevitskaya's talent. The artist's music, popular in aristocratic salons and in soldiers' barracks, among merchants and workers, signified a sharp turn on the Russian stage—from salon lyricism to a popular, earthy peasant style, in place of imitations of "gypsy singing," a turn towards the muzhik, the factory way of life, toward romantic models of national history.

She sang about the destruction of the Varangians and about the burning of Moscow in 1812, about events "On the Old Kaluga Road" and "In the Wild Steppes of Transbaykal," "A Broad Sea Stretched Out," and "When the Dawn Will Break in Siberia," "Ballad of the Weaver," "The Dashing Merchant," and "The Little Horse Quietly Plods Along." These songs were performed for the most varied audiences and everywhere met a triumphant reception.

As one newspaper wrote, "The songs of Plevitskaya do a thousand times more for national self-consciousness and feeling than all the ragged old voices of all the ragged old nationalists taken together." And even all the sensationalist noise raised in the press about the singer's honoraria of many thousands rubles, of diamonds and extravagant concert finery, could not harm her enormous popularity.

3. The Surete is the French Political police.

4. Repressed during these years were the leaders of the Foreign Department Artyuzov and Spigelglas, already mentioned in this essay. (They were rehabilitated in the 1950's.) Slutskiy left this life as a very young man.

Chernobyl Organization Formed in Latvia

90UN0607A Riga ATMODA in Russian 11 Dec 89 p 6

[Article by M. Bombin: "The Chernobylians"]

[Text] The constituent conference of the Chernobyl Alliance—a public organization uniting those persons who took part in eliminating the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES imeni V.I. Lenin—was held on 25 November at the Club imeni Dzerzhinskiy ("Magadane").

Taking part in the work of this conference were about 500 persons, basically former "partisan" military-service personnel. General Fedor Kuzmin, commander of the PribVO [Red Banner Baltic Military District], who was invited to the conference, failed to show up for the meeting with those who had served under him.

A moment of silence was observed by the conference participants to honor the memory of those persons who have perished as a result of radiation sickness. According to data of the Alliance's Organizational Committee, during the period from 1986 through 1988 there were approximately 5,000 Latvian residents in Chernobyl for one reason or another; some 2,500 of these were Rigans. One out of every four is ill...

According to estimates by Western specialists, the total number of persons who should be under mandatory medical observation amounts to 5 percent of the USSR's entire population. As reported by an atomic physicist who spoke at the conference, during the next 15-18 years in Latvia alone about 1500 persons will die from the consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe. Since 1986 the infant mortality rate in Latvia has tripled.

However, of the 2,500 Rigans who have already sought medical help, only one has been diagnosed in relation to radiation sickness. As explained by Anna Aleksandrovna Saprikova, department chief of the Riga Municipal Health Service, who spoke at the conference: "At the present time we are simply unable to establish a trustworthy diagnosis due to a lack of the necessary technology." We may judge the level of Soviet diagnostics by the case of Valeriy Valentinovich Vasilyev, who lost hope of obtaining the necessary medical assistance. Vasilyev bought a bottle of champagne and turned some of it over for analysis instead of urine. Not until protein was discovered (!) in the champagne did the physicians proceed to treat the patient. As reported by Doctor Sergey Begin, a member of the Alliance's Organizational Committee, among those persons who eliminated the consequences of the accident there have been widespread cases of cardio-vascular diseases, malfunctions of the digestive tract, diseases of the nervous system, and headaches. There are cases of premature impotence, and some persons have suffered from nail and tooth decay.

Despite the obvious possibility of infection, according to a document dated 25 May 1989 and signed by Pavlov, the deputy chief of the Gosagroprom Main Administration: "During the first quarter of 1989 alone the state

purchased in three republics—the Ukraine, Belorussia, and the RSFSR—40,900 tons of milk containing radionuclides in excess of the allowable level." This document also declares that the "grain obtained in 1988 on Belorussia's polluted territory was fully utilized."

In August 1989 an appeal to the USSR Supreme Soviet by a group of officers who had participated in eliminating the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES was received. The authors of the appeal called for the abrogation of the order issued by the chief of the Third Main Administration of the USSR Ministry of Health dated 27 June 1986 and the corresponding regulation of the Central Medical Administration of the USSR Ministry of Defense, which hamper timely research and, in fact, help to hush up information concerning the amounts of radiation received. This appeal was turned over to Colonel Viktor Alksnis, a deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet, as a result of which, instead of a response from the Supreme Soviet, the "Chernobylians" received a pro forma reply from the Ministry of Defense... The conference participants have conveyed a new, analogous document to Marina Kostenetskaya, another deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet.

During a break the conference participants viewed a hitherto unreleased motion picture by the Ukrainian producer-director Rolan Sergienko entitled "Ask Not for Whom the Bell Tolls." It shows some terrible but truthful scenes.

The "Chernobylians" who spoke at this conference demanded that various privileges be granted. They range from free rides in urban transportation to special services. But what can an utterly impoverished state grant?

Colonel Yaparov, chief of the republic-level military commissariat, and Valdis Nagobad, deputy minister of health, have acknowledged their own lack of competence. The colonel's speech was interrupted by shouts from the auditorium: "If they call us out again, we won't go anywhere!"

"I am not a specialist..."—that was the way the deputy minister ended his speech.

"I am not a specialist either"—his words could have been repeated by Oleg Mikhaylovich Timofeyev, the representative of the Central Committee, who went up to the rostrum after him, sweating from shame.

"Since the party brought about the Chernobyl catastrophe—let them pay us," the "Chernobylians" shouted.

Uzbek People's Deputy on Fergana Crisis, Political Issues

90US0094A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian 1 Oct 89 p 3

[Interview with A. Khusanov, people's deputy, by V. Berezovskiy: "A. Khusanov: 'Respecting the Law'"]

[Text] Executive secretary of the oblast newspaper KOMMUNA Abdusabbat Khusanov was elected people's deputy of the USSR from the 25th Fergana electoral okrug. Here our correspondent has a chat with him.

[Correspondent] At the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR you took the floor to propose looking into violations of legality. What was the impetus for this?

[Khusanov] Rashidovism has led the republic into a quagmire of profound crisis that has struck many aspects of life. I'm not going to list all the woes that have overtaken our economy, culture, and nationality relations—they are well known. I'll dwell instead on the problem of legal consciousness, which, in my opinion, is at an extremely low level. People's confidence in law, justice, and the lawkeeping organs has been broken. How did this come about? Why has the citizen ceased to be law-abiding?

Cotton, construction, silk, and other speculation sanctioned by the bureaucratic apparatus's overgrown elite has lured thousands of people into its orbit, corrupting their legal consciousness and morality. This, perhaps, is the most terrible crime committed against the people. Bribery, theft, and deceit have become the order of the day; armed gangs have appeared. Crime has metastasized literally to all spheres. I'm convinced: it is this evil that is putting the brakes on perestroyka in the republic.

When prison doors slam shut behind former cotton and other "kings," those will be glad tidings. The hour of retribution has come! The trials of bribetakers from the republic's Ministry of Internal Affairs—Khudayberdiyev, Karimov, and other high-placed officials—evoked a unanimous reaction: it serves them right! There cannot nor will there be any forgiveness for them.

However, our legal consciousness's recuperation has been severely undermined, set back. The reason? Innumerable violations of the law. As we know, in recent times hundreds of people unjustly convicted have been acquitted. What we've seen is an attempt to stand above the law. But this is inadmissible, even out of the best intentions. As a result, there has been a new wave of mistrust for the lawkeeping organs, which in turn has paralyzed their work to a certain degree and led to an unprecedented outbreak of crime.

I feel that those who permitted violations of legality must answer for what has happened. Social justice demands it. Among them is Galkin, a former deputy public prosecutor for Fergana oblast, who sanctioned the arrest of and guilty verdict against twenty citizens who were subsequently acquitted. That is why I took the floor at the Congress.

[Correspondent] Did the Congress vindicate your hopes? How do you rate the actions of the republic deputies?

[Khusanov] I went to the Congress with a stack of concrete questions in hand. It was virtually impossible to give a speech. In the first place, too many wanted to, and

secondly, certain party leaders tried to dictate to the deputies to whom and about what they should speak. This caused friction inside the delegation, incomprehension. Through our collective efforts we were able to get Adyl Yakubov a chance to speak, which he did rather convincingly. We did not stop there, though. Twice the Uzbekistan delegation had appointments with Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov. We spoke about the low purchase prices for agricultural goods, about the social desolation in the villages, about the ominous ecological predicament in the Fergana valley. And the premier supported us, he's met us halfway. Since the government's intervention, the Novokokandskiy factory has been halted, the hydrolysis plant in Fergana reprofiled, new technology acquired for the Azot association, and prices raised on cotton and silk cocoons.

What did I come away with from our meetings with the head of the government? The conviction that our problems need to be posed more convincingly, more concretely. In my view, the republic government does not do this as decisively as it should. That is the only reason the situation at the Novokokandskiy factory went to such extremes: the solution of other persistent problems were laid out in a long box.

[Correspondent] The June tragedy occurred on the territory of your electoral okrug as well. How do you explain it, and might those events have been averted?

[Khusanov] Undoubtedly. But only under one condition. If the local authorities and the people had shared the same interests.

It was no secret to anyone in Fergana that the situation in Kuvasay, where the majority of the Turk-Meskhets resided, was extremely volatile. Local criminals were terrorizing the population, behaving insolently, degenerately. On 23 May the smoldering ashes of conflict ignited. This was when decisive intervention was needed, to cut off a future tragedy at the root. The authorities, however, chose the other, accustomed route. They concealed what had happened from the broad public and took no effective prophylactic measures. Why? Evidently not wanting to put themselves in an unadvantageous light before their higher-ups.

Another cause prodding the crowd to pogroms was something I've already spoken about: the disintegration of our legal consciousness. Take note: murderers, rapists, and troublemakers are predominantly quite young, first offenders. But this doesn't mean that they were law-abiding citizens. It was no great feat to derail them and draw them into crime.

[Correspondent] I know that at the Congress you addressed a deputies' inquiry to the public prosecutor of the USSR with respect to former Fergana public prosecutor Avaz Mukhtarov.

[Khusanov] During the election campaign I received a mandate from the voters to sort out the Mukhtarov story. In a series of articles—"On the Escalator of

Protection," "On that Side of the Answer," "But the 'Armor' Has Yet To Be Removed"—PRAVDA VOSTOKA related the conflict between Mukhtarov and the now former Kuvinskiy "furniture king" Ulikov. The latter, in order to "overthrow" the useless public prosecutor, framed him: he dumped 300 cans of nut butter as a bribe at the gates of Mukhtarov's house. The story got a widespread response, more than one commission was put to work, and a criminal case was even opened. The former first secretary of the oblast party committee (obkom), Umarov, who is now under arrest, did everything he could to shield Ulikov. Scandalous abuses were allowed with respect to Mukhtarov. The public prosecutor's house was even subjected to a search . . . by the obkom building department instructor.

At last, everything seemed to return to its rightful place. All charges against Mukhtarov were dropped—"for lack of a crime"—and Ulikov was removed from his job and expelled from the party, as were some of his relatives who had acquired party tickets through nepotism. However, Mukhtarov did suffer, being relieved of his duties as Fergana public prosecutor until the well-known events. And this was at a time when the oblast center needed a competent person capable of imposing order.

The public prosecutor of the country responded to my inquiry, recognizing that Fergana urgently needed a strong public prosecutor. But he did not repeal the order against Mukhtarov. I did not agree with the public prosecutor's arguments. In my opinion, he signed a reply—as still can happen—written by people who had looked into Mukhtarov's case but had not penetrated to the heart of the matter.

Thus Mukhtarov is now accused of using the office car to drive from Tashlak when he was working in Kuva. But what kind of "immodesty" is that if no buses travel that route? And how is he supposed to get home late at night? Furthermore—What's there to hide?—dozens of leaders who are sent from the oblast center to the rayons are forced to do the same thing. It's impossible to get an apartment there, and even if you do, then that can be considered an abuse, inasmuch as you already have a house. Either way, you lose.

Everything's fine as far as Mukhtarov and public prosecutor ethics go. After all, had he given cause then he would have been punished by the party as well. But that didn't happen. Today he's working as an assistant to the oblast public prosecutor, distinguished himself during the Fergana events, and was awarded a medal. The Ulikovs "distinguished" themselves as well: two of them were arrested for participating in the pogroms. Again they're on opposite sides of the barricades.

By the way, the Mukhtarov case is no exception. Dozens of former workers in the lawkeeping organs cannot get reinstated, although they're unsullied before the law. Among them is a former judge from Rishtan, Dzhu-maeva, who was slandered by a criminal.

[Correspondent] Coming up is the next Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR and the elections for the local Soviets. What tasks have you put at the top your list on the eve of these important public events?

[Khusanov] We have to continue to build a law-governed state. Only precise, tested, modern laws can protect perestroyka, direct the creative energy of the people into practical changes. We need to introduce clarity into the concepts of socialist property, union federation, republic sovereignty. We need to perfect the laws on state enterprises, cooperatives, public organizations.

Probably the upcoming elections will attract new masses of people into political life, something we can only welcome. There is no other path for the development of self-government. I expect much of the future deputies, who will bring with them a profound knowledge of life and a close connection with the voters and will become genuine defenders of their interests.

Former, Current Fergana Oblast Officials on Region's Problems

90US0094B Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
13 Sep 89 p 2

[Article by V. Berezovskiy: "Leaders: Appointed and Elected"]

[Text] Retirement

Former chairman of the Executive Committee of the Fergana Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies Kh. Madzhidov welcomed me into his home. He had obviously not been well; the doctors had made a diagnosis—nervous exhaustion. That is not surprising. A heavy load of responsibility had fallen on this man's shoulders. Under him the kray had been lashed by pogroms, arson, murder, thousands of refugees fleeing their homes and work. According to the testimony of those who worked with him, two days after the start of the disturbances Madzhikov was already admitting that he no longer had the moral right to remain in the post of chairman. He held on another month and a half, then submitted his resignation. I shall cite it in full: "Due to the radical decline in my health and the necessity of extended treatment, I ask the session of the oblast Congress to relieve me of my post as chairman of the Fergana Oblast Executive Committee. I express my profound gratitude to the deputies, to all Ferganans, for their collaborative work." On 12 August the session approved his request.

So here he sits under a grape arbor, dressed casually in sweatpants and a plain shirt, pouring tea and recalling how it all was:

"Before Fergana I headed up the Agriculture Department of the republic's Council of Ministers, I myself am from Tashkent, but for many years I worked in Karakal-pakiya, in the Golodnaya steppe. In the fall of 1985 I was called in by Usmankhodzhaev, who proposed I go to

Fergana as chairman of the obispolkom. My first question was: 'What, doesn't the oblast have cadres of its own?' The decisive factor was my experience with mechanized cotton picking, which needed to be introduced in Fergana. I set this as my main task. And also housing. I knew that housing was very limited in the oblast, especially in the villages.

"A year later had already made significant strides in mechanized picking. It did not come easily; we had to overcome years of conservatism among the economic, party, and council leaders. But the advances were evident. The lucerne fields expanded, and livestock raising became profitable. By the way, the oblast produces an average of 460-470 kilos of livestock, one of the leading republics.

"Much was resolved as far as housing went as well. In one of the kishlaks of the Lenin kolkhoz and old woman complained: 'For three years my son has been waiting for a plot near the house so that he can marry. I look and there's plenty of land in the yard going to waste, nothing's planted, nothing's built.' I told her: 'Okay ma, we'll help you with workers and materials. Build away!' She agreed. Then in many places we created special brigades, plots, enlisted everyone we could. If in 1985 124,000 square meters of living space were provided throughout the oblast, then three years later the number was already 526,000. The latest resolutions of the party and the government on this score speak to the fact that we were following the correct path.

"How did my work go? It was all very complicated. I knew the oblast only from one side—the agrarian. The people, traditions, problems—all that took me a long time to penetrate, reach, comprehend. Frankly, it took me three years. Only today can I say that I know Fergana. But now it's too late. I lost scads of time orienting myself, getting to know the cadres. Maybe that's why for the most part I was tied up with purely economic problems, which are closer to my level of competence than social issues. However, this was not only my problem. Up till very recently, Fergana had many 'outsider' leaders—two thirds of the obkom buro. We all had a decent grasp of general leadership principles, but we were at sea when it came to concrete, oblast-specific issues of economics, daily life, culture, and public life. We often ran into reefs, underwater rocks, and in the end we were simply cast ashore.

"I think we should put an to 'outsider' leaders once and for all. This tradition had its start in the first Five-Year Plan, when people were cast from kray to kray, from oblast to oblast in order to 'set things straight,' 'to introduce order,' 'to spread the load.' All this achieves is short-term successes. An incompetent outsider leader, in order to conceal sins, relies on throwing his weight around, driving out old cadres, and support from the center. It's been a long time since we've had a democratic mechanism of advancement for leaders. Who in Fergana, I might ask, knew me when I was selected chairman? Some boss. Nevertheless, I was voted in unanimously.

"Was I free in my decision making? Far from it most of the time. The real power is in the hands of the party apparatus, and I myself was even an apparatchik, a member of the obkom buro. Many of our decrees were issued jointly with the obkom. They never made it clear who exactly was responsible for what. Deputies' activity frequently depended on whether or not the executive committee would be able to incorporate them into their real work. That is, everything was upside down. That's why I was so often in contact with the raikom and gorkom first secretaries, trying to convince them rather than the deputies. Today I realize methods like that won't get you far. But at the time it was sometimes the only way out of a situation.

"The tragic events of June caught everyone unawares. No one had expected that scale of excess. I won't talk about the causes; their analysis lies ahead. I'll only say that the lawkeeping forces proved unprepared to deal with the disorders, which overflowed into a bacchanalia of pogroms. Naturally, I am the last person to disclaim any guilt. I was unable to use the authority given me to avert the disaster, to protect people from violence. I'm prepared to accept any punishment of a party nature, whatever it might be. But the pain I feel over what happened will probably stay with me to the end of my days.

"I was sincere in my expression of gratitude to all the deputies, all the Ferganans, for their collaboration. I myself will go back to Tashkent; here, in Fergana, remain children. Not everything I'd planned worked out. But I did the best I could. . . ."

I am a witness: this confession did not come easily to the former leader. I had the feeling that he had gone through quite a lot and thought it through before coming to these conclusions. In many ways he is being honest and fair. The exchairman's story is also valuable because it bares the mechanism of power in the command-administrative system, its distance from the realia of life. Who should be put at the head of the oblast Soviet? Usmankhodzhaev invited him, said he had to go . . . and that was it! The rest followed automatically given the regime.

It may be too late now, but Madzhidov recognized the fallaciousness of appointing leaders from the top. His retirement is a logical and necessary step. The former chairman realizes that in the new elections the voters will not give him a vote of confidence. Times have changed.

We are not going to judge Kh. Madzhidov harshly. Nor did the session of the oblast Soviet that relieved him of his duties, actually. He was leader in his own era, which was determined by a system of social relations that today we have put behind us. But his story deserves serious thought. If only so that it does not get repeated.

Program of Hope

That same day I met with the new ispolkom chairman, Gulam Fazylov. And first off I asked him whether he had wanted to take this post. His reply was unequivocal: yes.

It takes a good deal of civic courage and self-assurance to shoulder such a burden. Judging from everything, Fergana will be attracting heightened interest for a long time to come. How are the numerous problems of economics and ecology to be solved? Will the bonfire of nationality strife blaze up anew? It is up to the new head of the Soviet to respond to these difficult, often tortuous questions without making any allowances. On the contrary, the demand will be extraordinarily brutal. And not only from the top, as is usually the case.

For the first time in the republic the head of the Soviet has been chosen on an alternative basis. An "outsider" candidate's chances were virtually nil. Although, there turned out not to be any. Apart from Fazylov, Yu. Islamov, chairman of the oblast agricultural-industrial committee came out as a candidate. Both of them were locals, Ferganans, even the same age—53—and with remarkably similar biographies. Both started out in production, became active in the Komsomol, occupied posts in the Soviets and party committees. Their platforms, which were published in the local newspapers on the eve of the elections, covered a broad spectrum of problems and demonstrated that the candidates had a firm grasp of the situation and each saw their own ways out of the impasse.

By the way, platforms are a relatively new thing in our public practice. Frequently they're a mishmash of generalities, pledges, and ultra-loud pronouncements. Both Fazylov and Ismanlov avoided those defects. But the latter's platform was overloaded with numbers and self-promotion. Fazylov stressed the individual, orienting all problems toward the person, expounding his platform in clear, accessible language. Even at that stage sympathies were inclined in his direction.

The elections themselves, however, had their complications. The deputies of the oblast Soviet, who now found themselves in what was for them a new situation, occupied the heights. They showed detailed interest in the candidates. Opinions diverged. Most of Ismailov's votes came from the rural deputies; most of Fazylov's from the urban deputies. But Fazylov received the deciding edge of 26 votes because he had been working as a leader longer: he was the more familiar face, remembered especially for heading the Fergana gorkom. In addition, in his latest position as head of Ferganstroy, he was somewhat removed from the June tragedies. That, probably, also had an impact.

How does the new leader envision the kray's future?

"Although I'm actually more of an urban type, I do see that the roots of many of our problems lie in the village, where the dominant portion of the population resides and the social situation is most exacerbated. Cardinal measures are needed. We can no longer accept the enormous rift between town and country in our culture, in the level of work and of social welfare. By putting off

all these problems we are sabotaging our tomorrow. As if today weren't hard enough. There are 70,000 unemployed in the oblast, and 7,000 are needed in the plants, factories, and construction sites. There are chronic shortages in the local professional technical institute [PTU]. This is a very dangerous imbalance which, if not corrected, will lead to serious deformities in production and will generate negative political consequences. It is a twofold task: As the village develops, nurturing its potential, there must also be, simultaneously, educated, qualified specialists. We must improve the schools, which are in a disastrous state, medicine, the whole rural social infrastructure. That is what the program for the oblast's development requires. The country and the republic are meeting us halfway by sharply increasing capital investment. Dozens of new machine-building enterprises are going to be built. There are plans for increased output of consumer goods. We will be able to deal with this if we include, if we put in motion man's entire intellectual, spiritual, and professional potential. So far, unfortunately, that hasn't happened. There is a threat to the proposed shoe factories in Kokanda and Sokha, the textile factory in Margilana. Fergana, with its rich potential, is being subsidized for meat and milk, as before. Regional self-financing, which is not that far off, does not allow us the luxury of abstract discussions; rather it demands action, action, and more action.

The premier task is to return peace and calm to the inhabitants of Fergana after the June drama. One of its sources, I think, was the alienation of the organs of power from the people, the extreme underdevelopment of self-government. This must be overcome. The upcoming elections to the local Soviets will have much to contribute here. But to sit and wait with our hands folded is out of the question. We are going to support all public initiatives, movements, and trends toward consolidating forces, cohering, bringing people together. And to decisively cut off any extremist, provocative sallies. Here there can be no equivocation.

The problem of refugees is very disturbing today. Part of the Russian-speaking population is leaving the oblast in the aftermath of events. We have to stop people, turn back the wave of rumors and conjectures. Patience, tact, and respect for human dignity—we need these things no less and perhaps more, than the millions of rubles of capital investment.

In order to retrieve people's trust in authority, the local Soviets must radically restructure their work, must take public initiative in hand. We need more democracy, glasnost, and control. The last is essential. In my view, we are witnessing a decline in discipline and responsibility among leaders at all levels. The harmful habit of dumping everything on others, of shying away from independent decisions, remains. I'm a proponent of collectivity, but there has to be a leader in any matter.

Undoubtedly, it will be easier for Fazylov to work than it was for his predecessor. He knows the oblast and the

people well, and he himself is well known. But he also faces many "rapids," the first being the upcoming elections. In these few months left him, the new chairman must prove in practice his ability and leadership, must win the voters' confidence. I will not try to speculate as to Fazylov's fate.

One thing is clear. Having literally suffered alternative elections, Fergana will never, I believe, return to the past, to unanimous approval of candidates imposed from above. This is another one of the lessons of the June tragedy. It is also one more step down the road to the democratization of our life.

Legislation Needed for Dealing with Personnel Reductions

90US0356A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 23 Dec 89 p 2

[Article by O. Khvastunova: "Were you Fired or Cut from Work?"]

[Text] Young workers and women with children often ask themselves this question these days under the new system of management.

A street like any other street. To the right of us is a sealed fence of a dirty, unidentifiable color. In it is an access door without any markings but with a small window. To the left is a bar from which can be heard a merry hum and abusive language. Its exiting patrons are distinguished solely by their staggering gait.

"Couldn't we drop in and have a talk?" I nod towards the access door.

"I will not allow that young man past this door" Mikhail Il'ich Novikov snaps back. (The young man—Andrey Yeliseyev—remains silent and only makes an occasional shy attempt to object.) "I will let you enter, but I'll talk to him outside. I treated him like a son! And he let me down."

"Maybe he's still young." I look at Andrey.

He is twenty, but he looks to be sixteen, with his slender build and light hair.

"Look," says Mikhail Il'ich indignantly. "If ours were a cooperative for putting the methods of Makarenko into practice, we'd take him! But this is an industrial cooperative—we have to work here and earn money. Come in."

And with a theatrical gesture the chairman of the cooperative "Spurt" throws open the door before me.

The first thing I notice is that everyone is hard at work. Tidiness is unusual in factory work shops.

Only a year ago here there were industrial workshops of a research institute where sporting equipment was made. In the words of long-time residents, there was plenty of disorder. In May the institute relinquished its proprietorship. At that point the cooperative "Spurt" appeared here, and all of its workers became members.

Or not quite all. At first the drunkards were sacked. Then came the parasites and idlers. (This is Mikhail Il'ich's version—according to Andrey's version, anyone who did not suit the new management was sacked.)

"And how much sick time do you think he took?" Mikhail Il'ich inclines his head towards me with an air of confidentiality. "Do you think he was really sick? His father set him up at the hospital for two months... And we paid him for sick leave. What else can you do?"

And really, what does a cooperative (or for that matter, any establishment or enterprise that counts its money)

need with a worker who is sick for two months straight? Or with someone who does not want to leave when dismissed and who stands up for his rights, quoting the civil code by heart? This is the typical representative of those who are not our best young people, in Mikhail Il'ich's opinion.

They say that about fifteen years ago, when the upcoming five-year plan was being developed, a large reduction in personnel was proposed due to the scientific and technological revolution. The question arose: What will happen to these people? Indeed, the first to lose their jobs would be young people and women with children. And it will take a number of years to create new jobs. So they managed to do without the reductions.

And now we have exactly the same problems: the system of *khozraschet* [economic accountability] in enterprises gives rise to unemployment. Various figures are being quoted by economists on the projected rise in the number of unemployed: the numbers get up into the millions and even tens of millions. Already today the employment bureaus are only placing short-term employees in jobs. Those leaving jobs out of personal volition and particularly those who are frequently laid off are left to their own resources.

"But what can you do?" a certain factory director said to me privately. "When it came time to reduce our staff, the first to go were women with children and then the young people who still have to learn some sense. Am I supposed to leave them and let the strong workers go?"

"In our country we have no law defending the rights of citizens affected by personnel cutbacks," agreed V. Mishin, secretary of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions. "But one may emerge. We hope to direct a proposal to that effect to the Supreme Soviet. Last year we were able to place two million people in jobs, but how many more remain without work?"

...Andrey had waited patiently for me outdoors.

"Well, I guess they were saying some things about me. Even if they let me go now by my own volition, and not because of a violation of regulations, I still won't be able to get another job. Two dismissals in one year—who would want me?"

Andrey could be advised to go to the council of trade unions and have them declare the dismissal illegal and reinstate him at work. But even if he succeeds in being reinstated, he still will not last very long at the cooperative. The cooperative has the right to call a general meeting and dismiss Andrey once again.

"But they dismissed me unfairly" said Andrey angrily. "If you want, I'll summon my friend. He worked with me. He'll confirm that I'm not a lazy-bones! They want to let him go too—he's next in line after me."

Still, we are an amazing people. The affair with Andrey may strike some as routine and uninteresting. Hardly anyone will sympathize with a fellow who at the age of

twenty became unemployed. For many years in a row we have seen announcements on every factory entrance: "Needed:..." And we haven't noticed that these announcements are gradually disappearing, and that the number of unemployed Soviets has risen, actively increasing at the expense of our young people. We don't think about that; we are troubled by much more fascinating problems today. For example: What was Yeltsin doing late at night at government dachas? Or: Did NLO arrive at Voronezh? And is Kashpirovskiy a real wonder-drug? Unemployment is on the rise, but not only do we make no attempt to prevent it or to somehow lessen the blow—we are not even aware of it. We will probably only begin to think about it seriously when protest marches sweep through our cities, and leading them will be young people who at twenty years of age have found themselves of no use to our society.

I had one more conversation with Andrey. He called me about ten days after our first meeting.

"The trade union council I went to reinstated me at work. I went to work, and on the next day... I was cut.

Social Benefits for Former Camp Inmates

90US0343A Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA
INDUSTRIYA in Russian 20 Dec 89 p 4

[Article signed by the Editorial Board: "Privileges for Concentration Camp Prisoners"]

[Text] "When I was in my 20s, I was in the Salaspils concentration camp in Latvia. Recently I learned that there is a decree on privileges for former juvenile prisoners of the camps. I would like to know what these privileges are and how to get them." Signed, A. Smirnov.

The decree "On Granting Privileges to Former Underage Prisoners of Fascist Concentration Camps" was recently approved by the USSR Council of Ministers on the initiative of the Soviet Children's Fund (SDF) imeni V. I. Lenin. As the SDF reported to us, the decision on the right for these privileges is made on the basis of the document which confirms a person's tenure in a concentration camp by the commissions on setting pensions under the ispolkom of the local councils of People's Deputies.

Such documents may be registration cards of the ispolkom of the Union of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent Associations of the USSR, or certificates from the archives of museums of the former concentration camps, international anti-fascist organizations, boarding houses, People's Commissions of Education and People's Commissions of Public Health, extracts from the books of movement of wards of childrens' homes, certificates of international investigative services, written statements of witnesses, who were in the concentration camp together with the given person, and so on.

It often happens that a person does not have the necessary documents. To get them, one may apply at the

Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense, the ispolkom of the Union of the Red Cross and Red Crescent of the USSR associations, the Main Archive Authority under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, republic and local government archives, the Central State Historical Archive of the Latvian SSR in Riga, and the Military-Medical Museum of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR in Leningrad.

There are also two international addresses: State Museum-Archive of Osventsim (PNR, Osventsim) and the International Search Service of the Red Cross.

The privileges are as follows: Former juvenile prisoners of the concentration camps obtain the right to receive interest-free loans for individual living quarters, and members of horticultural societies for the construction of garden houses and for the improvement of garden plots. Once a year a round-trip passage by railroad is lowered to half price for them. Doctors' prescriptions will cost half as much. Once pensioned, they may make use of the clinics at which they were registered when working. At the place of work, former juvenile prisoners of concentration camps are given preference in providing authorizations, admittance to horticultural societies, and the installation of telephones. They may use regular annual leave at a time convenient for them, and they receive the right to supplementary leave.

People in the category of essential and uninterrupted work receive a 20 percent increase in old age pension for uninterrupted length of service at one enterprise, institution, or organization, irrespective of whether they worked on 1 January 1983 or later.

Invalids who are former under-age prisoners of concentration camps have the right to receive free prescription medicine. They and those who live with them pay half as much for heating, water, gas, and electricity. And likewise for an apartment. Surplus accommodations (up to 15 square meters) are paid for at a single rate. The manner of introducing these 50 percent reductions is determined by the Union Republic Councils of Ministers.

Youth Attraction to Prostitution Examined

90US0357A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in
Russian 17 Dec 89 Second Edition p 6

[Interview with A. Meliksetyan, scientific associate, USSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences by V. Strakhov: "Early Trouble"]

[Text] It was believed for a long time that our country does not have and cannot have prostitution. Alas... Since the problem exists, it has to be researched. We have such researchers in the scientific and research institute of the USSR Ministry of External Affairs and the Central Skin and Venereal Institute. Journalists have no access so far to the materials at the disposal of the scholars. It turned out that the only "unclassified" scholar in this line was A. Meliksetyan (candidate of pedagogical sciences),

senior scientific associate of the scientific and research institute of the physiology of children and teenagers under the USSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences. Aleksandr Sergeyevich is our interviewee.

[Correspondent] Why are you, a professional pedagogue, dealing with this problem?

[Meliksetyan] Miscalculations, pedagogical, social, economic and other mistakes have a deleterious impact on the molding of children's characters, their outlook and, as a result, their behavior. Now virtually everybody is alarmed - crime is growing among those under age. Venereal diseases have become more frequent, and AIDS is not far away. I do not think that under these circumstances teachers should remain on the sidelines and blame others for their mistakes.

[Correspondent] What are the results of your research?

[Meliksetyan] I studied a number of aspects of the amoral and unlawful behavior of those under age in the Leninskiy rayon of Moscow. This is a central and densely populated area. Suffice it to say, it includes Arbat lanes and Luzhniki. Hundreds of young people gravitate here every day, coming from all parts of the capital. The rayon has quite a few hotels, including those for foreign tourists.

We conducted an anonymous opinion poll in all the schools in the rayon. A separate group of questions dealt with sexual relations and sex education. The schoolchildren's answers cannot be taken as an absolute truth of course - some of them preferred to keep silent about their "adventures," while others, on the contrary, boasted about them. But we did not limit ourselves to questionnaires alone. The skin-venereal and the narcological out-patient clinics, women's consultation offices and a maternity home in the rayon became part of a special study.

The results of the analysis came as a shock. Very few schoolchildren said in the questionnaire that they suffered from venereal diseases. But here is what statistics say. The number of VD patients among the city's schoolchildren trebled between 1982 and 1988. About one a half thousand abortions have been registered among those under age, with four girls being under 14.

Such statistics are irregular unfortunately. According to the women's consultation office No. 12 in the Leninskiy rayon of the capital, the number of abortions done to the under age increased by 25 percent in 1988 over 1987, while the number of under age girls giving birth went up by 50 percent.

All this testifies to an extremely unfavorable situation.

[Correspondent] You wrote the book "Prostitution: Yesterday, Today...Tomorrow?" Is the question mark an affirmation or a doubt?

[Meliksetyan] I studied a heap of materials while I was writing a book. And here is my conclusion. Prostitution

is one of the tips of the iceberg. Among others I would name drug addiction, alcoholism, crime...They put a heavy burden on our society taken together. Prostitution should be fought and studied comprehensively, up to referring to historical examples. I often say that there is no theory without history and there is no idea about the subject in question without theory.

Unfortunately, we do have social roots of prostitution. Let turn to history. Poverty, dislocation and hunger were such roots in the early 1920s for example. What about today? They are attributed to a large extent to the violation of the principle of social justice. Women are placed in such a situation when material demands have increased dramatically, while the opportunities to satisfy them are nil, taking into account bare store shelves.

Young people's growing aspirocity is another serious cause. I cannot but quote one of the students answering our questions about his relationship with his parents. "I wish I did not have them at all." Many schoolchildren react to morale as to a didactic conclusion in a fable.

Some schoolchildren named prostitution as the most prestigious profession. I have to make a reservation outright that they all mean the so-called "inter-girls" [prostitutes sleeping with foreigners]. Those who start a relationship with foreigners and get dollars or pounds from them use the foreign word "putana" to describe themselves, although this means just an ordinary slut. But far from everyone become a "putana". The prostitutes have a gradation of their own, down to those working railway stations. "Putanas" themselves take a back seat after they reach 30 to increase the number of those hanging around railroad stations.

Among other reasons I would name envy, intolerance to seeing somebody live better than yourself. According to the experts, about one third of the prostitutes are mentally ill. They do not understand the pernicious effect of their trade. This contingent is the most prone to contracting VD or AIDS.

[Correspondent] Many readers suggest in this connection that prostitutes be taken to court, isolated from society and settled down in some faraway places.

[Meliksetyan] I do not agree. The problem cannot be solved through criminal justice, although administrative justice should exist. But how can it be applied if legislation has not defined prostitution yet? Representatives of the oldest profession get off the hook by paying very small fines to the officers of internal affairs.

Prostitution is an ailment of the entire society. One should combat the causes that gave rise to it, and not its consequences, the way militia and medical workers are doing now.

Here we have just approached the problem of sex education which I deal with. Broadly speaking, it should

start with the adults, although this may sound strange. Many parents are absolutely ignorant in these matters. What can a mother teach her daughter if she answered unperturbed her daughter's question "Why didn't Tatyana Larina marry Onegin?" by saying: "Her husband was a general, stupid".

It is my profound conviction that a special Family Institute should be established. We have the Childhood

Institute already, but this is not enough. We need a similar one for teenagers and young people.

The entire gamut of family problems should be studied having in mind its different aspects - historical, national, psychological, economic, ethical and aesthetical. The main thing is that the problem of prostitution will be solved only in combination with making our society healthier and, along with that, acquiring spirituality.

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